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ABSTRACT 
In this inquiry I focus on the philosophical framework that could guide educational programmes 
seeking the moral empowerment of students—the systematic development of the capacity to 
pursue their own intellectual and spiritual growth and to engage actively in the long-term 
transformation of their communities, two inseparable aspects of a twofold purpose. Moral 
empowerment, it is proposed, cannot be achieved by raising political consciousness alone or by 
pursuing moral education as activity isolated from other components of the overall curriculum. 
The iterative process through which the individual and the environment are transformed is in 
need of the full force of knowledge. 
The inquiry draws on the experience of Fundacion para la Aplicacion y Ensenanza de las 
Ciencias, FUNDAEC, a Band'i inspired organization in Colombia, in order to identify the essential 
elements of the evolving conceptual framework under consideration. Nurturing understanding is 
argued to be central to the desired educational process, necessitating a critical examination of the 
`subject' and the 'object' of understanding, and how the 'process of understanding' is shaped by 
them. Nurturing understanding must go hand in hand with the development of a number of 
spiritual qualities. For this to be achieved, the historical view holding science and religion in 
opposition should give way to the perspective that they are two complementary systems of 
knowledge and practice. The integration of knowledge into the content of the teaching-learning 
experience demands that sharp division between the cognitive and the motivational, between 
reason and faith, be avoided. The concept of 'capability' discussed in relation to both being and 
doing, is presented as an effective strategy for this purpose, with the potential to overcome 
certain dichotomies prevalent in educational thought and practice. 
3 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE 	 6 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 	 8 
BACKGROUND 	 8 
THE AIM OF THE INQUIRY 	 10 
GENERATING PREMISES 	 11 
OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT 	 16 
CHAPTER 1: MORAL EMPOWERMENT 	 18 
ESSENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS 	 18 
CONCEPTIONS OF POWER IN POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT 	 21 
SEARCH FOR AN EXPANDED CONCEPT OF POWER 	 26 
KNOWLEDGE AND VIRTUE 
	 30 
CHAPTER 2: THE SUBJECT OF UNDERSTANDING 	 36 
UNDERSTANDING 	 36 
COMPUTATIONAL AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF COGNITION 
	 40 
EXCESSIVE SUBJECTIVISM 	 43 
CHAPTER 3: NURTURING UNDERSTANDING AND FOSTERING SPIRITUAL QUALITIES 
	 49 
NURTURING UNDERSTANDING 	 50 
VIRTUES AND PRACTICE 
	 52 
FOSTERING SPIRITUAL QUALITIES 	 59 
CHAPTER 4: OBJECT OF UNDERSTANDING: THE CONTEXT 	 68 
CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL REALITY 	 70 
POSITIONING THE SUBJECT OF UNDERSTANDING 	 73 
FRAGMENTATION 	 78 
THOUGHT AND REALITY 	 82 
CHAPTER 5: COMPLEMENTARITY 	 86 
THE MODERNIZATION PROJECT 	 88 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 	 92 
MOVING BEYOND THE DICHOTOMY OF FAITH AND REASON 
	 96 
PROCESSES AND METHODS IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
	 99 
COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 	 104 
COMPLEMENTARITY IN CONVICTION AND ACTION 
	 106 
COMPLEMENTARITY OF LANGUAGES 
	 109 
CHAPTER 6: INTEGRATION 	 116 
DISTINCT AND INTERRELATED: A DEFENCE OF FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 
	 119 
CRITERIA FOR CURRICULAR INTEGRATION 
	 122 
VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE 
	 134 
THOUGHT AND ACTION 
	 137 
CHAPTER 7: CAPABILITIES 
	 140 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 
	 142 
AGENCY 	 147 
CAPABILITY 	 148 
BUILDING CAPACITY 
	 151 
CHAPTER 8: PEDOGOGICAL CHOICES 
	 161 
BANKING EDUCATION AND PROBLEM POSING 	 163 
4 
THE LOGICAL ORDER AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD 	 170 
CHAPTER 9: CONTINUITY OF THOUGHT, LANGUAGE, ACTION 	 180 
ONENESS OF HEART AND MIND 	 183 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COLLECTIVE 
	 188 
CONCLUSION 	 194 
APPENDIX 1 	 198 
APPENDIX 2 	 201 
APPENDIX 3 	 219 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 	 222 
5 
PREFACE 
I first became aware of the work of the Fundacion para la Aplicacion y Ensefianza de las 
Ciencias (FUNDAEC) in early 1990s when I was teaching at the School of Nations in Macau. The 
school had been created to impart 'quality education', offering an internationally recognized 
academic curriculum and infusing it with the spiritual teachings of the Band'i Faith. It was clear 
to us at the time that there was no such thing as `Baha'i education', but, like educators working 
in other `113aha'i Schools' around the world, we were trying to achieve coherence between our 
educational endeavours and our religious convictions. Ours was a fragmented approach, adding a 
few classes on moral education based on Band'i principles to standard curricula in English and 
Chinese; integrating diverse elements in a meaningful way was proving to be a difficult challenge. 
The path being explored by FUNDAEC seemed to offer us an attractive alternative. Its founders 
were making a distinction between religious education and what later came to be called `Band'i-
inspired' education. They were investigating a broad set of questions related to the empowerment 
of youth to contribute to the development of their communities within a vision of spiritual and 
material civilization rooted in the Band'i teachings. For those of us who closely examined 
FUNDAEC'S approach, it soon became clear that it was not suggesting adherence to one or another 
educational theory and practice. FUNDAEC was engaged in the kind of social action that 
incorporates profound philosophical reflection in its activity; it was consciously seeking the 
elements of a new conceptual framework at least for what it was calling 'education for 
development'. This deepened my interest in philosophy of education, leading me soon to formal 
studies in the philosophy of Chinese education in Beijing Normal University  
In 2002, I joined the Office of Social and Economic Development (OSED) at the Band'i World 
Centre and, consequently, became more involved in the work of FUNDAEC. OSED functions as a 
global learning agency, systemizing the knowledge being generated in diverse endeavours in the 
field of social and economic development and disseminating the results among Band'i 
communities. It has followed the work of FUNDAEC over the years and has drawn on its ideas to 
advance a discourse on education in which a growing number of organizations are participating. 
In recent years, it has supported several such organizations to implement some of FUNDAEC'S 
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programmes. My intention to explore the philosophical framework of Band'i-inspired education 
has, as a result, acquired a degree of urgency. 
My course of study at the Institute of Education since 2007 has given me the opportunity to 
pursue a personal interest, which is, at the same time, of vital importance to the work of OSED. 
Under the invaluable guidance of Graham Haydon and Jan Derry, to whom I feel deeply 
indebted, I have been able to look for insights in relevant literature that would help me describe 
possible elements of the framework gradually evolving through the work of Band'i-inspired 
organizations with the encouragement of OSED and the help of FUNDAEC. The educational 
material elaborated by FUNDAEC and the documents it has written about its experience, visits to 
agencies in Africa, Asia and Latin America implementing some of its programmes, and 
participation in meetings of representatives from these agencies allowed me to put together an 
account of FUNDAEC's approach to moral empowerment. Frequent conversations with two of its 
founders, Farzam Arbab and Gustavo Correa, helped me find answers to questions that were not 
treated explicitly in the available material, and I would like to express my gratitude for their 
assistance. 
Two challenges were bound to present themselves in this inquiry. The first was to avoid turning 
the inquiry into a means for defending my religious convictions. The content of the thesis, I hope, 
shows that I have met this challenge with reasonable success. The second challenge is more 
subtle. The objective of the thesis is to identify a set of concepts emerging from FUNDAEC's work, 
examine them from the perspective of various authors and reach conclusions that would enable 
me to elaborate elements of a philosophical framework for an educational process that seeks the 
moral empowerment of its students. But given the nature of the task, it was inevitable to analyse 
the relevant literature, at least to some extent, from FUNDAEC's perspective. Despite this fact, I 
believe, my arguments are largely formulated according to the original objective. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
Background 
The Bahal Faith is the youngest of the world's independent religions. It was born in Iran in the 
middle of the nineteenth century and its spiritual and administrative centre, subsequent to the 
successive banishments of its Founder, Band'u'llah, was established in the Holy Land, in the 
twin cities of Haifa and 'Akka. 
The Band'i Faith does not see itself as one more religious system superimposed on the conflicting 
creeds that divide humankind, but rather as a restatement of the eternal verities underlying all the 
religions of the past. It upholds the unity of God, recognizes the unity of His Prophets, and 
inculcates the principle of the oneness and wholeness of the entire human race (Effendi, 1947). 
The fundamental principle enunciated by Band'u'llah is that religious truth is not absolute but 
relative, and that Divine Revelation is progressive (ibid.). Band'is—constituting a worldwide 
community of some five million representing most of the nations, races and cultures on earth—
believe that the unification of humankind is inevitable, although the path to its realization is 
tortuous. Among the principles they espouse are unfettered search after truth, the abolition of 
prejudice and superstition, the harmony of science and religion, the equality of rights and 
opportunities for women and men, and the elimination of extremes of wealth and poverty. 
Band'i experience in the field of development stretches back to the beginnings of the Faith in Iran. 
In that country, the community of adherents was able, in just a few generations, to advance from 
a population consisting largely of illiterate villagers to one whose members were in the forefront 
of many endeavours. By 1973, for example, Iranian Band'is had achieved a 100 percent literacy 
rate among women followers under the age of 40, in contrast to a national literacy rate among 
women of less than 20 percent (Office of Social and Economic Development, 2008). The Bahal 
community's involvement in social and economic development entered a new stage in the early 
1980s, chiefly as a result of a substantial increase in the Bahal population of many nations. 
Band'i Development endeavours in villages and towns throughout the world often begin as 
simple grassroots initiatives to address some of the challenges faced by local communities 
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through a process of action and reflection that relies on insights drawn from the spiritual and 
social teachings of the Band'i Faith. Several hundred substantial projects have already emerged 
from thousands of grassroots initiatives, often in collaboration with governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Most of these are in the field of education, primarily academic 
schools; a smaller number have grown in complexity over time and developed elaborate 
organizational structures. 
One agency which has dedicated its resources over a few decades to search for educational 
content and methods inspired by Band'i teachings is the Fundacion para la Aplicacion y 
Ensenanza de las Ciencias—FUNDAEC. It was founded in 1974 by a group of scientists and 
professionals trying to understand the role of science, technology and education in the social and 
economic development of a micro-region, initially around the city of Cali in Colombia. 
FUNDAEC has expressed its primary aim as the creation of a social space for specific populations 
in which they could actively engage in learning about their own path of development. The name 
given to this social space is University for Integral Development. With this vision FUNDAEC 
dedicated the first decade of its existence to research and action on the different processes of 
community life, assisting various groups in the aforementioned micro-region to participate in the 
generation, application and diffusion of knowledge to improve each process. While some of the 
processes of individual, family and community life are not directly related to education, 
analyzing the chain of daily activities involved in each and the factors determining its 
unfoldment generated a body of knowledge that was progressively incorporated into educational 
materials, principally for youth. For example, examining the chain of activities related to the 
production of crops and animal husbandry gave rise to participative research on alternative 
systems of production on small farms. Similar research and action was carried out in areas of 
health, formal education, socialization, community organization, local economies, environment 
and appropriate technology. A set of some eighty textbooks based on this experience were 
prepared constituting the core of a curriculum for secondary education that, in the ensuing two 
decades, reached tens of thousands of students in several Latin American countries. The 
secondary school programme became known as Sistema de Aprendizaje Tutorial (SAT); to make 
its large scale implementation possible, two other programmes were also developed, one for the 
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training of secondary school teachers and the other for raising human resources with competence 
at the Masters level. In recent years, FUNDAEC has focused on a revised portion of the SAT 
curriculum to create a programme for the training of 'Promoters of Community Well-Being', 
which is now being adopted by a growing number of organizations in Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific. 
The Aim of the Inquiry 
The intention of my thesis is to help advance the discourse of the growing number of groups and 
organizations around the world engaged in educational processes that have come to be 
designated as `Band'i inspired'. To do so, I first identify a number of key concepts that can be 
considered crucial elements of an evolving framework for the educational processes in question. 
The Band'i teachings themselves, of course, do not include what might be called educational 
theory, or for that matter, a structured educational philosophy. I could use them as a primary 
source for the identification of key concepts by carrying out my own particular reading of Band'i 
text. But that is not the approach I adopt; this choice, among other things, allows me to steer 
away from apologetics. The other source available to me is the fledgling discourse of Band'i-
inspired educational endeavours. However, the capacity to go beyond the expression of ideals 
and make theoretical contributions has been, in general, slow to develop. Most groups are 
engaged in offering educational services based on one or another prevalent theory with some 
reference to such principles as the unity of humankind, the equality of men and women and the 
harmony between science and religion. A notable exception is FUNDAEC, whose experience 
necessarily becomes a major source in which elements of the framework being sought can be 
found, although in most cases they are not adequately elaborated. The founders of FUNDAEC 
were aware from the beginning that they would not be defining the framework for Band'i-
inspired education. All they hoped to do was to take a few steps in the desired direction and 
initiate a process of action, reflection and research that would lead to the creation of a framework 
and the corresponding educational programmes in a series of approximations. The field of 
education, they believed, has been subject to too many theoretical fads. While the succession of 
theories that have achieved temporary prominence during the past decades have contributed to 
progress, much more can be achieved through systematic action—well informed by a diversity of 
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pedagogical perspectives—accompanied by profound reflection within an evolving conceptual 
framework. 
That I refer to FUNDAEC often throughout the thesis does not make it the sole focus of my 
attention; my hope, too, is that the ideas being explored here can help those involved in Band'i-
inspired endeavours to achieve greater coherence as they strive to translate their ideals into 
effective educational programmes. Emphasis is on the gradual development of a framework for 
action to which an increasing number of groups can contribute, arising from experience and 
reflection—two ingredients of any endeavour to tackle philosophical problems. Naturally, I 
intend to make some contribution, no matter how small, to the discussion of certain themes in the 
general discourse on education as well. 
The several key concepts that are identified and discussed throughout the thesis as possible 
elements of an evolving framework for educational processes inspired by the Baha'i teachings 
have not been subjected to much philosophical scrutiny to date. The main task of this thesis, then, 
is to search the relevant philosophical literature, to examine the concepts in question in that 
context, and to find ways to elaborate them in a language that lends itself to philosophical 
exploration. By its very nature, this task involves reference to several authors rather than an 
exhaustive treatment of the works of one or two. While a sufficiently deep understanding of the 
work of each author is required, the aim is not to treat his or her arguments comprehensively, but 
more to use insights gained from them to elaborate, to a reasonable extent, the key elements of 
the conceptual framework under consideration. 
Generating Premises 
The term `Band'i inspired' is in need of some clarification: The educational efforts thus 
designated do not include religious instruction. Like followers of other religions, Band'is, too, 
engage in the study of the history of their faith, its laws, principles and tenets. These are not, 
however, the topics addressed in the kind of programmes with which I am concerned. Nor is the 
object of study individual and social codes of conduct 'inspired' by the teachings of the Faith—a 
Band'i version of moral education. 'Inspiration' in this case refers to the framework of thought 
and action within which educational experience unfolds, a framework that, as already mentioned, 
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is to be continually elaborated and refined. Programmes are expected to develop through a 
dynamic process of action and reflection on action, which is well informed of various theories 
and practices in the field of education and is in conscious interaction with these practices. In fact, 
those involved in such endeavours are not exclusively Baha'is but like-minded individuals who 
agree on the fundamental elements of the evolving conceptual framework. 
At the heart of the framework under consideration is the concept of moral empowerment. A brief 
examination of the genesis of the concept as used by FUNDAEC—sometimes denoting the 
principal aim of the educational process it proposes and sometimes referring to the process 
itself—seems necessary in this introduction. Discussions with individuals who have played 
crucial roles in the creation of FUNDAEC underscore the importance of two interrelated sets of 
Band'i teachings that gradually led them to their conception of moral empowerment. The first 
has to do with the principle of the oneness of humankind and the second with the evolution of 
human society. 
The oneness of humankind is the central principle of the Band'i Faith and the pivot around which 
all its other teachings revolve. The widespread acceptance of this principle, Baha.'is believe, is 
indispensable if humanity is to overcome its present formidable challenges. Oneness, they are 
quick to point out, does not imply uniformity; on the contrary, it should bring to mind the image 
of a garden in which the diversity of colours and shapes increases its beauty. Yet, with all the 
diversity, the flowers are "refreshed by the waters of one spring, revived by the breath of one 
wind," and "invigorated by the rays of one sun" (Baha.'i World Centre, 1978, p. 290). At the 
same time, "the consciousness of the oneness of humankind" should not be construed as "a mere 
outburst of ignorant emotionalism" or "an expression of vague and pious hope" (Effendi, 1974, p. 
42). The principle while requiring the recognition of the gains humanity has made in building 
harmonious relationships, both interpersonal and collective, cannot be "merely identified with a 
reawakening of the spirit of brotherhood and good-will among men" (ibid.). It is "applicable not 
only to the individual, but concerns itself primarily with the nature of those essential 
relationships that must bind all the states and nations as members of one human family" (ibid.). It 
envisions a world "organically unified in all the essential aspects of its life, its political 
machinery, its spiritual aspiration, its trade and finance", without stifling "the flame of a sane and 
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intelligent patriotism in men's hearts", abolishing "the system of national autonomy so essential 
if the evils of excessive centralization are to be avoided", or suppressing "the diversity of 
ethnical origins, of climate, of history, of language and tradition, of thought and habit, that 
differentiate the peoples and nations of the world". It calls for a "wider loyalty" and implies "an 
organic change in the structure of present-day society, a change such as the world has not yet 
experienced" (ibid.). 
As to the evolution of society, Band'i teachings suggest that humanity's collective life can be 
seen in terms of stages analogous to the different phases in the life of a human being: infancy, 
childhood, adolescence and maturity. This analogy, Band'is believe, captures "the millennia-long 
process that has carried humanity to this culminating point in its collective history" (Band'i 
World Centre, 2001, p. 50), the beginning of its passage to maturity. Accordingly, the agitations 
of today's society are understood as the necessary manifestations of an age of transition. Each 
period in the biological, cognitive and emotional life of the individual is marked by certain 
conditions characteristic of a particular degree of intelligence and capacity, and entering a new 
phase requires advances that supersede former conditions and needs. It is envisioned that the 
transformation called for in the nature of social relations and social structures in this stage of 
transition are as profound as the transformation that marks the passage from adolescence to 
maturity. In this light, the destructive and constructive forces operating in the world today are 
associated with parallel processes of disintegration and integration of a society in rapid 
transformation, and are interpreted as forces that are simultaneously compelling humanity to 
abandon the habits of childhood and to adopt ways that are commensurate with its approaching 
maturity. It is important to note that, for Band'is, such a view of history does not imply an 
ideology and a political programme that would force the appearance of a mature humanity. They 
are well aware that ideologies based on deterministic visions of history have caused havoc in the 
world during the twentieth century. That humanity undergoes a process of maturation is a 
conviction that influences thought and behaviour as would the knowledge that a growing tree has 
the potential to bring forth luscious fruits if it receives the necessary light, nutrients and water. It 
is in the makeup of a child to become an adult, and the consciousness of such a potential is 
indispensable particularly during the turbulent age of adolescence. 
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Everything seems to indicate that the interplay of the two sets of teachings stated above—on the 
oneness of humankind and on the evolution of society—created in the minds of the founders of 
FUNDAEC the conception of a telos: a twofold moral purpose of personal transformation—the 
becoming "imbued with new virtues and powers, new moralities, new capacities" (Band'i 
Publishing Trust, 1972, p. 9)—and of the transformation of society. The aim of the educational 
process, at least the one for preparing promoters of community well-being in a programme 
equivalent to secondary education and another for the training of the corresponding secondary 
school teachers, was thus expressed as the empowerment of the individual to assume 
responsibility for developing those virtues and powers required of her as a member of a human 
race now entering its age of maturity, on the one hand, and of consciously contributing to organic 
change in the structures of society, on the other. The term 'moral empowerment' is to 
encapsulate the enabling educational process implied by this aim. Moral empowerment is the 
topic of the first chapter of this thesis, but one consideration that seems to have given direction to 
FUNDAEC'S line of reasoning in adopting such an aim should be mentioned here. 
History, both past and contemporary, offers examples of how religious teachings are re-
interpreted by certain groups in order to focus them on the problems of society at a given time. 
Liberation theology, already in full bloom in Latin America in the years FUNDAEC was being 
formed, is a good example of this phenomenon in the Christian Faith. The nature of the Band'i 
Faith and its organization is such that its followers have not felt the need for such alternative 
readings. However, those who join the worldwide community do characterize the various 
mindsets through which religion in general is experienced. The pathways to a central religious 
experience represented by these mindsets have been explored by students of religion and include 
ritualism, legalism, evangelism, social reform and mysticism. Aware of these tendencies that 
have in fact caused many a division in most religions, the Band'i community tries to create a 
particular balance among the various aspects of the teachings it espouses. How to achieve the 
`right balance' between the mystical, moral, administrative and social teachings of their Faith is 
an ongoing theme of discussion. For the founders of FUNDAEC who were active participants in 
such discussions, constant endeavour by members of the community not to function in an inward 
looking congregational mode in which religion would be treated as "a series of beliefs, a set of 
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customs" (Band'i World Centre, 1978, p. 52)1 or one in which the focus would be on the mere 
acknowledgement of belief and a virtuous life concerned with one's own affairs, was a moral 
obligation. 
The Band'i teachings that inspire FUNDAEC and other educational programmes being considered 
here, then, are to a great extent on the theme of 'civilization building' and the indispensable role 
individuals, communities and social institutions play in propelling the advancement of 
civilization. The intimate relationship between the two dimensions of the moral purpose—seen 
in the context of the gradual emergence of a world civilization that embraces both the spiritual 
and material dimensions of human existence—is to be considered a fundamental element of the 
philosophical framework of these programmes. As FUNDAEC puts it, a profound awareness of the 
reciprocal relationship between personal growth and organic change in the structures of society 
is essential to social action. One develops virtues not in isolation, but through activity for the 
benefit of others: 
To focus one's sense of purpose only on the development of one's own potential is to 
lose objectivity and perspective. With no outside interactions and social goals, one has no 
standard by which to judge personal progress and no concrete results by which to 
measure one's development. A person forgetful of the social dimension of moral purpose 
is prone to subtle forms of ego—combinations of guilt, self-righteousness, and self-
satisfaction. (FUNDAEC, 2006, p. 13) 
Conversely, a sense of purpose driven only by the desire to transform society can easily become 
distorted. By focusing exclusively on change of structure, one can lose sight of one's own 
spiritual and moral development, and overlook respect and compassion for others. The door is 
then open to cruelty and oppression as long as they serve the higher purpose of social and 
political transformation. "Social Action, then, must transcend the limitations of unfettered 
individualism and of suffocating collectivism and direct energies towards a balanced approach to 
personal and collective transformation—complementary dimensions of a single process" (ibid.). 
This is an extract from the following statement of `Abdu'l-Baha : "Religion, moreover, is not a series of beliefs, a set of 
customs; religion is the teachings of the Lord God, teachings which constitute the very life of humankind, which urge high 
thoughts upon the mind, refine the character, and lay the groundwork for man's everlasting honour" (Band'i World Centre, 1978, 
p. 52). 
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This formulation of the complementarity between the individual and collective dimensions of a 
moral purpose resonates with a passage written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi, the implications of 
which are discussed in a number of places in this thesis: 
We cannot segregate the human heart from the environment outside us and say that once 
one of these is reformed everything will be improved. Man is organic with the world. His 
inner life moulds the environment and is itself deeply affected by it. The one acts upon 
the other and every abiding change in the life of man is the result of these mutual 
reactions. (Band'i Publications Australia, 1990, p. 84) 
Outline of the Argument 
The introductory remarks above on the Band'i community's involvement in social and economic 
development of peoples, on the approach adopted in the present exploration of a conceptual 
framework that would inform educational programmes seeking moral empowerment and on the 
nature of religious beliefs that would inspire certain organizations to work within such a 
framework, pave the way for an analysis in chapter 1 of the notion of moral empowerment and 
the identification of a series of concepts to be examined in subsequent chapters. Understanding 
emerges as an essential element of the framework under consideration and the theme runs 
through the entire thesis. In chapter 2, search for desired characteristics of the 'subject of 
understanding', the protagonist of moral empowerment, is undertaken through a critical 
examination of Bruner's computational and cultural accounts of cognition, on the one hand, and 
in light of Alasdair MacIntyre's analysis of emotivist self and arguments against extreme 
subjectivism, on the other. The discussion of understanding is further developed in chapter 3 by 
considering its infinite dimension both as a process in which one may systematically advance 
and as an attribute of the human soul with its endless potentialities. A brief analysis of 
Maclntyre's account of virtues embedded in practice helps clarify the concept of 'spiritual 
qualities', which together with understanding are viewed as permanent constituents of being. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that fostering understanding and nurturing spiritual qualities should 
be considered inseparable aims in an educational process concerned with moral empowerment. 
In chapter 4, the exploration of the 'object of understanding' in its most general sense—physical, 
social and spiritual reality—is undertaken. Drawing on insights from John R. Searle, Thomas 
Nagel and John McDowell, as well as attempts by FUNDAEC to deal with the problem of 
fragmentation in education, significant connections between the subject, the object and the 
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process of understanding are made explicit. Focus is then shifted in chapter 5 to an argument in 
favour of the complementarity of science and religion as two sources of knowledge, in which 
specific objects of understanding are to be sought. Chapter 6 deals with the question of 
integration, first at the level of knowledge—drawing on Paul Hirst's theory of forms of 
knowledge and his later views on the priority of practical knowledge—then at the level of values 
inherent in knowledge, and finally through a brief presentation of the inseparability of thought 
and action. Chapter 7 is dedicated to the examination of the concept of capability, both an 
element of Amartya Sen's conception of development as freedom and a fundamental element of 
FUNDAEC'S pedagogical approach to moral empowerment. Chapter 8 takes further the notion of 
capability by examining its relevance to pedagogical choices, specifically its usefulness as an 
integrating strategy to overcome certain deeply rooted dichotomies in education. Finally, 
focusing on capabilities that bear directly on moral issues, the question of continuity between 
thought, language and action is addressed in chapter 9 with particular attention to the oneness of 
heart and mind, and the interplay between the individual and the collective. 
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CHAPTER 1: MORAL EMPOWERMENT 
In the introductory remarks reference was made to moral empowerment, a term signifying both 
the process and the goal of educational programmes that seek to enable students to take charge of 
their own intellectual and moral growth and to contribute to the transformation of society. While 
the entire thesis is dedicated to this theme, a preliminary analysis of the concept, its meaning and 
application, seems necessary as a first step. Since the transformation in question is perceived in 
the context of humanity's transition from childhood to maturity, I begin this analysis with a brief 
description in the first section of the nature of certain relationships fundamental to human 
existence, suggesting that transition to maturity is marked by the profound transformation they 
will necessarily undergo. This, I argue, entails a willingness to go beyond narrow conceptions of 
power. In the section that follows, I undertake a quick examination of certain views of power and 
of the corresponding educational approaches seeking political empowerment. The limitations of 
the political dimensions of power, identified in that section, sets me on a search for an expanded 
notion of power on which educational processes concerned with moral empowerment could draw. 
With insights emerging from this discussion in the background, I then introduce a series of 
concepts to be elaborated in subsequent chapters as key elements of the conceptual framework 
being explored. 
Essential Relationships 
Being impelled by a twofold purpose to pursue one's own intellectual and spiritual growth and to 
contribute at the same time to the transformation of society does not imply tension between the 
two; they are two interwoven aspects of one necessary and inevitable movement. What is 
proposed here is that advancing in both implies change in those essential relationships that define 
human existence—among individuals and groups, between the individual, community and 
institutions of society, and between these and the natural environment. Any search for the 
content and methods of Baha'i-inspired educational programmes must address, not infrequently, 
three interrelated questions: What will these relationships be like once humanity has entered its 
age of maturity? What is the nature of the changes that will occur in these relationships as the 
transition from childhood to maturity advances through successive stages? And what kind of 
educational activities will enable the student to participate in transformative processes at any 
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given stage? None of the three questions have immediate answers; a long process of research, 
action and reflection, all carried out within a philosophical framework which itself must evolve, 
can shed light on the issues at hand as an effective pedagogy is gradually developed. 
What can be argued with relative ease at this point is that the principle of the oneness of 
humankind gives direction to this age of transition and offers insights into the nature of the 
changes that must occur in each of the above-mentioned relationships. An example from the 
Band'i teachings illustrates this point. In the physical world, the human body has evolved to a 
degree of complexity that makes the emergence of consciousness possible. The modes of 
operation that guarantee the biological functioning of the body and its well-being are 
characterized by the perfect integration of diverse cells: "No cell lives apart from the body, 
whether in contributing to its functioning or in deriving its share from the well-being of the 
whole" (Band'i International Community, 1995). It is the wholeness of the system that allows for 
the complete development of the capacities inherent in each of its component elements. The 
physical well-being achieved finds its purpose in channelling the expression of individual 
consciousness; "that is to say, the purpose of the biological development transcends the mere 
existence of the body and its parts" (ibid.). 
It is worthwhile to consider whether the same conception does not apply to the organization of 
humanity's collective existence. Admittedly, unlike the cells of the body, the individuals 
constituting society are endowed with intelligence and volition. But will not the essential 
relationships that define human existence evolve during the passage from childhood to maturity, 
one can at least ask the question, in such a way that the diverse capacities of the members of the 
collectivity are given room to fully develop as the bonds among individuals, communities and 
the institutions of society are strengthened? And if so, can one assume that such development 
will lead to an increasingly more complete expression of human consciousness through the 
complexity of social organizations and structures, themselves undergoing an evolutionary 
process?2 
2 
The metaphor of the human body used here may bring to mind other attempts to describe society in organic terms. Durkheim's 
model of organic solidarity is one example. Durkheim makes a distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. 
Mechanical solidarity is a feature of less advanced, more homogenous and highly religious societies, whereas organic solidarity 
represents the higher evolutionary stage in social order marked by complexity, differentiation and interdependence as seen in 
modern industrialized society. However, it is important to note that Band'is are not necessarily promoting such an organic model 
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The metaphor of the human body, if taken seriously, points to the inadequacy of the conception 
of human society either as an aggregate of competing elements or as a conglomerate of 
differentiated sectors each trying to exploit the achievements of others. As transition to maturity 
advances, humanity will need to move away from the vision of society as the arena of 
negotiations among individuals defending personal or group interest. The steady increase in the 
number of people living in conditions of absolute poverty, the growing gap between the rich and 
the poor and the economic crisis affecting even the richest countries of the world, in an era of 
globalization so focussed on competitiveness, seem to indicate that numerous challenges have to 
be overcome if the aspirations of the individual are to be harmonized with the interests of society. 
The condition in which the state as the embodiment of collective will would crush individuality 
to defend what is considered to be a higher purpose, is not compatible with the type of 
relationships the principle of the oneness of humankind seems to demand either. Much of my 
argument in this thesis will assume that "the advancement of the race has not occurred at the 
expense of human individuality. As social organization has increased, the scope for the 
expression of the capacities latent in each human being has correspondingly expanded. Because 
the relationship between the individual and society is a reciprocal one, the transformation now 
required must occur simultaneously within human consciousness and the structure of social 
institutions" (ibid.). 
Given the centrality of power to the way relationships among individuals, groups and the 
institutions of society have taken shape during the long evolutionary process that has brought 
humanity to its present state, and given the close association between the very concept of power 
and such phenomena as domination, competition and conflict, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the transformation being envisioned may require a fundamental revision of the conception of 
power. A first step in such an endeavour would be to look at the various dimensions of prevalent 
views of political power and ask if they exhaust the meaning of power in all the relationships in 
which a human being enters. My brief analysis of political power in the following section leads 
me to the conclusion that there are other dimensions to power that a process of moral 
of social organization whatever its merits may be. They employ the metaphor only as a means to gain insight into to the nature of 
the relationships that would govern a society approaching its stage of maturity. The distinguishing feature of the vision of social 
organization that spurs their efforts is the 'consciousness of the oneness of humankind'. 
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empowerment would have to recognize and bring into play. But this conclusion in itself does not 
prove to be entirely satisfactory. The conception of political power also needs to undergo a 
transformation if the essential relationships defining human society are to evolve in keeping with 
the maturation of the human race. These relationships cannot be fragmented, for example, into 
those that involve political power as generally accepted today and those that depend on other 
dimensions of power3. Power structures that fill the political landscape, whether connected to 
government or the institutions of civil society, cannot be kept apart from the other spheres of 
human life; the struggles they engender penetrate every facet of individual and social existence. 
It seems to me that humanity is impelled, as it goes through the process of maturation, to aspire 
to higher and higher degrees of consistency in thought and action across the private and the 
public sphere. The notion of power that a politically active individual adopts has to become 
coherent with one implied by a comprehensive conception of human well-being, and vice versa, 
the powers that reside in the individual and the collective—through the release of which social 
and material progress is achieved—will have to be consistent with conceptions of power 
determining political life in general. 
Conceptions of Power in Political Empowerment 
Although power is a highly contested concept, there is an underlying tendency of many political 
theorists to associate it with domination. Whether it is "the production of intended effects" 
(Russell, 1975, p. 25) and the capacity to produce them, or the "probability that an actor in a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 
1957, p. 152), power aspires to be a quantitative concept that is to be empirically measured in 
terms of the resistance—actual or potential—that it can overcome. For the concept thus 
conceived to be viable, conflict, observable or not, needs to be ever present. In other words, 
conflict seems to emerge in one way or another as an attribute that makes the exercise of power 
possible; it is intrinsic to power in its actual state. I do not intend to embark on an analysis of 
power in this form. What I need are insights that allow me to analyze political empowerment, 
3 
Rawls' concept of justice as fairness, for example, is, according to Mulhall and Swift, grounded on a political conception of 
justice, one that does not carry over to the other domains of life: "Justice as fairness, Rawls...claims, is a purely political 
conception of justice. By this he means that its scope is restricted to the basic structure of constitutional democratic regimes 
(applying only to their most fundamental social, political and economic institutions, and not, for example, to churches, 
universities and hospitals); that it does not depend upon the truth of any particular comprehensive philosophical, religious or 
moral doctrines about human well-being; and that it is formulated only in terms of certain fundamental ideas that are implicit in 
the public political culture of democratic societies" (Mulhall and Swift, 1995, pp. 107-8). 
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particularly when it is the aim of an educational process, and then see if I can go beyond it to an 
expanded concept of power that would enter the notion of moral empowerment proposed in this 
thesis. Steven Lukes' treatment of three dimensions of power is the first source to which I turn 
for this purpose (Lukes, 2005). It allows me to examine political empowerment in the context of 
two examples: citizenship education in liberal democracies and Paulo Freire's account of 
education as conscientization. 
As a prototype of the one dimensional view of power, Lukes cites Dahl's "intuitive idea of 
power". According to Dahl, "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-3). The emphasis is on behaviour, on the 
exercise of power, rather than on its possession. The analysis of power, its exercise and the 
extent of its influence, takes place within the context of western liberal democracy and involves 
the careful examination of a series of decisions. One method entails determining, for a given 
decision, which participants have initiated alternatives that are finally adopted, who has vetoed 
alternatives initiated by others, whose proposals have been adopted and whose proposals have 
been turned down. These actions are then tabulated as individual successes or defeats. The 
participants with the greatest proportion of successes are considered to be the most influential 
(Lukes, 2005, p. 17). 
To introduce the two dimensional view of power, Lukes draws on the observation that power has 
two faces.4 While power is obviously exercised by individuals participating in the making of 
decisions that affect others, it is also exercised when persons or groups limit the scope of issues 
to be considered, allowing room only for those matters that are not detrimental to their set of 
preferences. The one dimensional view of power, then, is concerned with 'decision-making' as a 
choice among alternative modes of action. The two dimensional view is also concerned with 
`non-decision making' as an influence "that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or 
manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, 
p. 44). Lukes points out that both views place undue emphasis on observable conflict, be it overt 
or covert, and both are individualistic in essence. For instance, while the discussion of the two 
dimensional view of power brings in the idea of the "mobilization of bias"—the operation of sets 
4 See (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). 
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of "values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures" (Lukes, 2005, pp. 20-21) which 
consistently benefit some in the expense of others—it falls short by not acknowledging that such 
bias is not sustained simply by a series of actions, but also by "the socially structured and 
culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be 
manifested by individuals' inaction" (ibid., p. 26). 
Cognizant of the existence of 'unobservable conflict', Lukes argues that it is the hidden face of 
power in its three dimensional representation that needs to be exposed. Conflict which acts as 
fuel for the exercise of power in its one and two dimensional sense is transformed into "willing 
compliance" to domination in the three dimensional view of power.5 Power operates unseen by 
securing willing compliance. Certain Marxist philosophers seek to provide an explanation of this 
phenomenon by elaborating on the theme of 'false consciousnesses'. Gramsci's elaboration 
underscores the consciousness developed by the subordinated social groups who borrow and 
internalize their conception of the world from the ideology of dominant groups. Internalization is 
manifested either in the form of belief in the values such a conception enshrines or in the 
inability to conceive of alternatives to the prevalent social norms. 
A critique of Lukes' radical view of power would have to address certain fundamental questions, 
for example, how he can reconcile two potentially contradictory conceptions of human beings: as 
autonomous rational agents exercising power in its first two dimensions and as malleable 
creatures of social conditions dominated by power in its third dimension (Hindess, 1996, p. 73). 
However it is not my intention to carry out a comprehensive analysis of Lukes' or any other 
theory of power for that matter. What is relevant to this inquiry is that while Lukes' three 
dimensional representation of power does not exhaust the concept, it does offer insights into the 
views of power implicit in certain educational approaches. There are clear connections, for 
example, between power in its one and two dimensional sense and some of the objectives of 
citizenship education. In a liberal democracy, one may assign to citizenship education the task of 
5 
Lukes has modified his original view by stating that power is a "capacity and not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, 
and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests". Further, he has pointed 
out that the topic of his radical view of power: "power as domination" is only concerned with "one species of power", and that it 
is inadequate to confine "the discussion to binary relations between actors assumed to have unitary interests, failing to consider 
the ways in which everyone's interests are multiple, conflicting and of different kinds" (Lukes, 2005, pp. 12-3). 
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enabling students to participate actively in the cultural, social and political domains. The focus 
can vary depending on the views of the dominant social or political group at the time, which may 
attach supremacy to the market and the operation of individual choice or emphasize social 
welfare and social obligation. But no matter what the dominant view, there are common values 
inherent to liberal democracies that the citizen must learn to cherish. All parties would agree, to 
cite an example, that in order to resolve conflicts and achieve some degree of consensus in a 
pluralistic society, "appreciation of the paramount importance of democratic decision making" 
(Buckley and Erricker, 2004, p. 174) has to be cultivated. Citizenship education, of course, does 
not confine itself to the teaching of democracy; it incorporates "knowledge, attitudes, moral 
codes, and values, thereby placing spiritual and moral education explicitly within its scope" 
(ibid.). Yet, irrespective of other moral attributes, the citizen of a liberal democracy is to uphold 
democratic values; she should be politically empowered to participate in the processes of 
decision making, to identify those policies and practices that are biased towards certain groups 
and to bring these biases to the attention of the public. The parameters of this type of 
empowerment, one can argue, are defined to a great measure by the predominant value placed on 
`free and fair competition', and the kind of power with which the citizen is to be invested 
belongs mostly to one, and occasionally two dimensional realms. 
The most notable educational approach which deals with the representation of power in its third 
dimension is Paulo Freire's. Given that according to this view both the observable and 
unobservable conflicts are to be considered, any attempt at empowerment would necessarily 
involve the cultivation of critical consciousness. Freire analyzes in a most insightful manner how 
the oppressed can defeat the false consciousness they have adopted. Human beings begin in a 
state of "semi-intransitive" consciousness, solely centered on "survival" on a biological level, 
lacking "a sense of life on a more historical plane" (Freire, 2000, p. 17). They enter a "transitive" 
state, as they "amplify their power to perceive and respond to suggestions and questions arising 
in their context," and as they "increase their capacity to enter into dialogue not only with other 
men but with their world" (ibid.). However, this is only a "naïve transitive" state in which 
consciousness of people is still "part of a mass", within which "developing capacity for dialogue 
is still fragile and capable of distortion" (ibid., p. 18). This state of consciousness is characterized 
by "an over-simplification of problems; by a nostalgia for the past; by underestimation of the 
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common man; by a strong tendency to gregariousness; by a lack of interest in investigation, 
accompanied by an accentuated taste for fanciful explanation; by fragility of argument; by a 
strongly emotional style; by the practice of polemics rather than dialogue; by magical 
explanations" (ibid.). Consciousness must progress from a naïve to a "critical transitive" state if 
it is not to be distorted. The critically transitive consciousness is characterized thus: 
...by depth in the interpretation of problems; by the substitutions of causal principles for 
magical explanations; by the testing of one's 'findings' and by openness to revision; by 
the attempt to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived notions when 
analyzing them; by refusing to transfer responsibility; by rejecting passive positions; by 
soundness of argumentation; by the practice of dialogue rather than polemics; by the 
receptivity to the new for reasons beyond mere novelty and by the good sense not to 
reject the old just because it is old—by accepting what is valid in both old and new. (ibid.) 
Only when the oppressed have reached a state of critical transitive consciousness will they have 
the power to act on society. Freire criticizes the type of education he calls 'banking education' as 
one in which the act of teaching and the relationship between the teacher and the students, 
perpetuate an intransitive or naïve transitive state of consciousness and helps reinforce the 
domination exercised by the oppressor. Banking education assumes a dichotomy between human 
beings and the world: "A person is merely in the world, not with the world or with others; the 
individual is spectator, not re-creator" (Freire, 1998, p. 56); he possesses an empty "mind" 
passively open to "the reception of deposits of reality from the world outside" (ibid.). For 
education to liberate, it should become problem posing, allowing students to become "critical co-
investigators in dialogue with the teacher" (ibid., p. 62). The problem posing method recognizes 
a movement in which the "point of departure" constitutes "the situation within which they (men 
and women) are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene" (p. 66). For 
this movement to occur people must not perceive their state as fated and unalterable; instead they 
need to view their situation as "an historical reality susceptible to transformation" (ibid.). The 
movement is necessarily one of inquiry. "Any situation in which some individuals prevent 
others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence" (ibid.). Freire therefore 
describes this movement of inquiry as one "directed towards humanization—the people's 
historical vocation" (ibid.). In chapter 8, I will argue that adherence to the dichotomy between 
banking education and problem posing becomes an obstacle when programmes concerned with 
moral empowerment look for criteria that would determine pedagogical choices. 
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Search for an Expanded Concept of Power 
With the above two examples in mind, I now need to ask if it is possible to elaborate a 
conception of moral empowerment that can enter domains not covered by citizenship education 
and education as conscientization. Clearly, the intention is not to ignore the elements of these 
and other approaches to empowerment. A programme wishing to foster the twofold purpose at 
the heart of moral empowerment would also try, for example, to cultivate an appreciation of the 
paramount importance of consultative decision making and to assist in the movement from a 
state of semi-transitive consciousness into a critically transitive one. The question is the extent to 
which the kind of educational process being sought here would need to explore other dimensions 
of power which could in turn modify the view of power in the three dimensions proposed by 
Lukes. 
It is important to mention that the notion of domination seems to have taken centre stage in most 
analysis of power in accordance with the assumption that other representations have less 
theoretical value. Lukes has expressed the view that "revisionary persuasive redefinitions" of 
power are not aligned with the "central meanings of 'power' as traditionally understood and with 
the concerns that have always centrally preoccupied students of power" (Lukes, 2005, p. 34). As 
a result, they end up "concealing from view the (central) aspects of power which they define out 
of existence" (ibid., p. 34). What are these central meanings of power, one may ask, as 
traditionally understood? To what extent does Hobbes' legacy continue to exert influence on 
today's discourse on power? There is no question that "riches joined with liberality", "friends" 
and "what quality soever maketh a man beloved or feared of many, or the reputation of such 
quality" (Hobbes, 2011, p. 94) can and have been used as means of yielding a certain kind of 
power. But how can one justify incessant pursuit of power as the defining factor of the human 
condition based on such observations no matter how many times and under how many differing 
circumstances they have been made? 
It may be that Hobbes can be sidestepped as an extreme. But the same pattern of thinking can be 
seen in others who in one way or another attempt to understand human relations in purely 
materialistic terms. Foucault's declaration that by power he does not mean "mechanisms that 
ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state", "the mode of subjugation which [...] 
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has the form of the rule" or a "general system of domination exerted by one group over another" 
(Foucault, 1976, p. 92) promises a possible break from the notion of power so closely associated 
with domination. But as one examines carefully what he claims to be methodological 
precautions—rules that would help us "eschew the model of the Leviathan" and shift our study 
of power from the "limited field of judicial sovereignty and State institutions" to the "techniques 
and tactics of domination" (Foucault, 1972-1977, p. 102)—one begins to see a familiar vision of 
human existence. Power is omnipresent because it is "produced from one moment to the next, at 
every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another." Relations of power are not to 
be seen in "a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships..., but are 
immanent in the latter" (Foucault, 1976, p. 93). Foucault's disagreement with Hobbes does not 
seem to be on the nature of power and its omnipresence, but the points at which it should be 
studied—not in its "central location," but at "its extremities, in its ultimate destinations": points 
"where it becomes capillary" (Foucault, 1972-1977, p. 96). I must admit that a different reading 
of Foucault may be possible, but while my limited reading of his work clearly indicates the 
brilliance with which he analyzes power relations, it does not offer me the kind of insight I seek 
in order to explore an expanded notion of power, one that frees it from its close ties to 
domination. 
What I claim in this brief discussion is that assigning domination such a central role in the 
discourse on power—with its corollary that conflict is vital to its exercise—is limiting the 
philosophical investigation of the concept to perceptions and habits that belong to the stage of 
humanity's childhood. According to Barry Hindess, Western political thought has mostly dealt 
with two conceptions of power. In the first, power is a simple quantitative phenomenon, nothing 
more than "a generalized capacity to act". In the second, more complex conception, the right to 
act also receives attention, "both capacity and right being seen to rest on the consent of those 
over whom power is exercised" (Hindess, 1996, p. 1). It is true that a government, for example, 
may 'exercise' power 'over' its people with or without their consent. But it seems legitimate to 
ask, in the context of a search for an expanded concept of power, why 'being exercised over', 
although a historical fact, should continue to define in its totality the nature of power. I assume 
this is the kind of question that led FUNDAEC to look for something more than political 
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empowerment in the first place. The following statement, although charged with emotion, is 
indicative of the organization's anxiety over the issue of power: 
That change and transformation entail the operation of power is an undeniable fact. That 
numerous issues in the field of development have a significant political dimension is also 
irrefutable. But the premise that political and economic power—interpreted as advantage 
enjoyed by persons or groups or as an attribute of individuals, factions, peoples, classes 
and nations used to acquire, to surpass, to dominate, to resist and to win—is the agent 
that will bring prosperity to the entire human race is untenable. In spite of all claims to 
the contrary, there is no convincing historical evidence for this supposition... 
The rapid expansion of western civilization takes to every corner of the world both the 
blessings and the curses of the Enlightenment. The blessings include the systematic 
removal of the veils of superstition. But, unfortunately, this is accompanied by a 
coarseness of mind that tends to dismiss the ideal and to call real that which is ugly and 
base. The result, after a few centuries of insistence, is widespread forgetfulness of those 
many powers of the human spirit that are in fact responsible for some of the greatest 
accomplishments of humanity's past. Among these are the power of unity, of humble 
service, of noble deeds, of love, and the power of truth. But even to mention the word 
`truth' in respectable discourse has become unacceptable; truth has been dethroned and 
reduced to something that is negotiable or a mere expression of dominance. The loudest 
message broadcast by the media all over the world for an entire generation to hear is 'He 
who is successful is right'. (Arbab, 2000, pp. 162-3) 
While the assertions made in these paragraphs clearly require philosophical scrutiny, the passage 
does suggest a dimension of power absent in Lukes' analysis which needs to be examined in 
relation to moral empowerment. To begin, it questions a widespread assumption in the field of 
development that a conception of power that merely values political and economic advantages 
for which individuals and groups have to compete will ultimately lead to an acceptable degree of 
prosperity for the majority of the human race. To what extent, I too would ask, did the herculean 
effort to give to the disempowered masses of humanity access to such power help them free 
themselves from the yokes of oppression? But the more interesting implications of the passage 
for my inquiry lie in the introduction of what it calls the powers of the human spirit. The 
question before me is whether an educational endeavour that seeks to help the students to 
become effective channels, for example, for the "power of unity, of humble service, of noble 
deeds, of love," can engender a process that indeed goes beyond political empowerment. Are 
these not powers at work in the harmonious interaction of individuals, communities and 
institutions when they do not wish to focus on the conflict of interest that may or may not exist 
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but are willing to find new channels for the expression of collective aspiration to advance 
civilization? Will not these powers over time transform the very decision making process from 
unending cycles of dominance of one individual or group over another into genuine consultation: 
collective investigation of reality? And will not a movement in this direction require detachment 
from one's own point of view, one's particular perspective and one's preferences, if the group is 
to reach maturity of understanding through consultation? 
Band'i-inspired educational efforts can gain certain insights in their quest for a conception of 
power more suitable to the age of maturity of the human race in the rich metaphors of their 
Faith's spiritual teachings, and in fact of many religious traditions: A pure, kindly and radiant 
heart is likened to a sovereignty ancient, imperishable and everlasting; humility is said to exalt 
the human being to the heaven of glory and power; a thought of peace is regarded as more 
powerful than a thought of war; idle disputation to advance oneself over one's brother is seen as 
unworthy of a human being. Apart from reflections on such spiritual teachings, insights need to 
be gained from philosophical approaches in which the subject of power is studied in new ways. 
One such approach involves the analysis of the positive and non-exhaustive nature of power. 
When viewed as a substance possessed by one or more people, in line with prominent discourses, 
power is a measurable and circumscribed unit that is distributed. If A gets filled with so much 
power, B will be emptied of a corresponding amount of it. Even in the case of Lukes' radical 
three dimensional conception, a process of political emancipation, when successful, takes power 
away from the oppressors and redistributes it among the oppressed. 
There are, however, dimensions to power which draw on resources that are limitless; increasing 
power in this perspective enhances reciprocity and interconnectedness. When these dimensions 
are recognized, empowerment can become a process that calls for the development of one's 
capacity to accompany others and to release their powers and capacities. It advances as power is 
built, developed and increased "through cooperation, sharing responsibility and working together" 
(Bellous and Pearson, 1995, p. 54). To describe empowerment in this way is to acknowledge the 
possibility of power as a concept that is difficult to pin down, one which covers the release or 
actualization of a wide range of potentialities in the individual and the collective. That it is fuzzy 
and therefore not possible to capture in measurable terms, in the way power as domination is, is 
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to its advantage. Hannah Arendt reminds us that power is always "a power potential and not an 
unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity like force and strength" (Arendt, 1958, p. 200). It 
is actualized when people are together "in the manner of speech and action" and when in their 
being with one another they have reached a state in which "word and deed have not parted 
company"; "words are not empty and deeds not brutal"; and "words are not used to veil 
intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish 
relations and create new realities" (ibid.). Power in the sense that Arendt describes is "boundless" 
and intimately connected to action. It is the condition of plurality that ties power to action: 
"power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the 
property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the 
group keeps together" (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). It is this power which is the antithesis of violence. 
As Arendt writes: " the will to power, as the modern age from Hobbes to Nietzsche understood it 
in glorification or denunciation, far from being a characteristic of the strong, is, like envy and 
greed, among the vices of the weak" (Arendt, 1958, p. 203). 
Knowledge and Virtue 
The conception of empowerment emerging from the above exploration, associated intimately 
with a vision of the evolution of those essential relationships that define individual and collective 
existence, although not fully developed, allows me to begin the next task of my inquiry: the 
identification of the main concepts that would constitute some of the elements of the framework 
for an educational process that identifies itself with moral empowerment. The premise that 
humanity is approaching its stage of maturity holds within it claims about the evolution of the 
collective powers of the species; the conviction that such powers are increasingly manifesting 
themselves is at the heart of the optimism with which the possibility of something beyond 
political empowerment has been discussed in the previous section. It is common to refer to the 
explosion of knowledge as a characteristic of our times, but the sheer quantity of knowledge 
available to humanity can be taken as a sign of the more profound transformation anticipated 
here. Particularly, the collective capacity to manifest such powers as consciousness, thought, 
comprehension, insight, memory and vision—as well as other powers of the human spirit like the 
power of unity, of humble service, of noble deeds and of love mentioned earlier 
	 must increase 
enormously. If the metaphor of the human body is to express the desired relationship between the 
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individual and the collective in a society that reflects the principle of the oneness of humankind, 
these powers have to manifest themselves in greater and greater measures in both the individual 
and the species as a whole. Educational processes must emerge, then, that enable a vast number 
of people to develop intellectual and spiritual powers, already present in potential, to a degree 
only achieved by exceptional individuals in past generations. 
One of the most valuable contributions FUNDAEC has made to Band'i-inspired discourse on 
education is its analysis of widespread oppression in terms of worldwide structures and processes 
that in the end deny the majority of humanity access to knowledge. Based on this perception, it 
has proposed that moral empowerment needs to occur in the context of participation in the 
generation, application and diffusion of knowledge—driven by the twofold purpose of pursuing 
personal growth and contributing to the transformation of society—and not in the struggle for 
power per se. For such participation to lead to moral empowerment, however, the intellectual 
excellence associated with the acquisition of knowledge should be freed from the chains of 'self-
centeredness'. Knowledge needs to be acquired in light of a profound understanding of social 
reality not as an outsider, but as one intimately involved in its ongoing transformation. In this 
sense, 'nurturing understanding'—the way reality is understood, described and acted upon, 
becomes one of the key concepts of the philosophical framework being sought here. But 
divorced from certain inner spiritual conditions, knowledge can be used to perpetuate oppression. 
Therefore, 'fostering spiritual qualities', deemed inseparable from 'nurturing understanding', is 
another concern of the educational process under consideration. 
In exploring the question of knowledge in the context of moral empowerment, it soon becomes 
necessary to look at the way the framework for the desired educational process would establish 
the necessary connections among its own normative and cognitive elements. When religious 
conviction is present, to act in a certain way in a given situation would not be simply desirable 
because it would increase total happiness, or because it follows the Kantian maxim, although it 
may fulfil such conditions, but also because it is consistent with a pattern of conduct understood 
to be prescribed in the scriptures. Yet a rationality that places undue emphasis on a given 
interpretation of a set of religious teachings is too narrow, and the educational process based on 
it would suffer from a suffocating rigidity that can only lead to rebellion. Exclusive dependence 
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on the reading of the 'text', which admittedly must have a place in a system of thought inspired 
by religion, would distort experience, and the role of science—both its methods and its content—
in the educational process would at best become blurred. Given the centrality of the principle of 
harmony between science and religion in the Band'i teachings, such an approach, always in 
danger of a fundamentalism arising from literal interpretations at war with each other, would be 
untenable. On the other hand, an approach that considers the insights of religion irrelevant is 
equally unacceptable. To resolve the dilemma, I examine in chapter 5 the notion of 
complementarity as advanced by FUNDAEC. The contrast between this notion of complementarity 
and certain prevalent views of the relationship between science and religion should be noted here. 
According to one perspective, whatever truth is expounded by religion about spiritual 
phenomena will someday be explained by science. Religion in this case is an institution of the 
childhood of humanity that will finally be made irrelevant by scientific explanation. An opposing 
view may hold that religion is the outcome of God's Revelation, and that—as God knows 
everything—scientific truth is ultimately attainable by penetrating the mysteries of religious text. 
From yet another perspective, science and religion are so distinct that there is no possibility of 
significant conflict between them. Science studies the material universe. It drives technology 
which can be employed for the good of humanity or to its detriment. Science in itself does not 
have the ability to point the way. Religion, on the other hand, is concerned with the spiritual 
dimension of human existence. Its task is to throw light on the inner life and to engender a code 
of ethics that can appropriately guide human behaviour. So long as each remains within the 
sphere of its own genius, they can coexist in harmony. This "view of the harmony between 
science and religion is valid, but only at the level of application. Ultimately, in this approach, 
science and religion are separated and allowed to pursue their own ways, and what assumes 
importance is the interaction between technology and morality" (Arbab, 2000, p. 186). Arguing 
for complementarity between science and religion as two systems of knowledge and practice 
with some overlap addresses at a more profound level the harmony between the two. 
Complementarity also implies that an educational process concerned with moral empowerment 
has the freedom to look to both sources in order to engender understanding of various 
dimensions of reality and to cultivate appropriate virtues in the students. 
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A question that arises naturally once issues related to sources of knowledge are to some degree 
analyzed is how, in nurturing understanding and fostering spiritual qualities, one brings the 
objects of understanding from various sources together to create the proper teaching-learning 
experience that would empower students to pursue their own development and contribute to the 
advancement of society. I borrow FUNDAEC'S concept of 'integration' in the context of which I 
explore the relevant elements of the philosophical framework being sought here. A major 
challenge of integration is to move away from a vision of knowledge that largely considers it as a 
sum of contents and methods of fields and disciplines separated by rigid boundaries—a vision 
that contributes to the fragmentation of life in a society organized around these separate pieces—
without trivializing the content of education. Using social practices as the axis around which 
educational processes can be organized is a tantalizing prospect. However, Michael Young 
points out that the trend in curriculum studies focused solely on social practices has led to the 
marginalization of knowledge, as it does not provide a basis upon which a distinction between 
curriculum knowledge and everyday knowledge could be made. He identifies two other co-
culprits: first, the work begun in the 1970s in the sociology of educational knowledge, to which 
he himself contributed, sidelining the role of knowledge by conceptualizing subject-based 
curriculum in terms of social interests that define its content and second, postmodernism with its 
critique of school curriculum, claiming that it leaves no space for any voice except those of the 
professional and the academic elite. All three developments, he mentions "collude, albeit 
unintentionally, with the marketization that now drives educational policy" (Young, 2008a, p. 
82). He adds that "in denying a distinctive role for knowledge that transcends specific social 
practices, interests and contexts, these approaches remove the grounds for a critical relationship 
between theory and curriculum policy and practice" (ibid.). 
Integration as discussed in chapter 6 is concerned with more than issues related to the disciplines 
of knowledge and social practices. In its attempt to deal with the various dimensions of the 
challenge of integrating the content and methods of a morally empowering educational 
experience, FUNDAEC introduced the notion of 'capability'. It used the word in a very specific 
way, as "developed capacity to think and act in a particular sphere of activity and according to an 
explicit purpose." Capability refers to "complex spheres of thought and action each requiring a 
number of related skills and abilities," but its acquisition, in addition to the mastering of skills, is 
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dependent on the assimilation of "relevant information", advancement in the "understanding of 
the relevant concepts" and the development of "certain attitudes, habits and spiritual qualities" 
(FUNDAEC, 2008, p. 47). Others, of course, have used the concept, notably Sen and Nussbaum. 
At a first glance, this seems to be a coincidence, two unrelated uses of a word in different 
contexts. But, as I argue in chapter 7, there are common underlying conceptions as well as 
differences in philosophical frameworks the examination of which sheds further light on the 
question of moral empowerment. 
FUNDAEC's own account of the concept of capability limits it to the area of curricular design. In 
fact, it speaks of it mostly in relation to the analysis of the content of the programmes it has been 
developing over a few decades corresponding to secondary education. FUNDAEC's particular 
focus on the ages between 12 and 18 reveals by itself an interesting view of empowerment. In a 
world where adult literacy/conscientization on the one hand and universalization of primary 
education on the other occupied centre stage, the founders of FUNDAEC, after an initial attempt to 
create an accelerated programme to train generalists in integrated rural development, came to 
identify youth in their teens as the most promising group whose education could spearhead the 
social and economic development of the communities in which they were working. This would 
not, of course, diminish the importance of primary education, but their experience convinced 
them that all was not lost, as was often said, when children did not go to a 'good primary school'; 
they encountered numerous youth who, while lacking certain skills typically developed in 
childhood, possessed the intellectual ability and the spiritual resilience to make up for lost time 
and advance rapidly in the process that was later to be called moral empowerment. Further, they 
rejected the prevalent notion that vocational education was the most reasonable answer to the 
needs of the youth from the so called 'disadvantaged' populations; they reacted with indignation 
to what they perceived as 'learning to think' for the children of the rich and 'learning to carry out 
orders' for the children of the poor. They were concerned with the capacity of a given 
population to apply and generate knowledge as it walked its own path of development and were 
searching for an educational programme that would equip the youth of the community to 
participate effectively in such a process and, ultimately, to lead it. Capability has proven to be a 
sufficiently robust concept to give shape to such a programme. Although capabilities are to be 
developed in individuals, a major criterion for their selection is their relevance to capacity 
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building in the community. Not necessarily apparent in the case of every capability, sets of 
interrelated capabilities are concerned with the essential relationships briefly discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter, and as such with the transformation of the environment and its 
structure. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SUBJECT OF UNDERSTANDING 
The main purpose of this chapter is to look for parameters that would enable an educational 
endeavour seeking moral empowerment to identify the characteristics of the subject of the verb 
`to understand'. To begin, I locate the hazard of superficiality in education in the failure to 
nurture understanding and argue that to do so properly, one must take into account the 
interconnectedness of the subject, the object and the process of understanding and search for 
approaches that pay them equal attention. I then examine some features of the 'subject of 
understanding' implied by computationalism and culturalism as analyzed by Bruner, by the 
emotivist culture as described by MacIntyre and by subjectivism as suggested, for example, by 
Kierkegaard. None of the contenders measures up fully to the protagonist of moral empowerment 
envisioned in this thesis. But each offers a partial view, out of which emerges a sketchy but 
suggestive picture of who she or he may be. 
Understanding 
Nurturing understanding is a way to combat the superficiality to which the practice of education 
has proven itself vulnerable over the decades. The desire to remedy superficiality, of course, has 
driven the work of a number of educators who have begun their inquiry with the criticism of 
educational processes that fill the students' minds with facts and pay little attention to the 
development of their powers. But the remedy does not prove potent enough when the alternatives 
proposed focus mostly on the transformation and manipulation of information. The blurring of 
the distinction between assimilation of information and understanding of concepts, on the one 
hand, and the more or less equal treatment given to profound concepts and trivial ones, on the 
other, introduce their own brand of superficiality.' 
The problem becomes exacerbated when understanding is confused with mastering learning 
techniques. These techniques are often taught with trivial examples, comprehensible through 
6 
Bits of information are finite things that are necessary to impart in an educational process. Being finite, they should be 
assimilated fully in a finite number of steps. Concepts, on the other hand, although not necessarily infinite in meaning and 
implications, often have to be understood progressively. According to FUNDAEC, "one must ask the question whether, for a given 
object of understanding, the dimensions [to be grasped] are finite or infinite. Are there certain concepts, for example, that we can 
understand and be done with? Do all objects of understanding call for the same depth of understanding? Does it make sense, for 
example, to design an activity the objective of which is for the student to understand precisely and completely a given object of 
understanding? These are not trivial questions and some kind of answer to them is necessary if we are to design educational 
activities the purpose of which is to enhance understanding" (FUNDAEC, 2005, p. 28). 
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straightforward explanations, assuming that their application is the key to the understanding of 
complex concepts.' But even when attempts are made to avoid such superficiality, deeper 
problems remain unresolved if understanding itself is reduced to mere achievement, and its 
infinite dimension as a process in which one advances is ignored. In this context, issues related to 
the powers of the human spirit and the interconnection between understanding and the 
development of certain dispositions take on particular significance. 
Understanding seems to be a notion that defies all manner of definition. It is not synonymous 
with how the human mind sorts out and processes information; it is not merely a culminating 
point, at which one arrives upon learning certain facts; it is not simply the conclusion reached 
after following one or another procedure according to certain rules of logic; and it is not 
reducible to judgments by way of sound reasoning based on the beliefs one holds. 
FUNDAEC begins its exploration of the theme with the innocent statement that "the verb to 
understand assumes a subject and an object" (FUNDAEC, 2005, p. 11). The verb also implies a 
process through which one advances in understanding substantive concepts, as well as significant 
moments of insight and the grasp of specific facts and meanings. The process is often likened to 
moving forward along a path which, though marked by certain milestones corresponding to 
levels of comprehension of vital aspects of reality, has by no means a predetermined end. With 
this idea in mind, I suggest that too much emphasis on any one of these three elements—the 
subject, the object and the process of understanding—at the expense of the others gives rise to 
problems in education and, in fact, it has done so in some prevalent educational theories. 
Consequently, it seems imperative that in order to meet the challenge of nurturing understanding 
educational programmes need to concern themselves with all three explicitly—to ensure that 
they contribute to the development of the intellectual and spiritual powers of the student, are rich 
in content both conceptual and informational, and pay attention to the process of understanding 
itself That in the case of the programmes developed by FUNDAEC understanding concepts, 
acquiring spiritual qualities, attitudes and habits, building skills and assimilating information are 
addressed together in the context of the development of capabilities—as discussed briefly in the 
7 
See, for instance, how teachers are advised to teach students concepts in general through an approach called 'concept 
attainment' using the concept of fruit. (Woolfolk, 2010) 
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last chapter and in more detail in chapters 7 and 8—is partially a response to the desire to treat 
understanding in this fuller sense. This way of looking at the challenge of nurturing 
understanding in education, it seems to me, is a promising one. 
Understanding differs from physical action, say, planting a tree and mental occupation in 
thinking. It is also distinct from mental activity involved in processes such as gathering and 
sorting information. All these contribute to understanding, especially when carried out 
purposefully, but they do not make up the process in its entirety. Further, what is required to 
advance in understanding is not independent of the object of understanding. It makes little sense 
to say, "I understand" without any reference to what it is that I am understanding. Attempts to 
reduce the process of understanding of every object to the application of a single approach—
cognitive, cultural, empirical, constructivist and so on—is the cause of great difficulty in 
educational philosophy and the ensuing pedagogies. Moreover, it does not seem reasonable to 
conceptualize the process of understanding without any reference to the qualities of the subject 
of the verb 'to understand' or to view it as a mere activity in which she or he is engaged. Nor can 
the subject be sharply separated from the object of understanding at any given instance. Does not 
the understanding of a specific set of scientific concepts contribute to the development of certain 
qualities and attitudes, intellectual and even spiritual, and is not the presence of specific qualities 
essential to the understanding of a set of scientific concepts? 
There has been a longstanding tension between two major positions in the field of education: one 
predominantly concerned with knowledge and information and another primarily focused on the 
individual learner. A number of pejorative terms such as 'rote learning' and 'banking education' 
have been used against pedagogies following the former. The accusations are unfair when we 
consider, for example, that much of the discourse on liberal education is centred on the subject 
matter. Implicit in any treatment of liberal education is that exposure to a rich body of 
knowledge is vital to the development and training of the mind. Richard S. Peters sheds light on 
what led to this sharp division between the learner and the content of education. The so-called 
`child-centred' movement emerged as a reaction to traditional teaching approaches that fill up 
the brain with items, using coercive techniques, if necessary. The alternative models offered by 
progressive trends focus on the manner rather than on the matter of education. Peters argues that 
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although, on moral grounds, it is only correct that students be accorded respect and their liberty 
be preserved, the manner in which these principles are upheld cannot serve as a substitute for the 
content, namely the forms of knowledge which nurture a full range of understanding in pupils. In 
other words, there is no foundation to the assumption that an emphasis on worthwhile content 
would have to be accompanied by a "rigid" and "unreflective" method of education. On the 
contrary, Peters claims that "all the talk about growth, self realization, and the development of 
the individual potentiality" (Peters, 1966, pp. 35-6), has glossed over what is worthwhile and in 
the interest of the child to learn. 
The 'behavioural objectives model' represents another approach that focuses on content, now in 
the form of rigid objectives, this in spite of its apparent concern with 'demonstrable changes' in 
the pupil. In an attempt, as Joseph Dunne has put it, to rescue "teaching from woolly-mindedness 
and muddle and of constituting it as a truly rational practice" (Dunne, 1992, pp. 4-5), the content 
of education ends up being organized according to measurable objectives in taxonomies of 
cognitive and affective domains. The cognitive movement is a clear attempt to get away from the 
cold mechanical stance towards the learner springing from the stimulus-response of behavioural 
models of learning. It ousts the outer stimulus as the central factor in learning and assumes that 
by examining the processes of sorting and encoding information within the brain, the individual 
can be brought back into the picture in the most worthy manner. However, the 'advance' in 
learning theory achieved by shifting the focus to the individual learner continues to suffer from 
mechanistic presuppositions. 
This brief reference to the ongoing debate on content-centred and learner-centred views of 
education illustrates the need for systematic exploration of the complex connections that bind the 
subject, the object and the process of understanding. To admit in abstract that relationships 
essentially exist, of course, is not significant by itself. To ensure that they are taken fully into 
account in an educational process that seeks to nurture understanding is a formidable challenge. 
As a first step in my attempt to examine the nature of this challenge, I identify some of the 
characteristics of the subject of understanding suggested by the way the process of understanding 
is progressively viewed in a particular development of educational thought beginning with the 
so-called cognitive revolution. 
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Computational and Cultural Dimensions of Cognition 
Jerome Bruner's prolific work in educational psychology, beginning with contributions that gave 
rise to the cognitive revolution, is a rich source of insight into certain facets of the process of 
understanding and its subject. In his celebrated work Culture of Education, he describes 
fundamental views that altered "conceptions about the nature of the human mind in the decades 
since the cognitive revolution" (Bruner, 1999, p. 1). In this context, he considers two major 
conceptions, the 'computational' view and what he calls `culturalism'. The computational view 
is concerned with "information processing: how finite, coded, unambiguous information about 
the world is inscribed, sorted, stored, collated, retrieved, and generally managed by a 
computational device. It takes information as its given, as something already settled in relation to 
some pre-existing, rule-bound code that maps onto states of the world" (ibid., pp. 1-2). The 
objective of computationalism is to "devise a formal re-description of any and all functioning 
systems that manage the flow of well-formed information" (p. 3). The human mind is one such 
system that must necessarily work according to the specific rules and procedures governing the 
processing of input. To be useful to education, a theory of mind must, of course, go beyond an 
explanation of how it works; it must "contain specifications of some kind about the 'resources' 
required for a mind to operate effectively" (p. 8), including mental tools as well as conditions 
required for effective operations. A computational approach to education, according to Bruner, 
does at least three things: It restates classical theories of teaching or learning in a computable 
form; it comes up with a description or protocol of what actually transpires in the process of 
problem solving or mastering a particular body of knowledge, and then restates it in "strict 
computational terms"; it takes students through a process of re-description of the output of a 
prior operation, to "turn around" on the results of a procedure that has worked locally and to re-
describe it in more general, simplified terms. In applying this feature of all "adaptive" 
computational programmes, the learner "goes meta," considering how she thinks as well as what 
she is thinking about (pp. 8-11). 
I have briefly mentioned these features of the computational approach to education in order to 
clarify that the explanation it seeks for the process of learning, and by implication for 
understanding, is a highly complex one. Yet, Bruner himself finds it impossible to accept that the 
rules common to all information systems could cover the "messy, ambiguous, and context- 
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sensitive process of meaning making" (p. 5). His alternative is culturalism, with the caveat that 
disagreements between the two have been exaggerated. Culturalism has no difficulty 
incorporating the insights offered by the computational approach; what it cannot do is to deny 
meaning making processes that do not meet the rules of computability. 
Bruner's analysis of culturalism is rich. The proposal that is relevant here as I explore the 
characteristics of the 'subject of understanding' is that education, in initiating the young into the 
culture should "partake of the spirit of a forum, of negotiation, and of the recreating of meaning" 
(Bruner, 2006b, p. 82). Bruner reminds us that the pedagogy which views education as the 
process through which knowledge and values are transmitted by the more expertly 
knowledgeable ignores the social production of meaning. The transmission model presupposes 
that the young "are underprivileged not only epistemically but deontically as well—lacking in a 
sense of value propositions and a sense of the society" (ibid.). They are not only "underequipped 
with knowledge about the world," which needs to be imparted to them, but are also 'lacking' in 
values" (ibid., p. 83). The truth of such deficits, as expressed in religion or science of psychology, 
is not the issue. What is at stake is how such presuppositions shape educational practice. These 
characterizations of the child, "whether driven by Original Sin, by primary process, or by 
egocentricism" imply that there is something that should be "rooted out, replaced, or 
`compensated' (ibid.). The pedagogy would therefore view teaching as "surgery, suppression, 
replacement, deficit-filling, or some mix of them all" (ibid.). Through the emergence of 'learning 
theory' an additional method was introduced: reinforcement with reward and punishment as the 
instruments of "a new technology" for accomplishing these ends. Moreover, Bruner suggests that 
developmental theories which regard growth of the intelligence mainly from the inside out and 
the role of environment merely as one of providing nourishment appropriate to the stage of 
development are not up to the task of creating an enriched pedagogy. Thus, he concludes: "What 
we lack, in the main, is a reasoned theory of how the negotiation of meaning as socially arrived 
at is to be interpreted as a pedagogical axiom" (ibid.). 
In his presentation of culturalism, Bruner recognizes that he has to go back and forth between 
questions having to do with the nature of the mind and the nature of culture; to look at the 
interaction between the "powers of individual minds and the means by which the culture aids or 
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thwarts their realization" (Bruner, 1999, p. 13). He, thus, puts forwards nine tenets that would 
guide a psycho-cultural approach to education. One of them, the "constructivism tenet", is 
particularly relevant to the present argument. Culturalism, Bruner contends, has a double task. 
On the macro side it looks at culture as a "system of values, rights, exchanges, obligations, 
opportunities, power" (ibid., p. 11). On the micro side, it concentrates on how the individuals 
"construct realities and meanings, at what cost, and with what expected outcomes" (ibid.). 
Culturalism is concerned with "inter-subjectivity" and should be counted among the "sciences of 
the subjective" (ibid., p. 12). 
Bruner's culturalism adds new dimensions to computationalism's candidate for the subject of 
understanding who, after all, could not be more than a highly complex computer. Two of its 
accomplishments are of particular importance for my inquiry: it recognizes the significance of 
context in the process of understanding, and it acknowledges the collective dimension of 
understanding. In culturalism, Bruner moves away from an exclusive focus on the workings of 
the brain; the aim of education includes the creation and recreation of culture. Thus the learner is 
a participant in forum-like processes of meaning making in a constantly changing environment. 
Yet, it seems that the constructivist thread running through his account commits him to models 
of learning in which the learner is either transforming and manipulating information, processing 
and codifying the representations of the parts of environment with which she interacts, or is 
negotiating meaning in the everyday practices of life. This, one could argue, represents a tenuous 
relationship between the learner and reality. That such activity contributes to understanding is 
not denied; it is that total commitment to constructivism causes one to miss the richness of 
meaning that emerges from acknowledging, to use Bakhurst's words, "the social dimension of 
the mind without forsaking a sensible realism in which minded beings inhabit a world which is, 
to a large extent, not of their making" (Bakhurst, 2001, p. 195). 
Bakhurst's criticism of radical constructivism is suggestive of the care one would have to 
exercise, were one to incorporate certain characteristics of the `constructivist' in the vision of the 
subject of understanding in a process of moral empowerment. He warns us that "willingness to 
fictionalize the self' defeats the objective of bringing back meaning to the phenomenon of mind. 
Self is then "as much made by meaning as making it" (ibid., p. 188). If we insist that there is no 
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"aboriginal reality", we would have to conclude that "the world as we encounter it is a product of 
the organizing power of the mind, of the 'narrative construction of reality' and "where 
everything 'real' is, in a sense, an artifact of our modes of interpretation and categorization" 
(ibid.)8. Bakhurst cautions us to be clear that the "mediational means" of "cultural tools" do not 
"somehow get between us and reality itself. Rather, their use serves to bring reality within our 
reach" (ibid., p. 195). "Just as the use of a hammer does not remove us from the object on which 
we are working," he clarifies, "so our concepts, models, theories and so on need not create a 
barrier beyond which we cannot see. We use them to disclose the world to us, not to obscure it" 
(ibid.). 
Excessive Subjectivism 
Another problem with seeing the process of understanding entirely from the point of view of 
constructivism is the relativism inherent in the knowledge being constructed. This is not to say 
that aspects of ethical and much of social reality are not constructed by the human mind 
according to the dynamics of a given culture. Nor is there any intention to deny that theory 
influences the way even physical reality is observed. It is that the subject of understanding as a 
constructivist is in constant danger of excessive subjectivism, particularly in relation to views of 
the moral universe. Bernard Williams' argument against moral relativism strengthens my 
reluctance to depend too much on Bruner's "sciences of the subjective" in identifying the 
characteristics of the subject of understanding, the protagonist of moral empowerment. 
According to Williams moral judgments do not simply describe the speaker's own attitude since 
the very possibility that the claims they make can be rejected by someone who utters a contrary 
moral judgment gives such claims substance stretching beyond the mere "autobiographical" 
account of tastes, feelings and preferences. Further, he suggests that moral outlooks could be 
right or wrong, in so far as they reflect beliefs and convictions about questions of import—for 
8 
Bakhurst would probably agree with Ilyenkov's notion of the ideal for whom "real" does not simply refer to "everything man 
perceives as a thing outside his own consciousness" and "ideal" to "everything that is not conceived as such a thing" (Ilyenkov, 
1977). Ilyenkov points to a much more complex relationship between consciousness, will and human activity. The man within 
which the ideal exists cannot be understood "as one individual with a brain, but as a real aggregate of real people collectively 
realizing their specifically human life activity" (ibid.). According to Bakhurst, "Ilyenkov developed a distinct solution to what he 
called 'the problem of the ideal'; that is, the problem of the place of the non-material in the natural world. The latter involves a 
resolute defence of the objectivity of ideal phenomena, which are said to exist as aspects of our spiritual culture, embodied in our 
environment ..." (Bakhurst, 1997, p. 34). 
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which a certain level of consensus within society should exist—and are not simply expressions 
of personal likes and dislikes. Even if reasons for holding one set of beliefs as opposed to another 
were no more than rationalizations for conformity or non-conformity with a particular group, and 
"our moral attitudes were rarely determined by reasons," he goes on to assert, "our model of 
moral attitudes and moral judgments must at least be complex enough to leave room for the 
rationalizations. It is only if the position to which a man is led by these forces satisfies some 
conditions of being the sort of position to which reasons are relevant that we can understand it as 
a moral position at all" (Williams, 1993, p. 18). 
The subjectivist position has been keenly criticized by Maclntyre as well, his account of its 
modern embodiment in the "emotivist" self being particularly revealing. Maclntyre charts the 
emergence of emotivism —the doctrine that all evaluative judgments are nothing but the 
expressions of attitude or feeling—from the late seventeenth century to the present time. He 
attributes the interminable character of disagreements in the moral sphere to "conceptual 
incommensurability"—incommensurability pertaining to underlying premises and irresolvable 
by appeals to a rational set of arguments in support of one or another normative position. In this 
climate, "argument ceases and the invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of 
pure assertion and counter-assertion" (Maclntyre, 1981, p. 8). This interminability in public 
argument corresponds to the arbitrariness found in the private domain. A "paradoxical air" 
surrounds the contemporary moral debate in the public sphere which, despite its inherent 
inability to arrive at consensus, aspires to express itself in a language that strives to appeal to 
some independent and impersonal standard of objectivity—so much pleasure for so many people, 
unconditional obligation of the rational being, or the intrinsic duty of someone holding one or 
another position. For Maclntyre, the notion of pluralism is imprecise as it equally applies to "an 
unharmonious mélange of ill-assorted fragments" and "an ordered dialogue of intersecting 
viewpoints" (ibid., p. 10). That "we simultaneously and inconsistently treat moral argument as an 
exercise of our rational powers and as mere expressive assertion" (ibid.) is symptomatic of 
"moral disorder". 
Maclntyre locates the origins of the emotivist self in Kierkegaard's Enten-Eller. The book, 
despite the vivid descriptions it provides of the individuals embodying the aesthetic and the 
44 
ethical, submits in the final analysis to the primacy of subjective choice. It is not the choice 
between good and evil, but the choice whether or not to choose in terms of good and evil that is 
significant in the everyday arena of moral discourse and practice. This position has led to the 
interminability that characterizes so much of our current moral language "as the expression of a 
criterionless choice" between "incompatible and incommensurable moral premises and moral 
commitment" (ibid., p. 38). Maclntyre further attributes the rise of the emotivist self to the 
failure of the enlightenment project and the attempts of moral philosophers, particularly Kant and 
Hume, to find rational justification for morality outside a teleological framework. 
Independent of our evaluation of the accuracy of his historical analysis, we see in Maclntyre's 
description of the emotivist tradition numerous features of the dominant culture of our time. We, 
too, see that a "unifying preoccupation" of our time, "is the condition of those who see in the 
social world nothing but the meeting place for the individual wills, each with its own set of 
attitudes and preferences and who understand that world solely as an arena for the achievement 
of their own satisfaction, who interpret reality as a series of opportunities for their enjoyment and 
for whom the last enemy is boredom" (ibid, p. 24). We have no choice, then, but to admit that the 
emotivist self exerts an enormous force in our social environment. Maclntyre argues that we 
ought to confront emotivism in order to overcome the challenge raised by the claim that "all 
moral, indeed all evaluative, argument is and always must be rationally interminable" (p. 11)9. In 
an emotivist culture, the sense of what constitutes candid and non-manipulative social relations is 
lost because personal preferences and impersonal evaluation are collapsed together. Sentences 
are used in debates and arguments to persuade others of the superiority of one's own preferences. 
In such an environment, the individual does not perceive the discrepancy between meaning and 
use of sentences. Meaning is no longer the property of concepts but a mere shadow that allows 
9 Maclntyre's argument against emotivism is centred on its theoretical underpinnings. Emotivism has been presented by its 
advocates as a theory about the meaning of sentences used to make moral judgments. Maclntyre rejects the theory on three 
counts: First, the theory claims to explain the meaning of a certain class of sentences whose function is to express feelings or 
attitudes. The two functions of the sentence "this is good"— one that is expressive of the speaker's attitude and another that is 
designed to influence the hearer's attitude 
	 are however conflated. Moreover the characterization of the feelings and attitudes in 
question are left out completely. Second, as a theory of meaning of sentences, it does not see any distinction between expressions 
of personal preference and those of an evaluative nature and therefore it regards sentences that carry a force of reason beyond 
specific contexts and those that are context-bound as equivalent in meaning. Third, since the expression of feelings and attitude 
is not the function of the meaning of a sentence but of its use (Maclntyre cites Gilbert Ryle's example of the angry schoolmaster 
venting his feelings by shouting at the small boy who has just made an arithmetic mistake, '7x7=49!') the theory disregards the 
incongruity between the meaning and the use of sentences. "Meaning and use would be at odds in such a way that meaning 
would tend to conceal use" (Maclntyre, 1981, p.13). 
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the agent to use sentences, albeit unconsciously, to achieve his goals. He could claim he is 
appealing to independent criteria while all he is doing is expressing his feelings in a manipulative 
way. The emotivist self is a poor choice for the 'subject of understanding'. On the one hand, 
lacking the ability to distinguish between preferences and propositional knowledge, it cannot 
connect properly to an object of understanding, and on the other, its ways of understanding could 
not be trusted, for it is prone to be influenced, albeit unconsciously, by manipulative means in 
social relations and to perpetuate them. 
Maclntyre's analysis of the emotivist culture and the type of individual that thrives in it is 
incisive. Having rejected such an individual as a candidate for the subject of understanding, I 
need to explore the extent to which the characteristics of the 'self defined by communitarianism 
would enter the vision of the protagonist of moral empowerment. The relationship between the 
individual and the collective is a vast subject in itself; it was touched on in the previous chapter 
and will be examined to a limited extent in the last. It may be necessary to mention here, 
however, that the contrast between the communitarian view of self and the liberal outlook with 
which the emotivist self finds some affinity is not as sharp as it seems at first. According to Will 
Kymlicka, this contrast proves to be ambiguous once the relevant arguments receive closer 
scrutiny (Kymlicka, 2002). The distinction made between the "unencumbered" liberal self which 
is prior to any end, project or social commitment, no matter how immersed it may be in them, 
and the "embedded-self' of the communitarian "constituted by its ends" represents a false 
dichotomy. Michael Sandel as a communitarian, for example, admits that the boundaries 
imposed by ends that constitute the self are flexible; they can be redrawn, incorporating new 
ends and excluding others. He states that "a certain faculty of reflection" and "a certain capacity 
for self knowledge" are necessary if the subject is to be "empowered to participate in the 
constitution of its identity" (Sandel, 1998, p. 152). We, therefore, need to regard "the bounds of 
the self as open" and "the identity of the subject as the product rather than the premise of its 
agency" (ibid.). On the other hand, the liberal, in response to the critics of the concept of 
unencumbered self, argues that what is essential is not that we perceive in abstract "a self prior to 
its ends", but that "we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends in the sense that no end or 
goal is exempt from possible re-examination." Thus as Kymlicka puts it the differences between 
the two positions "hide a more fundamental identity; both accept that the person is prior to her 
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ends. They disagree over where, within the person to draw the boundaries of the self..." 
(Kymlicka, 2002, p. 227)1°. 
Once it is accepted that the self prior to its ends can be understood "in the sense that no end or 
goal is exempt from possible re-examination" (ibid., p. 225), our view of subjectivism may be 
modified allowing us to look for certain characteristics of the subject of understanding even in 
Kierkegaard's account, which Maclntyre considers to be a major source of emotivism. 
Kierkegaard himself expressed his concern "that in our age, because of the great increase of 
knowledge, we had forgotten what it means to exist, and what inwardness signifies..." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 223). Kierkegaard did not deny an objective reality; in fact, he considered 
extreme subjectivism as madness: "In a merely subjective determination of the truth, madness 
and truth become in the last analysis indistinguishable " (ibid.). As Patrick Gardiner points out, 
Kierkegaard denounced what he considered to be a propensity of his age to "identify with 
amorphous abstract entities like 'humanity' or the 'public' allowing people to absolve 
themselves from individual responsibility for what they thought and said" (Gardiner, 1988). 
Alarming as the spread of the emotivist culture may be in our times, we must also admit that the 
propensity to shirk responsibility for one's words and deeds also persists. Kierkegaard's gloomy 
prediction for the future of education seems to have been fulfilled at least partially: "In fact there 
are handbooks for everything, and very soon education, all the world over, will consist in 
learning a greater or lesser number of comments by heart, and people will excel according to 
their capacity for singling out the various facts like a printer singling out the letters, but 
completely ignorant of the meaning of anything" (Kierkegaard, 1962, pp. 88-9). 
Interestingly, Kierkegaard's view on how knowing—of a certain kind—leads to a lost and 
deserted status of being echoes the tension mentioned earlier in this chapter that persists between 
educational approaches that emphasize content and those that focus on the individual learner. 
10 
 Kymlicka questions the consistency of the view that goals and social roles are constitutive of who we are and 'a given' in the 
sense that we can discover and reinterpret their meanings, but not examine their value. "Perhaps communitarians do not mean to 
deny that; perhaps their idea of our embeddedness is not incompatible with our rejecting the attachments we find ourselves in. 
But then the advertised contrast with the liberal view is a deception, for the sense in which communitarians view us as embedded 
in communal roles incorporates the sense in which liberals view us as independent of them, and the sense in which 
communitarians view practical reasoning as a process of 'self discovery' incorporates the sense in which the liberals view it as 
process of judgment and choice" (p.228). 
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The assertion of a dichotomy between a subjective agent and an objective world does not allow 
for the type of relationship between the two that must flourish if education is to engender 
understanding. The 'subject of understanding' must engage in a great deal of introspection and 
reflection in order to understand. But much of what should be understood is found in fields and 
disciplines of human knowledge. Moreover, the subject of the verb 'to understand' is not an 
enclosed entity roaming in complete independence; it is situated within the context of an ever-
enlarging circle of physical and social relationships. 
My arguments have brought me to a point where I need to pause and examine what I may have 
achieved up to now. Having identified 'understanding' as a fundamental concept to be analyzed 
in my exploration of educational processes concerned with moral empowerment, I have looked 
for insights in the work of several authors to get a glimpse of possible 'candidates' some of 
whose characteristics would be incorporated into a vision of the subject of understanding in the 
discourse to which I am trying to contribute. The candidates suggested by these works occupy a 
wide spectrum ranging from a sophisticated computer to the emotovist self in ascendance in 
today's society. To decide that any one of them is by itself the subject of understanding being 
sought would require commitment to one or another educational theory, a commitment I am not 
ready to make. What I hope the discussion of the various sets of ideas does accomplish is to offer 
insights into the nature of understanding and, to some extent, its subject. It is important, of 
course, that 'looking for insights' as an approach adopted in this thesis does not become a kind of 
eclecticism. To escape this fate in my search for a subject of understanding, I must be able to 
describe, even if vaguely, a picture of a protagonist whose individuality has integrity of its own 
and who has the capacity to engage in the very complex process of understanding in its many 
dimensions. But it is too early in the inquiry to achieve such a purpose. A number of other key 
concepts have to be examined in the ensuing chapters before the goal can be reasonably met. 
What is needed now is more clarity on the concept of understanding and how nurturing it 
involves the fostering of spiritual qualities. 
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CHAPTER 3: NURTURING UNDERSTANDING AND FOSTERING SPIRITUAL 
QUALITIES 
Understanding has an infinite dimension associated with it. The notion of infinity does not imply 
that human understanding is not limited. What it suggests is that not every aspect of 
understanding can be circumscribed, for example, in the way computationalism and culturalism 
seem to propose. There is a boundlessness to be taken into account both in relation to concept 
acquisition and as an attribute of the human soul with endless potentialities. To explore this 
infinity, any endeavour inspired by religious conviction must look deep into its foundations 
where its conception of the human being has taken shape. Here, the physical universe, no matter 
how vast, is embedded in a much larger reality to which all religious traditions have referred as 
spiritual. This larger reality has its own existence and is not merely an emergent set of qualities 
of the physical universe. The scientist, of course, can rightfully choose to ignore spiritual reality 
and focus entirely on explaining the complex web of causes and effects within the realm of the 
physical and in terms of emergence. He cannot ever prove, nor should he care to prove, that what 
emerges does or does not have an independent existence which physical instruments, including a 
network of neurons, could possibly examine. In this sense, science as a system of knowledge and 
practice is self-sufficient. 
Among FUNDAEC'S contributions to the discourse of Band'i-inspired educational endeavours is 
the way it has adhered to a religious view of existence without trespassing the bounds set by 
science. In a strictly materialistic paradigm, it has argued, knowledge is, in the final analysis, 
acquired through the senses, this despite all the complexities introduced by the theory 
dependence of observation, the role of paradigms and/or research programmes in scientific 
inquiry and the intricacies of culture. Stimuli are received by the senses and processed by the 
brain—an entirely material object, a collection of highly specialized cells communicating 
through physical and chemical interactions. Collective activities of these cells are given names, 
such as short-and long-term memory, cognition and affective responses, and are studied in depth. 
Yet, the fact remains that there is nothing there but a huge set of atoms and molecules with an 
extremely complex and immeasurable set of interactions. So the question of who understands 
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would be reducible in principle to the question of which configuration of atoms and molecules 
and what set of interactions receive the generic name understanding." 
This interpretation of reality is rich enough to allow for the most extensive study of the brain and 
its functioning, as well as the examination of the higher order entity called culture, also the 
manifestation of interactions among a large number of sets of atoms and molecules over a very 
long time. Within this paradigm the physical universe as well as social reality can certainly be 
studied. While the scientist, reluctant to introduce unnecessary elements into the work of science, 
can engage in numerous lines of inquiry, as educators, we are not bound to the materialistic 
paradigm. The assumption that spiritual reality has as much an existence as material reality may 
not add anything to the operation of science. But what if taking it into account does make a 
difference in our pedagogical choices? What if the nurturing of understanding in the context of 
pursuing one's own growth and contributing to the transformation of society—a society that, 
after all, slides every day deeper into a state of moral confusion—does depend on our 
assumptions about the nature and implications of the existence of spiritual reality? Are we not 
justified as educators, then, to at least explore these assumptions, taking of course every caution 
to avoid the close-mindedness and the obscurantism that has historically hampered religion's 
ability to deal with science? 
Nurturing Understanding 
For a Band'i-inspired endeavour, exploration of the spiritual dimension of human existence 
necessarily occurs in the context of the Band'i view that the reality of the human being is the soul 
and that the soul is not a material substance.' Mental faculties are inherent properties of the soul 
According to Bakhurst, there are "two principal styles of anti-Cartesianism on the contemporary scene": The first includes 
"varieties of naturalism", which "aspire to explain the relation of mind and world by employing only explanatory resources 
compatible with natural sciences." The extreme version of naturalism in the philosophy of mind seeks to replace "mistaken 'folk 
psychology— 
 theory of the mental with a "scientifically more respectable theory cast in neuroscientific terms". The extreme 
forms of naturalism in epistemology consist of "evolutionary approaches to knowledge that construe matters of justification of 
belief purely in terms of an organism's strategies for adaptation to its environment". Both extremes are "exercises in revisionary 
metaphysics in the name of science, in that they seek to engineer fundamental changes in our present conceptions of ourselves". 
The second style of anti-Cartisianism takes shape in "radical constructivism", whose proponents contend that "it is a mistake to 
argue that our representations genuinely depict an objective world" (Bakhurst, 1997, p. 38). 
12 	 , Baha'i 
	 do not support the Cartesian duality of body and mind: "The mind comprehendeth the abstract by the aid of 
the concrete...It is by the aid of such senses as those of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch that the mind comprehendeth" 
(Band'i World Centre, 1976, p. 38). The mind is, however, regarded as "the power of the human spirit", as "the perfection of the 
spirit" and "its essential quality, as the sun's rays are the essential necessity of the sun." It is believed that the rational soul or the 
human spirit "as far as the human ability permits discovers the realities of things and becomes cognizant of their peculiarities and 
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as radiation is an essential property of the sun. It is through the powers of the soul that the mind 
comprehends, imagines, and exerts influence, while the soul is a power that is free. Such a belief, 
taken as an article of faith, if necessary, can admit that the mind comprehends many an abstract 
concept with the help of the concrete observed through the physical senses. The computational 
functions of the brain, as identical as they may be to those of a computer, do not cause difficulty 
for this point of view. The duality of body and mind with all its inherent problems is not a 
necessary consequence of belief in the existence of the soul. The ever-presence of evolving 
culture is not denied as one seeks explanations for individual and collective thought and 
experience. What does occur is that the language being used becomes broader, opening space for 
certain powers to be considered and cultivated. Intelligence ceases to be defined as the capacity 
of the human brain, but more broadly as the combined capacity of a number of interacting 
faculties of the soul. Objectives of curricula are formulated so as to include the sharpening of 
these faculties, allowing the powers of the spirit to flow and bring harmony and development to 
the life of the individual and of humanity as a whole. On a practical level, the introduction of 
such an assumption points to as yet unchartered terrain in the search for solutions to the ever-
evasive challenge of motivation in education. When everything is reduced, explicitly or 
implicitly, to interactions between material entities, one can only seek sources of motivation 
either externally, in social and economic achievements, or internally, in ill-defined notions such 
as self-image and self-satisfaction. But necessary as these may be in specific situations, 
motivation to learn is best sought in the realm of spirit, as an illumination that excites one or 
more of the faculties of the human soul. 
These considerations add new dimensions to understanding to which I have referred as a process 
and occasionally as an achievement. Understanding, at least in its infinite sense, will also have to 
be considered an attribute of the human soul. There will continue to be facets of understanding 
tied to the world of the contingent, like processing information and negotiating meaning in a 
cultural context. Yet understanding as a whole will acquire permanence, not in the sense of 
storing and retaining knowledge in memory, but the kind of permanence that the concept of soul 
effects, and of the qualities and properties of beings..." The human soul "does not descend into the body", because descent and 
entrance are characteristic of physical bodies. "The spirit is connected with the body, as this light is with the mirror. When the 
mirror is clear and perfect, the light of the lamp will be apparent in it..." (Band'i Publishing Trust, 1981, pp. 207, 239) 
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brings to the contemplation of human existence. Permanence does not mean static state; 
understanding will be an attribute endowed with its own dynamics of growth fed by the 
comprehension of many concepts and facts facilitated by the functioning of the brain. 
When this added dimension is acknowledged, it becomes possible to explore the relationship of 
understanding as an attribute of the human soul with other such attributes, which, in addition to 
finite manifestations in doing, have a more independent existence related to being. Underlying 
this line of reasoning is the assumption that among all the virtues a human being can possess, 
those in at least one category, to which I refer as 'spiritual qualities', can be considered 
constituents of our being, and that the development of these is of particular significance to moral 
empowerment. Whereas in popular discourse, an assortment of characteristics such as 
punctuality, amiability, alertness—and some modern creations like assertiveness—are discussed 
as virtues, spiritual qualities are distinct attributes fundamental to our identity as a human being. 
In fact, by them, a wide range of virtues gain significance. The sharing of one's resources with 
others in specific circumstances, for example, takes new meaning when it is intimately connected 
to generosity as a divine perfection that the soul of the human being is to increasingly acquire. A 
kindly tongue as a manifestation of a kind heart has more substance than the mere habit acquired 
in conformity with the rules of etiquette. Tactfulness, to take another example, seems superficial 
when compared to qualities such as wisdom and humility. The immediate task before me, then, 
is to explore the existence and nature of this special category of human qualities and establish the 
reciprocal relationship between fostering them and the nurturing of understanding in education. 
Virtues and Practice 
The exploration being proposed in the above cannot be carried out without an analysis of the 
concept of virtue in its most general sense. But the theme has been treated at such great depth in 
philosophy that trying to address it in any systematic way here would be pretentious. The way I 
approach it is to select one credible and substantial account, in this case Maclntyre's account of 
virtues and practice, not to be used as theoretical framework, but like the works of other authors 
examined in this thesis, as a source of insight. 
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Maclntyre's narrative is well known. There are two concepts crucial to his account: 'practice' 
and 'goods'. The word practice refers to "any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity" (Maclntyre, 1981, p. 175). Maclntyre argues that each practice 
holds within it a set of internal goods which are realized through the achievement of standards of 
excellence appropriate to and definitive, albeit partially, of that practice. Personal attitudes and 
preferences need to submit themselves to the authority of the best standards and rules of practice, 
even though "the standards are not themselves immune from criticism" (ibid., p. 177). There are 
distinctions between internal and external goods. If motivated by an external good such as a 
candy, a child playing chess, for example, would have every reason to cheat in order to win. 
However, he could find a whole new set of reasons for playing if he came to recognize goods 
that are internal to the game. The child would, for instance, become motivated by how the game 
develops "a certain highly particular kind of analytic skill", "strategic imagination" and 
"competitive intensity" (pp. 175-6). External goods, prestige and money, for example, are 
"contingently" attached to practices; one could always obtain them through alternative means. 
Internal goods, on the other hand, can only be achieved by engaging in a particular practice and 
are "identified and recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question" (p. 
176). Those who lack the relevant experience are not competent judges of internal goods. 
The discussion of internal goods and standards of excellence enables Maclntyre to present a 
notion of virtues which wraps them in practices: "A virtue is an acquired human quality the 
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods" (p. 178). 
Higgins points out that, while for Maclntyre virtues are primarily "dispositions" or "excellences" 
of persons to achieve goods, they also constitute good in themselves, since they are partly 
constitutive of our well-being (Higgins, 2003, p. 281). 
Although practices are vital to the development of virtues at a fundamental level, they are not the 
only context within which the concept takes shape. Virtues are rendered "intelligible" against a 
background of social and moral life. It is only in a particular historical milieu that the exercise of 
virtues assumes meaning. The list of virtues and their rankings are not constant across eras and 
traditions. A certain virtue considered significant within one tradition can be non-existent in 
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another and sometimes even seen as a vice. In this sense, there are "too many different and 
incompatible conceptions of a virtue for there to be any real unity to the concept" (MacIntyre, 
1981, p. 174). Yet, a core conception of a virtue does emerge if one considers three contexts 
within which the virtue develops: 'practice', 'the narrative order of a single human life' and 
`moral tradition'. Higgins in his examination of Maclntyre's moral theory identifies these three 
contexts as "three levels of valuation"13, and explains how the virtue of patience, for example, 
moves through the first two of these three levels. Its exercise would allow the practitioner to 
draw out the goods internal to a practice and to preserve its integrity. In considering the patience 
required in each instance, one has to ask "waiting for what?" This question can only be answered 
in the context of a practice—a teacher is patient with the students and a politician in negotiation. 
Higgins suggests that the concept of patience is saved from rupturing as varieties of 'patience' 
are multiplied within different practices through the individual life narrative. A parent, a potter 
and a politician would each have to find out what role the virtue of patience would play in life 
outside a specific practice and synthesize different understandings of patience (Higgins, 2003, pp. 
281-2). 
In the third level, virtues are seen as those qualities the exercise of which lead to the human telos. 
Here "the moral horizon of a tradition", in Higgin's analysis, provides the broadest structure 
within which virtues can be evaluated in terms of the inquiry into good qua human beings. 
Virtues acquire specific significance and are graded differently across various traditions and 
within a particular age or cultural ethos. At this level, the virtue of patience, taking Higgins' line 
of reasoning, would mean something quite different in a modern industrial culture where it can 
easily be seen as an obstacle to success and in the ancient Chinese culture where it was among 
the most venerated qualities. 
13 
Higgins points out that "Macintyre's three moral domains are ultimately complementary, indeed interdependent". There is 
both "an upward and a downward dependence among the three levels". The "upward dependence can be seen as one moves from 
the level of practices, where goods and virtues are specific and multifarious, through the level of the individual, where some work 
of synthesis and hierarchisation is already necessary, to the level of the community where fewer, more general goods and virtues 
are endorsed by all". There is also a downward dependence. Communities rely on practices "to pursue their communal goods"; 
these goods are structured in terms of the goods internal to particular practices; and the work of integrating them into individual 
and communal lives is itself a practice. (Higgins, 2003, pp. 282-3) 
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Maclntyre's account of virtue and practice provides a language and valuable concepts with the 
help of which I can explore the notion of spiritual qualities. Virtues, whether analyzed in 
philosophical discourse or addressed in a programme of moral education, denote a wide range of 
attributes including attitudes, intellectual abilities, habits and mental as well as physical skills. To 
tie the development of a number of such virtues to specific practices may be highly useful for 
specific educational programmes. But is the conception of every category of virtue, one must ask, 
to be so fundamentally linked to practice? There is no doubt that engagement in any given 
practice does require the development of certain virtues and that these virtues are the means to 
the achievement of goods internal to the practice in question. And vice versa, every virtue will 
find expression in one or another practice. But are there not categories of virtues for which the 
relationship with practices is not so fundamental a feature, but in fact of secondary importance? 
Maclntyre himself appears to be cognizant of this problem when, as mentioned above, he 
incorporates into his account two other contexts within which the concept of virtues become 
intelligible. Beyond this, he feels obliged to identify virtues of justice, courage and honesty "as 
necessary components of any practice with internal goods and standards of excellence" 
(Maclntyre, 1981, p. 178), without which they will only be instruments for achieving external 
goods. 
But, even when the various dimensions of Maclntyre's narrative are taken into account, 
something more fundamental seems to be missing: the possibility that certain virtues, apart from 
being instrumental in achieving internal goods in one or more practices, may be essential 
components of being human. Take, for example, Anscombe's statement that the human being 
"regarded not just biologically, but from the point of view of the activity of thought and choice in 
the various departments of life—powers and faculties and use of things needed—'has' such-and-
such virtues: and this 'man' with the complete set of virtues is the 'norm', as 'man' with, e.g., a 
complete set of teeth is a norm" (Anscombe, 1981, p. 38). 
There are other difficulties with the tendency to overemphasize the concept of practice in the 
exploration of human qualities. One difficulty arises in relation to motivation. Achieving internal 
goods can be a source of motivation for participants in a practice. But what is it in the child that 
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would recognize the value of the internal goods as opposed to the candy he may receive if he 
performs well? From the point of view of an educator, at least, being motivated by internal goods 
is highly desirable. Yet, no matter how much consideration is given to goods internal to a 
practice, the conditions internal to the learner that give rise to motivation cannot be sidestepped. 
In the case of the child learning to play chess, "competitive intensity" is one of the internal goods 
mentioned by Maclntyre. But what correspondence is there, one may ask, between competitive 
intensity in playing chess and competitiveness as an inner quality? Should competitiveness be 
nurtured within the child irrespective of how it could undermine certain other highly valued 
qualities, only because it is considered an indispensable good to a practice? 
My intention here is not to argue that educational processes would not be concerned with 
practices per se. But in doing so, they would have to explore a number of questions that are not 
immediately answered, at least by Maclntyre's account of virtues. For example, how is the 
integrity of a practice ensured? The apparent answer is that the authority and standards of 
excellence in a practice, albeit themselves susceptible to criticism, are to provide the framework. 
Attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes have to be subordinated to these standards. But other 
factors such as profound moral convictions, principles and beliefs, which could be considered 
goods in themselves, also affect the way a practice unfolds. How are these to be treated in 
helping an individual adopt the required standards of excellence while being initiated into a 
practice? 
It is also necessary to ask how an educational process should deal with sets of internal goods that 
either conflict or compete with each other. MacIntyre suggests that individuals engaged in 
various practices each with their own sets of goods could ask themselves "what is my good?" 
This would involve the ability to put in order the various goods they acknowledge and find for 
each a place among other goods, presumably in the context of the narrative of their own lives. 
And they would succeed in this undertaking only if they do it "in company with those who 
participate with them in various practices and who also participate with them in the common life 
of the whole community" (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 288). What is being suggested is the formulation 
of a scheme whereby individuals and communities can determine their own good and organize 
the structure of goods internal to and between practices. Assuming that such an undertaking is 
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possible, what would be the standard against which competing goods as well as the relative 
worth of goods in various practices can be evaluated? What arises here is the troubling 
possibility of "conceptual incommensurability", this time within practices, which Maclntyre 
himself views as responsible for the moral disorder of our age. It is doubtful that "participation in 
the common life of the community" alone can, in the climate of our modern culture, provide the 
solution to this problem. Maclntyre's description of the concept of `character'—different to that 
of 'social role'—shows how a number of 'characters' come to define the culture of a particular 
period and place. He refers to character as "the object of regard" by majority members of a 
culture, as morally legitimizing "a mode of social existence" by which the general population 
come to "understand and evaluate themselves" (Maclntyre, 1981, p. 28). What if we consider the 
bureaucratic manager he so criticizes as a character of our present culture in the above sense? 
Whether Maclntyre regards the domain of management as a practice or not, it would be hard not 
to admit that its authority has dominated the standards of excellence in almost every practice 
including education and that its goods, among which efficiency ranks high, have transformed 
internal goods across many a practice. Maclntyre himself charts the rise of the technocratic 
expert from the search for an ideal social science in the enlightenment era to the goals that 
inspired social reformers which in turn led to the creation of a class of civil servants and 
managers, and later to the "theoretical codification" of practices associated with them by 
sociologists and organizational theorists. Finally "textbooks written by those theorists in schools 
of management and business schools" were used to shape "the managerial practice of the 
contemporary technocratic expert" (ibid., p. 83). Why did this development occur? Did not those 
involved in it "order the various goods" which they acknowledged? What was it in the context of 
their lives or in their moral tradition that gave rise to their definition and choice of virtues? 
It seems to me that, while presenting a highly valuable narrative on virtue, Maclntyre walks too 
closely to the borders of relativism. Others cross the border with no hesitation. Todd May, for 
example, who considers practice to lie at the intersection of the individual and the social, defines 
practices as constitutive of 'who we are'. It is the personal style one develops while engaging in 
practices and not an illusory secret self, according to May, that explains the uniqueness in each 
of us. Moreover, any reference to our being, whether religious or philosophical, that does not fall 
within the purview of practices would equally be an illusion: "an illusion of metaphysical depth" 
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(May, 2001, p. 31). It is ironic to note that a concept common in the phenomenon of religion 
across all traditions is that of self-sacrifice. Yet, the concept is intelligible only when being is 
understood in relation to doing and the exercise of such qualities as love, justice, and humility, 
qualities that have the power to transform conventional relationships both within practices and in 
communities. Achievement of goods within practices as the main motivator for action does not 
pay sufficient attention to such qualities as essential features of personhood. 
Acknowledging the great value of Maclntyre's account, but allowing for other accounts that treat 
certain virtues like justice and honesty at a much more fundamental level, I believe, increases our 
ability to resist moral relativism. David Can, for example, speaks of the danger of attaching 
virtues to rival moral traditions and points out that the language of virtues is "the cross-cultural 
currency of humankind" (Carr, 2003, p. 231). Nussbaum also speaks of the non-relativity of 
Aristotelian virtues in the way they correspond to universal spheres of human experience. 
Appropriate functioning in each sphere defines virtuous action. This objective morality when 
further developed will retain the grounding in actual human experiences without losing "the 
ability to criticize local and traditional moralities" (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 250). It is not that 
avoiding all relativism is possible, or even desirable, if one is to stay away from rigid orthodoxy. 
A relativism established in time, for example, helps one to overcome rigidity. Bernard Williams, 
who differentiates between various forms of ethical relativism, calling a certain form of it 
"vulgar", recognizes a "relativism of distance". Here 'distance' does not refer to the exotic or to 
what is elsewhere, but to the distant past or to the future. He perceives two types of confrontation 
between different moral outlooks: real and notional. In the case of the latter, the contrasting 
outlook does not represent a real option for us. While reflection on past value systems might 
inspire some thought relevant to modern life, we do not live the life of a "Bronze Age chief' or a 
"medieval samurai" and cannot take on their outlooks. However, confrontations among cultures 
of today are real, as we are all within the "causal reach" of one another. Williams criticizes the 
kind of relativism which regards the language of appraisal—good, bad, right, wrong, and so on—
as culture specific. The distinction between "us" and "them" according to him "is not merely 
given", and to "erect it at a certain point involves a political decision or recognition" (Williams, 
2008, p. 68). Williams claims that this type of standard relativism arose first in the Western 
world in the fifth century B.C. when the Greeks "reflected on their encounters" with people who 
58 
were not identified as Greeks. "It was in part, perhaps, a reaction against the sense of superiority 
Greeks typically brought to the distinction." And, "it is no accident that the paradigm expression 
of the distinction between nature and culture, which contributed to relativism, referred to the 
despised enemy: 'fire burns the same in Persia as it does here, but what counts as right and 
wrong is different' (ibid.). In confronting a "hierarchical society" today, Williams suggests that 
"we cannot just count them as them and us as us: we may well have reason to count its members 
as already some of 'us" (pp. 68-9). 
Fostering Spiritual Qualities 
The various observations made in the above seem to justify the search for an account, at least of 
a subset of all virtues, which would overcome some of the difficulties associated with the 
narrative of virtues wrapped in practices, this in a way that the basic value of the narrative is not 
lost. But how would Band'i-inspired educational efforts go about such a search? Once again, I 
look to FUNDAEC, which seems to have taken a few initial steps in this direction, to clarify the 
nature of the task. FUNDAEC begins its search by trying to identify some of the forces that 
motivate a person to pursue the twofold moral purpose mentioned in previous sections. Two 
stand out as of paramount importance. The first is 'attraction to beauty' manifesting itself in 
myriad ways: in love for the majesty and diversity of nature; in the impulse to express beauty 
through the visual arts, music, and crafts; in the pleasure of beholding the fruits of these creative 
endeavours; in the stirrings within the human heart of noble emotions in response to the beauty 
of an idea, the elegance of a scientific theory, and the perfection of character in one's fellow 
human beings; and in longing for order and meaning in the universe and in social relations.' 
The world's great religious traditions see this vital force as directed towards the Beauty of the 
Creator. By acknowledging it, their scriptures awaken and sustain the qualities that are inherent 
in the human soul. This they accomplish "not only by the standard of behaviour they uphold, the 
vision of human perfection they disclose, and the laws they promulgate, but also through the 
14 
Iris Murdoch refers to occasions in our surrounding for "unselfing" as beauty. Beauty is something that nature and good art 
share; it gives a "fairly clear sense to the idea of the quality of experience and change of consciousness". There is distinct 
difference between forced self-directed enjoyment of nature and a "self-forgetful pleasure in the sheer alien pointless independent 
existence of animals, birds, stones, and trees. 'Not how the world is, but that it is, is the mystical.
— Good art, not self-consoling 
fantasy art, "both in its genesis and its enjoyment" is opposed to "selfish obsession". "It invigorates our best faculties 
and ...inspires love in the highest part of the soul" (Murdoch, 1997, pp. 104-5). 
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beauty of the language in which they express profound truths" (FUNDAEC, 2006, p. 23). 
FUNDAEC cites the following passage in order to illustrate the sentiments this language can evoke 
in the human heart: 
0 Ye People that Have Minds to Know and Ears to Hear! The first call of the Beloved is 
this: 0 mystic nightingale! Abide not but in the rose-garden of the spirit. 0 messenger of 
the Solomon of love! Seek thou no shelter except in the Sheba of the well-beloved and 0 
immortal phoenix! Dwell not save on the mount of faithfulness. Therein is thy habitation, 
if on the wings of thy soul thou soarest to the realm of the infinite and seekest to attain 
thy goal. (Band'i Publications Australia, 2009, p. 31) 
The second force identified by FUNDAEC that, together with attraction to beauty, impels moral 
purpose is 'thirst for knowledge'. It is this force that motivates "every human being to gain an 
understanding of the mysteries of the universe and its infinitely diverse phenomena, both on the 
visible and on the invisible planes. It also directs the mind to seek a fuller understanding of the 
mysteries within one's own self. Oriented by a vision of beauty and perfection, an individual 
who is motivated by thirst for knowledge approaches life as an investigator of reality and a 
seeker after truth" (FUNDAEC, 2006, p. 31). The fire of "search, of earnest striving, of longing 
desires, of passionate devotion, of fervid love, of rapture, and ecstasy"15 is to be kindled within 
the seeker's heart and mind, who responding to the dictates of her own noble nature, must be 
impelled to engage in the investigation of reality. 
Before I continue with this line of reasoning, I should pause here and mention a danger inherent 
in the language being used by FUNDAEC in relation to the two forces it describes. Overemphasis 
on the powers of the individual is a disquieting characteristic of the so-called positive pedagogy. 
It is not difficult to confuse convictions about human nobility and potential powers of human 
spirit with exaggerated notions of self. Beliefs centred on the nobility of the human being, if not 
scrutinized with care, can lead to unwarranted romanticism about the individual. This 
romanticism dressed as faith in humanity makes it easy to believe in an array of fashionable 
statements that keep repeating such phrases as 'providing tools for genuine long range success', 
`cultivating imagination', or 'daily educational practice as an adventure in self discovery'. Most 
involved in educational efforts with which I am familiar find it difficult to weed out ideas whose 
15 See (Band'i Publishing Trust, 1978, p. 266) 
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pretentions mask their meaninglessness. Yet this is an ability they need to acquire if they aim to 
focus on the true manifestations of human nobility. 
With this cautionary note in mind, let me ask if this brief examination of the two forces given 
such prominence in FUNDAEC'S thinking can shed some light on the nature of spiritual qualities 
as a category of attributes education would need to address. The task is not to define spiritual 
qualities but to point to some of the characteristics that would make it possible to distinguish 
them, with some clarity, from other categories of virtues. One statement that suggests itself is 
that spiritual qualities are those attributes of the learner that are intimately involved in the 
operation of the two motivating forces, without which, in fact, the forces would lose their 
efficacy. At the same time, understanding, the way I have tried to depict it here, is like the water 
that satisfies one's thirst for knowledge and the light that guides one's attraction to beauty. In 
this sense, nurturing understanding and fostering spiritual qualities need to be considered 
inseparable goals of education as moral empowerment. There is a clear implication here that one 
needs to continually develop certain spiritual qualities in order to advance in understanding, and 
simultaneously, the development of spiritual qualities requires continual advancement in 
understanding. But I think the connection between the two processes runs deeper. 
The Band'i writings consider certain qualities such as justice, love, generosity, truthfulness, and 
faith to be reflections of divine attributes in the mirror of the human heart. In fact, a fundamental 
purpose of earthly existence is taught to be the acquisition of these qualities, which, as do 
physical organs developed in the womb of the mother for life after birth, define the capacity of 
the human soul in its infinite journey towards the source of all beauty and knowledge. 
Understanding, too, is a crucial determining factor of this capacity in the soul's eternal evolution. 
It is in this relationship with the divine that the deeper connection between understanding and 
spiritual qualities would be sought by a Band'i-inspired educational endeavour. 
For the purposes of this inquiry, I do not need to explore the mystical components of Band'i 
belief, and I have only touched on a few propositions because a Baha.'i-inspired discourse on 
education cannot ignore them. But emphasis on certain qualities as essential constituents of the 
human being does not have to depend on mystical arguments. A brief reference to the way 
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FUNDAEC introduces and discusses the concept of spiritual qualities in a first-level text—
remembering that it is to guide a philosophical discussion among young adolescents—may prove 
useful. The textbook in question is called Properties and is the first in a series dedicated to the 
enhancement of capabilities related to the power of expression, beginning with the examination 
of words and concepts that help us describe the world around us with clarity. The unit opens with 
a discussion of concepts and associated words that enable us to distinguish and describe the 
objects we see: shape, size, position and colour. It goes on to introduce the concept of properties 
of matter, both general—for example, that it can exist in the three phases: solid, liquid and gas 
each with its own general properties—and specific to a given substance—for example, specific 
heat and melting and boiling points. Having explored the concept of property in some detail 
through simple readings and language exercises, it turns to the human being by asking whether 
the concept also applies to human beings. Do they have general and specific properties that we 
can use to describe them? Do they have properties in common with animals, plants and minerals 
and do they have their own unique properties? In discussing such questions, it suggests that 
although in describing a person we do not use the word 'property', we do employ terms like 
attributes and qualities, which convey the same kind of meaning. Having examined briefly 
attributes such as honesty, courage and generosity, the text asks the students whether honesty or 
dishonesty, truthfulness or deceit, kindness or cruelty, generosity or greed are properties of the 
human being. To answer this question, it proposes that human beings possess a higher and a 
lower nature. When the attributes of the higher are not present, then the characteristics of the 
lower dominate. "The higher nature must control the lower nature in order for a person to be 
noble. Nobility is the true property of a human being who is to be characterized by such 
qualities as honesty, truthfulness, kindness and generosity" (FUNDAEC, 2004, p. 51). 
It is not necessary to go into the details of the lessons in question. Being a unit on language, it 
has ample scope to introduce concepts and words, facilitating, thereby, a rich discussion of 
spiritual qualities without entering into a religious discourse. In relation to truthfulness as a 
`property of the human being', for example, it becomes possible to discuss the difference 
between lies and errors, the dangers of propagating falsehood unintentionally and of not 
recognizing one's own prejudice, the possibility of lying to oneself, and how truthfulness, in the 
final analysis, demands dedication to the investigation of reality. The lesson on justice as another 
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property of the human being returns to the question of prejudice. "The habit of making decisions 
without investigating reality breeds prejudice. Prejudices flourish because people spend their 
lives blindly imitating others. With the help of justice, we can see with our own eyes and not 
through the eyes of others. Justice is the quality that allows us to distinguish between truth and 
falsehood" (ibid., p. 59).16 The lesson on love, reminds the students of how the concept is 
misused in today's society, confusing it with physical desire. "The basest forms of behaviour are 
said to be caused by love, and in its name, acts of revenge, jealousy, and infidelity are justified" 
(p. 63). The lesson then goes on to examine how certain other spiritual qualities such as sincerity, 
forgiveness, generosity and patience are intimately connected with love. 
The idea of transcendence, so closely associated with religious experience, has also been 
introduced in this unit. Students are asked to explore it as a capacity of the human soul to 
overcome the limitations imposed on it by nature, for instance, by understanding the laws that 
govern it and utilizing them. In relation to one's own nature, to give another example, this 
capacity helps in controlling anger and overcoming disappointment. An attempt to become 
wealthy by oppressing others is presented as the example of a misguided effort to rise above 
one's circumstances, to transcend perceived or real limits imposed on one by society. The desire 
to transcend, not controlled by justice, can lead us to abase ourselves, despite our inherent 
nobility. 
I have dwelt here on these few lessons because their content allows me to illustrate certain 
characteristics of an account of spiritual qualities with which I believe any Band'i-inspired 
educational programme would be comfortable. A few of these characteristics I discuss below in 
order to give some shape to this account, and bring the chapter to an end. 
Clearly a large number of concepts are connected to each spiritual quality. Nurturing the 
understanding of these concepts is part of fostering spiritual qualities. In this sense, they 
constitute a category of 'objects of understanding'. Nurturing the necessary understanding 
16 
The statement on justice in the above is based on a passage from the Writings of Band'u'llah: "The best beloved of all things 
in My sight is Justice; turn not away therefrom if thou desirest Me, and neglect it not that I may confide in thee. By its aid thou 
shalt see with thine own eyes and not through the eyes of others, and shalt know of thine own knowledge and not through the 
knowledge of thy neighbor..." (Band'i Publications Australia, 2009, p. 6). 
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involves the elaboration of the appropriate language, in this case inspired by insights from 
religion, a theme that will be discussed in chapter 5 in the section on the complemetarity of the 
languages of science and religion. As it will be argued there, the language in question will have 
to embrace an expanded rationality in order to tap the roots of motivation in students. One may 
ask, what are some of the features of the appropriate language? 
First, the language would have to involve the student in an exploration of moral issues but stay 
away from the relativism of such approaches as values clarification. To achieve this, it has to set 
a direction—a higher and a lower—but avoid moralizing. In this context, Charles Taylor's 
account of languages of qualitative contrast offers valuable insight. The language of qualitative 
contrast, although marginalized by utilitarianism and formalism, acknowledges the "qualitative 
distinctions we make between different actions, or feelings, or modes of life, as being morally 
higher or lower, noble or base, admirable or contemptible" (Taylor, 1982, p. 132). Those, for 
example, who hold integrity, liberation and charity as worthy of pursuit in a special way, 
incommensurate with pursuit of wealth, position or comfort, are often ready to sacrifice these 
lesser goods for the higher ones. This contrast can be expressed in a number of ways, through 
admiration for that which is higher and contempt for the base, through a sensibility to the higher 
good loosely called 'awe', and through the notion of obligation in relation to ordinary and higher 
goals: ordinary goals are dispensable in the sense that no one should be condemned for not 
having them, whereas higher goals, such as integrity, are indispensable—"those who lack them 
are not just free of some additional instrumental obligations which weigh with the rest of us; they 
are open to censure" (ibid, p. 136). The languages of qualitative contrast are not restricted to the 
moral sphere; they are also used, for example, in the aesthetic domain. Although in the case of 
the former the boundary around what constitutes moral cannot always be neatly drawn, there are 
instances when indifference towards a certain good is blameworthy and a relatively firm dividing 
line can be discerned. In this sense, "The languages of qualitative contrast embrace more than the 
moral" (p. 137). The language "characterizes motivation in a fashion which marks qualitative 
contrasts and which is therefore not morally neutral" (p. 141). 
Second, the language that is to serve as a vehicle for understanding spiritual qualities should 
convey a vision of human existence that extends beyond the requirements and needs of day-to- 
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day life. The understanding achieved is to enable the student to distinguish between superficial 
and lasting results of one's words and actions, directing moral purpose towards that which has 
permanence. Aspiring toward that which is lasting has too often led to contempt for this world. 
The understanding of spiritual qualities as vital elements of human existence, it is assumed, can 
be nurtured in such a way that it leads not to asceticism but to a balanced approach to one's own 
spiritual growth and one's contribution to the processes that transform society. 
An important characteristic of the account of spiritual qualities—of which these paragraphs are 
only an initial outline and which has to be elaborated through action and reflection by the 
network of Band'i-inspired educational endeavours—is its ability to address simultaneously the 
autonomous and permanent existence of spiritual qualities and the evolutionary changes in their 
meanings according to historical context. This would be congruent with the Band'i belief that 
religious truth is relative and revealed progressively. The human heart, for example, is prone to 
love. In the language used by FUNDAEC, to love is one of the 'properties' of the human being. On 
what we focus our love varies from occasion to occasion, and how we go about choosing one or 
another focus is determined by numerous social and cultural factors. In one sequence, for 
example, love can be expressed in larger and larger contexts, a friend, the family, the clan, the 
tribe, and the nation. At a given historical moment, love for one's country may be the largest of 
these contexts and patriotism the highest expression of love, even demanding the sacrifice of 
some of its other manifestations. But if the hallmark of the age of maturity of the human race is 
the realization of the oneness of humankind, the potential for a much wider expression of love, a 
kind of universal love, must be emerging and the fostering of this spiritual quality has to be a 
concern of education. Other loyalties are not necessarily to be forgotten, but they are to take new 
meaning in the context of this larger loyalty. Yet, all such expressions of love, even for the entire 
human race, are limited. In a certain sense, they are finite manifestations of something that is 
infinite. The account being considered here would see the consciousness of this infinite nature of 
love essential to the fostering of love as it expresses itself in changing finite contexts. 
Another characteristic of the account of spiritual qualities that is to serve Band'i-inspired 
educational efforts is the attention it must give to the principle of moderation. Otherwise the 
process of moral empowerment is derailed by self-righteousness, and ultimately fanaticism takes 
65 
over. The principle of moderation is often taken to mean walking 'the middle way'. However, in 
the case of spiritual qualities, to speak of moderation as the middle way sounds contradictory. 
What is too much love or too much justice, if these are the properties of the human being? 
FUNDAEC, at least, has tried to overcome this difficulty by focusing on another interpretation of 
moderation, specifically in the way spiritual qualities modify each other. There may be no such 
thing as too much love but the necessity for love to be modified, for example, by justice. The 
notion of excessive justice seems to contradict its nature as a property of the human being; yet if 
justice is not modified by compassion, some of its applications can take on the characteristics of 
cruelty. 
Finally, the understanding of the many concepts that are related to each spiritual quality aids in 
their development in the context of service to humanity. The concept of 'service', in general, 
implies activity for the benefit of others and embraces a variety of undertakings. As an element 
of the framework being explored in this thesis, it refers to acts that are directed by the twofold 
moral purpose and seek the transformation of some aspect of the essential relationships of human 
existence—among individuals and groups, between the individual, community, and the 
institutions of society, and between these and the natural environment. Acts of service are 
characterized by continuity and growing complexity; they are not disconnected events. They 
may initially be simple and easily accomplished, but as knowledge grows and capacity develops, 
the protagonists of moral empowerment are able to take on more demanding challenges. As with 
understanding, the image of a path captures important features of the conception of service. In 
fact, it is often used in the Band'i community to visualize effort and movement as well as 
resilience to overcome difficulties. A path of service invites participation, and participants can 
advance along it at different paces and strides. One does not walk the path alone; there is faith in 
the capacity of others and joy in their accomplishments. Walking the path of service is 
contingent on one's state of being. The efficacy of service is not evaluated merely by the 
perceived success or failure of an enterprise, but also by the extent to which understanding has 
advanced and the necessary spiritual qualities have been developed. This is not an evaluation 
carried out from outside, but by every single participant. The path of service is experienced and 
known not by one or two, but by a growing number of people; an entire population comes to 
assume ownership of it. 
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The relationship between spiritual qualities and acts of service seems to have features in common 
with the way practice and virtues are associated in Maclntyre's account. For example, virtues as 
internal goods are essential to a practice just as spiritual qualities are indispensable to the 
integrity of acts of service. But there is a fundamental difference. Standards that are to guide the 
evolution of practices are usually thought to be within them; acts of service, on the other hand, 
are not merely regulated by the rules and standards of the specific practices with which they are 
associated, but more significantly by the moral values that inspire them. Further, the reality of 
service is not confined to specific actions; it pervades the environment with the potency to 
transform the relationships that comprise it. Service transforms selfish grumble to selfless joy in 
giving, greedy exploitation to reciprocity and fairness, and arrogant knowing to a humble posture 
of learning. 
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CHAPTER 4: OBJECT OF UNDERSTANDING: THE CONTEXT 
If an educational process is to seek the moral empowerment of the student, nurturing 
understanding cannot limit itself to what happens in the mind of the 'subject of understanding'. 
She is to act on many an 'object of understanding', although not all, and contribute to a 
collective effort to transform them. Understanding physical reality allows for transformations 
that include the creation of technology as a fundamental aspect of human culture. In 
transforming the physical, the human agent breaks certain laws of nature only in appearance; in 
reality the laws are such that they permit the transformation in question. That large solid inert 
objects do not fly in the earth's atmosphere is a feature of the way the physical world works only 
at a certain level; there are more fundamental laws that make possible the flight of the airplane. If 
they exist, the laws that govern the evolution of social reality—or of culture—should also allow 
for transformation to occur in this dimension of existence. Understanding an object of 
understanding and acting upon it, then, requires of the subject of understanding a certain posture 
with respect to reality. What is the proper posture and how does an educational process help the 
student to assume it? It seems clear that some way of looking at reality itself is required before 
one tries to answer this question; the philosophical framework guiding the educational process 
must include elements that at least suggest some view of reality, no matter how vague and 
incomplete. Of course, not every view of reality will do. To insist on empowering the students to 
actively participate in the transformation of society and at the same time transmit to them a 
picture of culture as the predetermined outcome of the imposition of the physical environment on 
human beings, for example, is bound to lead to a host of contradictions. What I need to do, then, 
is to present a possible approach to physical, social and spiritual reality which could inform the 
philosophical framework of Band'i-inspired education, knowing that the framework will evolve 
through a process of action and reflection on action. 
As far as physical reality is concerned, the framework being sought in this thesis would be based 
on the premise that the physical universe exists and evolves according to an order the patterns 
and laws of which, in principle, lend themselves to being comprehended by the human mind. 
Band'is would hold to this fundamental conviction upon which the edifice of science is built, and 
would find it supported by the tenets of their Faith. But as mentioned before they would also 
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assume the existence of a larger reality, in which physical reality is embedded, and to which they 
would refer as spiritual reality. The contemplation of this reality is an important aspect of 
religion, particularly its mystical teachings. But this aspect of religion is not the concern of the 
present inquiry and is not being discussed here. There are dimensions of spiritual reality, 
however, that do enter into my discussion of moral empowerment. The arguments presented in 
the previous chapter in relation to spiritual qualities not as mere excellences attached to a 
practice but as attributes of the human being with their own permanent existence are examples of 
such considerations. 
Presenting the first set of basic statements about social reality presents its own difficulties. Social 
theory offers a number of accounts of social reality and its evolution; what I seek, however, are 
accounts that offer insights as to how the subject of understanding is to act on and transform 
social reality. One such account is set forth by John R. Searle in The Construction of Social 
Reality. In what follows, I will describe briefly some of Searle's views but, important as the 
insights gained from his work are for my inquiry, there are a number of features of his thought I 
find problematic. I try to go beyond them, by examining Thomas Nagel's The View from 
Nowhere which proves to be an invaluable source of insight into the way the subject of 
understanding is to situate itself with respect to reality. This examination is enriched by a brief 
reference to the concept of "absolute conception" as set forth by Bernard Williams. 
The relationship between the subject and object of understanding is a theme that is also 
addressed in a somewhat different discourse, one that begins by analyzing problems arising from 
the fragmentation of the knowledge of reality. Fragmentation of knowledge and its ill effects on 
education have been a source of anxiety for FUNDAEC since its inception and a few of its 
arguments, far less rigorous than Nagel's or Williams' but insightful nevertheless, are presented 
in the section that follows the one titled "Positioning the Subject of Understanding". The chapter 
ends with a section on "Thought and Reality" with a brief discussion of some of John 
McDowell's ideas, which I suggest speak to FUNDAEC's concerns at a fundamental level. 
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Constructing Social Reality 
Searle provides a description of social reality the structures of which, though invisible, are 
deeply rooted and emerge from the physical stuff of the universe. He employs examples such as 
money, marriage, property and the like to show that social reality is constructed, while physical 
reality, or what he calls its brute facts—mountains, rivers and planets—exists independently of 
the human mind (Searle, 1995, p. 15). Reality embraces brute facts, as well as facts whose 
existence is "relative to the intentionality of observers, users, etc" (p. 10). Items belonging to this 
latter category are either fabricated to perform a certain function or are naturally occurring 
objects to which an aesthetic, a practical or some other function is assigned. A chair and a screw 
driver are examples of the first while swimming in the river and using specific types of tree as 
lumber are examples of the other. 
The assignment of functions lifts brute facts out of the world of matter and gives them a social 
status not built into their molecular structure. Searle argues that nature is devoid of any intrinsic 
function. It is all about causal relations. It is, for example, intrinsic to nature that the heart pumps 
blood, and causes it to circulate through the body, a movement that is related to other casual 
processes having to do with the survival of the organism. But this brute fact is transformed into a 
different category of facts when we assign a function to it and place it relative to a system of 
values such as life, reproduction and health, supported by a vocabulary that includes malfunction, 
heart disease and heart failure. "We do not speak of better or worse stones unless we have 
assigned a function to stones" (p. 15). 
Functions are either agentive or non-agentive. Agentive functions are assigned relative to the 
interests of conscious agents to fabricated and naturally occurring objects. Non-agentive 
functions are "assigned to naturally occurring objects and processes as part of a theoretical 
account of the phenomenon in question" (pp. 21-2). The function given to a screwdriver is an 
example of the former while the function assigned to heart is an example of the latter. Searle 
goes on to identify a special class of agentive functions that stand for objects and states of affairs 
independent of themselves. These representations of activities and objects which are part of the 
institutional system of language are called 'symbolism' and 'meaning'. I do not need to go into 
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Searle's description of the relationship between language and social reality here. Suffice it to say 
that he sees linguistic forms as partly constitutive of social facts (p. 37). 
In order to give a more complete description of the construction of social reality, Searle adds two 
other features to his account: collective intentionality and agreement. Collective intentionality, 
he argues, should not be equated with individual intentionality coupled with mutual beliefs. He 
argues that those philosophers who thus reduce it misconstrue collective intentionality as a 
commitment to a view that "there exists some Hegelian world spirit, a collective consciousness, 
or something equally implausible" (p. 25). According to him, while it is true that mental life is 
inside each individual brain, it does not follow that all mental life has to refer to individual 
intention. The intentionality inside one's head can be individual as well as collective. The 
violinist playing in an orchestra is doing her part in performing a symphony. There is a collective 
intentionality, although it is contained in the head of each performer separately. Therefore, "we 
intend" is an entity that is real' 7. 
If collective intentionality exists, Searle argues, so does the collective imposition of agentive 
function on objects. When the function imposed on objects is by virtue of their physical features, 
say when two or more people would naturally use a log as a bench, it would not be difficult to 
see collective intentionality at work. However, when the intrinsic physical features of the object 
are not directly responsible for its function, then the imposition of function requires an additional 
element: collective agreement (pp. 38-9). Using the example of territorial boundary, Searle asks 
us to imagine how the concept with its rules and conventions could have evolved from a stone 
wall built by a primitive tribe to keep intruders out, into a boundary marker—say, the remnant of 
a wall—performing the same function by the way of collective agreement. The marker, now 
acting symbolically, is given a function extending beyond its physical features. That a piece of 
paper is considered to be, say, a twenty-dollar bill is another example. Here is a social fact 
belonging to a whole category of facts to which Searle refers as institutional. Institutional facts 
require special human institutions such as language and systems of constitutive rules. 
17 
Searle, in response to his critics, states that he needs "an account of collective intentionality which is consistent with 
methodological individualism" (Searle, 1997, p. 449). His ontology is that of "individual human organisms and their mental 
states", and not of "a primitive ontology of actual human collectives" (p. 450). According to him, the "collective's existence 
consists entirely in the fact that there is a number of individual agents who think of themselves as part of the collective." By 
implication, "We-intentionality can give rise to mutual belief, but does not reduce to I-intentionality plus mutual belief' (p. 453). 
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Constitutive rules in contrast to regulative rules which "regulate antecedently existing activities" 
not only regulate but also "create the very possibility of certain activities" (p. 27). 
With examples such as the above Searle argues that "the key element in the move from the 
collective imposition of function to the creation of institutional facts is the imposition of a 
collective recognized status to which a function is attached" (p. 41). There is a collective status 
attached, for example, to the territorial marker or the piece of paper demanding a whole set of 
institutional arrangements. 
In his description of social reality Searle is clearly trying to establish the logical priority of brute 
facts over institutional facts. He states that his aim is "to assimilate social reality to our basic 
ontology of physics, chemistry, and biology", " to show the continuous line that goes from 
molecules and mountains to screwdrivers, levers, and beautiful sunsets, and then to legislatures, 
money, and nation-states" (p. 41). To develop "a hierarchical taxonomy of social and 
institutional reality" is an objective based on the assumption that "social facts in general, and 
institutional facts especially, are hierarchically structured. Institutional facts exist, so to speak, on 
top of brute physical facts" (p. 35). "What is true of money is true of chess games, elections, and 
universities. All these can take different forms, but for each there must be some physical 
realization" (p. 35). Social reality—in Searle's account—is rooted in the brute facts of an 
external reality. This external reality is composed of particles in fields of force, some of which 
form systems. The systems are divided into living and non-living. Some living systems have 
evolved consciousness to various degrees and human beings are included in this category. 
According to this ontology, just as the human mind represents a set of higher-level features of 
the brain, features that are at once 'mental' and 'physical', culture signifies the culminating point 
of human beings' collective physical evolution. He states that he uses "the 'mental' so construed, 
to show how 'culture' is constructed out of 'nature' (p. 9). 
This brief description of Searle's conception of social reality points to a few elements of the 
philosophical framework being sought here. To understand that much of social reality is actually 
constructed during a long historical process confirms the subject of understanding in her 
intention to transform it. That we assign functions through collective intentionality and 
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agreement and that "we intend" has a reality of its own—irrespective of whether this collective 
intentionality resides in each individual's mind or has an existence akin to "Hegelian world 
spirit"—bring to light the nature of certain interactions between the subject of understanding and 
reality. But I find it difficult to reconcile the totality of Searle's account with the narrative of 
moral empowerment that is gradually being developed. Insights, in the way I am using the 
concept here, do not arise from espousing an explanation in its entirety. Disagreements also help 
achieve clarity. Searle seems inclined to reduce purpose in all its dimensions to function and the 
worldview that emerges from his analysis is largely materialistic. It appears to me that he is 
proposing a kind of physicalism, perhaps as a solution to the mind-body duality when better 
solutions are available. Nagel's views to which I now turn expose the unacceptable features of 
physicalism and establish a relationship between the external and the internal that helps me see 
more clearly the posture to be assumed by the subject of understanding towards physical as well 
as social reality. 
Positioning the Subject of Understanding 
The internal/external tension can to a certain degree be attributed to the claim of objectivity to 
unadulterated truth, on the one hand, and an equally extreme assertion—as in radical 
constructivism (Glaserfeld, 1996)—that there is no knowledge to be found beyond individual 
experience, on the other. Nagel analyzes the notion of objectivity and shows its limitations. He 
reminds us that objectivity is a method of understanding rather than a standard or test of reality. 
He then explores the nature of an objectivity that proves to be different from what he calls 
"physical conception of objectivity". This conception "is not the same thing as our idea of what 
the physical reality is actually like, but it has developed as part of our method of arriving at a 
truer understanding of the physical world, a world that is presented to us initially but somewhat 
inaccurately through sensory perception" (Nagel, 1986, p. 14). It is to this conception of 
objectivity that certain features of the mind present a real challenge. 
Nagel describes the stages through which we gain an objective picture of reality in the physical 
sense. The first stage involves those perceptions which "are caused by the action of things on us, 
through their effects on our bodies, which are themselves parts of the physical world" (ibid.). 
The next stage entails the realization that the perceptual appearances of objects do not resemble 
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and are thus detachable from their true nature. This awareness comes about as we perceive that 
"the same physical properties that cause perceptions in us through our bodies also produce 
different effects on other physical things and can exist without causing any perceptions at all" 
(ibid.). The third stage has to do with forming a conception of the true nature of things 
independent of their perceptual appearance. Our particular as well as the more general human 
perceptual points of view are left out. Models, theories and concepts that are not tied to the 
human perceptual point of view help us advance our understanding of the physical world. 
Nagel notes that the world so conceived is centreless, but he also considers it featureless. He 
argues that this bleached-out physical conception of reality, though powerful, cannot give rise to 
a method for seeking "a complete understanding of reality". For the process began with how 
things appear to us as a result of the effect of the action of things on our bodies. In the course of 
getting closer and closer to an objective understanding of the world, perceptions and specific 
viewpoints were omitted as irrelevant. However, they continue to exist along with "the mental 
activity of forming an objective conception of the physical world, which seems not itself capable 
of physical analysis" (p. 15). Nagel holds that there is more to reality than what the "physical 
conception of objectivity" allows for. Yet, "the physical has been so irresistibly attractive, and 
has so dominated ideas of what there is, that attempts have been made to beat everything into its 
shape and deny the reality of anything that cannot be so reduced" (ibid.). 
There is an underlying "epistemological criterion of reality" in all forms of reductionism—
behaviourist, causal or functionalist—"that only what can be understood in a certain way exists" 
(p. 15). But, unlike the physical aspect of the mental, "the subjective features of conscious 
mental processes" cannot be understood by the methods employed for understanding "the 
physical world that underlies the appearances" (ibid.). The question Nagel poses, therefore, is 
how to include the "subjective in the world as it really is" (p. 16) and whether there is another 
way in which objectivity can be understood. To put it in the language being used here, a better 
conception of objectivity entails a continuously enlarging process involving the subject and 
object of understanding. The subject of understanding places itself in the world by stepping back 
from the initial view of the object of understanding. A more objective view is then formed which 
has the old view and its relation to the world as its object. The old view is now "regarded as an 
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appearance, more subjective than the new view and correctable or confirmable by reference to it" 
(p. 4). The process can continue to yield increasingly more objective understanding of reality. 
Nagel's analysis of objectivity resonates with Bernard Williams' notion of "absolute conception 
of reality" as the ideal of objectivity in science. A key idea in Williams' philosophical 
investigation is the possibility of convergence. He argues that "discussions of objectivity often 
start from considerations about disagreement" (Williams, 1985, p. 132). While there are 
disagreements, which, for example, arising from purely incompatible personal desires, do not 
show any failure of knowledge or understanding on the part of individuals involved, there are 
other disagreements which do reveal lack of understanding of certain shared concepts. There is a 
tradition to think of disagreements in terms of how they fall on the opposite sides of such 
contrasts as practical and theoretical, evaluative and factual, ought and is. In dealing with 
examples of disagreements much work goes into classifying them according to one or another 
contrast. Williams expresses doubts about exercises that reduce the evaluative to the practical 
and those that extend the factual to the theoretical. He believes them to be of "positivist 
inspiration". In examining how disagreements are dealt with, he introduces the idea of 
convergence as the best explanation of the end of disagreement under the most favourable 
conditions. Williams does not limit the scope of explanation to dealing with disagreements. 
Agreements too are in need of explanation but in a different context and with different practical 
implications. 
Williams argues that convergence does not mean the same thing in science and in ethics, which 
he considers two sharply differentiated areas of inquiry. He urges us not to only acknowledge the 
distinction but to understand it in the context of convergence. "In a scientific inquiry there should 
ideally be convergence on an answer, where the best explanation of the convergence involves the 
idea that the answer represents how things are" (p. 136). In the realm of ethics there is not such 
"coherent hope", at least at a high level of generality. He points out that the distinction does not 
have any bearing on the possibility of convergence. Human beings can reach convergence on 
ethical issues. However, it is important to realize that such convergence, unlike convergence in 
science, does not come about as a result of being guided by how things actually are. "This means, 
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among other things, that we understand differently in the two cases the existence of convergence 
or, alternatively, its failure to come about" (ibid.). 
Williams refutes claims made by relativists who suggest that convergence in science is 
insignificant because the notion of the 'world' either as one which confirms our beliefs and 
judgments or as one which is prior to our descriptions of it and which all systems of belief and 
representation are trying to represent is empty, and who argue that in the case of the former, the 
concept of the world does nothing more than repeat our beliefs and in the case of the latter it 
refers to something 'unspecified' and `unspecifiable'. Williams points out that there is a third 
option: a conception of the world already there "in terms of some but not all of our beliefs and 
theories" (ibid., p. 138). When reflecting on the external world which exists independent of our 
experience, we must first concentrate not on our beliefs about it, but on how they represent 
aspects of that world. 
We can select among our beliefs and features of our world picture some that we can 
reasonably claim to represent the world in a way to the maximum degree independent of 
our perspective and its peculiarities. The resultant picture of things, if we can carry 
through this task can be called the "absolute conception" of the world. In terms of that 
conception, we may hope to explain the possibility of our attaining the conception itself, 
and also the possibility of other, perspectival representations. (Williams, 1985, pp. 138-9) 
Williams' notion of "an absolute conception" seems to be at once both the ideal of an objective 
reality that becomes more and more accessible to us and the method which serves to make 
effective a distinction between "the world as it is independent of our experience" and "the world 
as it seems to us" (p. 139). Our perspectival views and those that are different from ours can be 
explained in relation to the conception itself. This conception, Williams states, does not provide 
an account of knowledge, but "the possibility of a convergence characteristic of science" (ibid.). 
The purpose of this brief reference to Williams has been to enhance Nagel's picture of 
objectivity through a conception for which Nagel himself has ample respect. There is a certain 
feature of this kind of approach to reality and the process of understanding that is of particular 
relevance to a Band'i-inspired framework for education. By freeing the notion of objectivity 
from its limited physical conception, it becomes possible to include the subject of understanding 
in the reality it seeks to understand, but not at the centre of it, and as Nagel puts it, "without 
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reducing the mental to the physical". Nagel argues, and I assume Williams would agree with him, 
that we are not part of the world as it appears to us, but as it is in itself, and in this sense we 
should be able to include ourselves in a conception that is not tied exclusively to our point of 
view. We are able to "think of ourselves from outside—but in mental and not physical terms" 
(Nagel, 1986, p. 17). As we place ourselves in the world as it is, we include the existence of 
appearance in an extended reality. And this reality, like physical reality, is centreless. In order to 
imagine this extended reality, we need to consider our own minds as instances of something 
more general. "We must think of mind as a phenomenon to which the human case is not 
necessarily central, even though our minds are the center of our world" (ibid., p. 18). Further, as 
Nagel insists, even in its extended version, objective understanding of reality will always be 
incomplete. "This means that the pursuit of an objective conception of reality comes up against 
limits that are not merely practical, limits that could not be overcome by any merely objective 
intelligence, however powerful" (ibid.). Nagel does not find this to be a cause of alarm because 
"there is no reason to assume that the world as it is in itself must be objectively comprehensible, 
even in an extended sense" (ibid.). That reality extends beyond the physical does not mean that 
"all of it is available to some transcendental perspective that we can reach from here" (ibid.). 
An important feature of Nagel's argument is that he removes the dichotomy between the 
subjective and the objective; the distinction between the two becomes more a matter of degree 
and covers a wide spectrum. It becomes possible to think of reality as "a set of concentric 
spheres, progressively revealed as we detach gradually from the contingencies of the self' (ibid., 
p. 5).We can pursue an objective conception of the world, including the mind, as long as we do 
not assume that everything real can be reached by such a conception. "Reality is not just 
objective reality, and any objective conception of reality must include an acknowledgment of its 
own incompleteness" (ibid., p. 26). 
Nagel presents a significant criticism of physicalism, "... physicalism is based ultimately on a 
form of idealism: an idealism of restricted objectivity. Objectivity of whatever kind is not the test 
of reality. It is just one way of understanding reality" (ibid). This insight into the nature of 
physicalism is important as I try to discover the elements of a philosophical framework for 
Band'i-inspired educational processes not confined to 'religious education'. As mentioned in my 
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brief description of Searle's argument, recognizing that many aspects of social reality are built 
by collective intentionality and agreement and are therefore amenable to transformation is 
relevant to education seen in terms of moral empowerment. That underneath these constructions 
one will invariably find brute facts of the physical world does not present any problems to me 
either. But the question that has to be asked is whether there are other powers working in human 
existence, as real as the physical ones, which also play a fundamental part in the construction of 
social reality. Physicalism would try to explain the existence of these other powers, some of 
which I explored in the context of fostering spiritual qualities in the previous chapter, on the 
basis of the physical world as well; it would not be content with explaining 'some' or even 
`many' observed phenomena in terms of the physical, its ambitious project would be to explain 
`all'. That is the reductionism, and the idealism, that Nagel, if I am reading him correctly, seems 
to reject.18 The immediate question such reductionism raises in my inquiry is whether the 
twofold moral purpose of pursuing one's own spiritual and intellectual growth and contributing 
to the transformation of society—a purpose that provides the impulse for the educational process 
being investigated here—arises from physical evolution, and in the final analysis, from the 
fundamental forces that physics believes govern the operation of the physical universe. To be 
hesitant to take such a leap of faith is not to deny that the theory of evolution is one of the 
greatest achievements of science, or to suggest the need to introduce into it woolly ideas that 
would reduce its scientific value. What is at stake is simply this: are the students to be convinced 
that the extraordinary effort the pursuit of twofold purpose will demand from them is a mere 
requirement of the 'selfish gene'? 
Fragmentation 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, some of the issues discussed in the above also 
present themselves when one looks at the problems caused by the fragmentation of knowledge in 
education. FUNDAEC's concern with the question originates in observations related to social 
action. Social action, it reminds its students, does not mean frantic activism, participation in 
8 
"The realism I am defending says that the world may be inconceivable to our minds, and the idealism I am opposing says it 
could not be. There are other more radical forms of idealism than this, such as the view that to exist is to be perceived, or that 
what exists must be an object of possible experience for us, or that what exists or is the case must be an object of possible 
knowledge for us, or must be verifiable by us, or that it must be something about which we could have evidence...I believe that 
they all depend finally on the more general form of idealism." (Nagel, 1986, p. 91) 
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every project that seems to address one or another social ill. Its main purpose is to transform 
existing social reality into a higher one and as such depends on an ever deepening knowledge of 
that reality based on an increasingly more accurate reading of society. But what is the nature of 
such knowledge and how are we to gain it? 
In trying to answer this question in a chapter of a text called Constructing a Framework for 
Social Action, it offers a mixture of its own thoughts and those of David Bohm in Wholeness and 
the Implicate Order. Actually FUNDAEC'S affinity with Bohm is limited; its founders are clearly 
at home with his expressions as a scientist, but wary of the way he introduces a certain brand of 
mysticism into science. As far as the question of fragmentation of knowledge is concerned, the 
chapter in question does rely heavily on Bohm's analysis of the subject. The summary of 
arguments presented below, although not a direct quote from FUNDAEC, is entirely based on its 
ideas. 
According to Bohm, in today's society, the human mind is struggling with a state of confusion 
arising from a fragmentation that interferes with its clarity of perception and creates an endless 
series of problems without the ability to solve most of them. Society has been broken up into 
separate and conflicting parts, and the environment, viewed as an aggregate of separately 
existing parts, is exploited by different groups of people. Further, each individual human being 
"has been fragmented into a large number of separate and conflicting compartments, according 
to his different desires, aims, ambitions, loyalties, psychological characteristics, etc., to such an 
extent that it is generally accepted that some degree of neurosis is inevitable..." (Bohm, 2002, p. 
2). That these fragments exist separately is but an illusion. While one may consider 
fragmentation of cities, religions, political systems and so on as reality and wholeness only an 
ideal towards which we should strive, for Bohm "wholeness is what is real, and...fragmentation 
is the response of this whole to man's action, guided by illusory perception, which is shaped by 
fragmentary thought" (p. 9). 
Bohm admits that in practice it is not possible to deal with the whole of reality at once. It is 
necessary for the human mind to divide things up in order to reduce problems to manageable 
sizes. The process of division is a way of thinking that is useful mainly in the practical, technical 
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and functional domains. When this mode of thinking is carried to how a person thinks of himself 
and the world in which he lives—what Bohm calls his "self-world view", then he no longer 
considers the divisions as mere constructs of his mind that are useful or convenient, but rather 
begins to see and experience himself and his world as actually constituted of separately existent 
fragments. The fragments assume an autonomous and independent existence: 
Being guided by a fragmentary self-world view, man then acts in such a way as to try to 
break himself and the world up, so that all seems to correspond to his way of thinking. 
Man thus obtains an apparent proof of the correctness of his fragmentary self-world view 
though, of course, he overlooks the fact that it is he himself, acting according to his mode 
of thought, who has brought about the fragmentation that now seems to have an 
autonomous existence, independent of his will and his desire. (ibid., p. 3) 
In considering Bohm's description of self-world view, one has to acknowledge that human 
beings have a deep longing for wholeness. How does a humanity looking for wholeness, it has to 
be asked, end ups in the throes of fragmentation? Bohm appears to be seeking the roots of the 
problem of fragmentation in fundamental questions of epistemology: 
[F]ragmentation is continually being brought about by the almost universal habit of 
taking the content of our thought for a 'description of the world as it is'. Or we could say 
that, in this habit, our thought is regarded as in direct correspondence with objective 
reality. Since our thought is pervaded with differences and distinctions, it follows that 
such a habit leads us to look on these as real divisions, so that the world is then seen and 
experienced as actually broken up into fragments. (p. 4) 
I should mention here that the ideas discussed in the above resonate with a statement found in 
Band'i scriptures that the human mind cannot know the essence of things. This idea is 
fundamental to Baha'i belief in relation to the 'spiritual world', and particularly to the concept of 
God referred to as the 'Unknowable Essence'. It is also applied to the physical world: what is 
knowable is only the attributes of things. This is clear when one tries to think of such 
fundamental concepts as time, space, matter and energy. But the idea is applicable to social 
reality as well: No matter how precise and eloquent our descriptions of social systems and 
processes may be, they are models of reality, not reality itself. 
Bohm states that in scientific research "a great deal of thinking is in terms of theories," and looks 
into the roots of the meaning of the word in Greek to support his notion that "theory is primarily 
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a form of insight, i.e. a way of looking at the world, and not a form of knowledge of how the 
world is" (Bohm, 2002, p. 4). That Newtonian theory, which explained so many phenomena with 
such accuracy, he reminds us, was superseded later by relativity and quantum mechanics does 
not mean that it was wrong. It means that a theory works in a certain domain, that is, for a certain 
range of phenomena, and ceases to work outside this range. Bohm uses the words "clear" and 
"unclear" to express this idea. "The Newtonian form of insight worked very well for several 
centuries but ultimately (like the ancient Greek insights that came before it) led to unclear results 
when extended into new domains" (p. 5). In these new domains, relativity and quantum 
mechanics give new forms of insight and a radically different picture of the world from that of 
Newton. 
If we supposed that theories gave true knowledge, corresponding to 'reality as it is', then 
we would have to conclude that Newtonian theory was true until around 1900, after 
which it suddenly became false, while relativity and quantum theory suddenly became 
the truth. Such an absurd conclusion does not rise, however, if we say that all theories are 
insights, which are neither true nor false but, rather, clear in certain domains, and unclear 
when extended beyond these domains. (pp. 5-6) 
Further, Bohm rules out the possibility of a final form of insight corresponding to absolute truth 
or even a steady series of approximations to it. Rather, he argues that "one may expect the 
unending development of new forms of insight (which will, however, assimilate certain key 
features of the older forms as simplifications, in the way the relativity theory does with 
Newtonian theory)" (p. 6). This requires, however, that our theories be regarded "primarily as 
ways of looking at the world as a whole (i.e. world views) rather than 'as absolutely true 
knowledge of how things are' (or as steady approaches toward the latter)" (ibid.). 
The understanding that theory is a series of insights into reality, and not absolute knowledge of 
how things are, constitutes an important element of FUNDAEC's conceptual framework and, I 
believe, a Band'i-inspired discourse on education would easily identify with it. But this is only 
half of the story. It also has to be accepted, as any move away from positivism would require, 
that the models and theories we carry in our mind, whether elaborate or rudimentary, influence 
the way we observe things, what we see and what we accept as indisputable facts.19 This does 
19 
There are, of course, many subtleties to the way observation and theory interact. But the fact itself that observation statements 
are made in the context of a-priori knowledge is indisputable. A.F. Chalmers, for example, in his introductory book What is this 
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not deny the existence of objective reality. What it does is to distinguish between objective 
reality as one interconnected whole, and our own models of reality that are necessarily about 
fragments of it. 
Thought and Reality 
The notion that our theories about reality are not exact representations of reality as it is, although 
highly attractive, could also lead to unwanted fragmentation. It could be misinterpreted to imply 
that we are separating our mind and our thoughts from what we may call objective reality, 
including the physical universe and its diverse phenomena. In arguing that this danger can be 
avoided, FUNDAEC resorts to a speculative reflection. In one of its texts it invites students to 
engage in an exercise of imagination, knowing that the images employed do not represent a 
model of the mind or the world in any way. Having explained the nature of some of the 
challenges that phenomena at the quantum level present to science, it asks the students to 
imagine, as Bohm has done, the possibility that physical reality at its most fundamental level 
does not consist of particles but actually of a flow—of a movement. What are some of the 
images that come to mind, for example, in thinking about the flow of a river? As the river flows, 
numerous structures appear; they last for a certain period of time—some longer than others—and 
eventually disappear. Small vortices come into existence and then vanish. There are other 
patterns such as ripples and waves. 
All these structures have their own identity but are also connected to each other in a 
fundamental way. Their existence and behaviour emerges in the flow of the river. They 
are "abstracted from the flowing movement, arising and vanishing in the total process of 
the flow"20. They only possess relative independence or autonomy of behaviour, for the 
transitory subsistence of each one of them in the flow of the stream is very much 
dependent on the transitory subsistence of the others. Could it be, then, that the particles 
of matter, for example, are like the vortices that appear in the flow of reality? 
(FUNDAEC, 1999, p. 113) 
The text then asks the students to take one further step and imagine that thoughts, such things as 
theories and models, could also be various kinds of structure in this same flow. Through this 
thing called Science mentions three "components of the stand on the facts assumed to be the basis of science": a) "facts are 
directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via the senses"; b) "facts are prior to and independent of theory"; and c) facts 
constitute a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge." He presents clear arguments showing that "each of these 
claims is faced with difficulties and, at best, can only be accepted in a highly modified form" (Chalmers, 1978, pp. 3-4). 
20 See (Bohm, 2002, p. 62). 
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flow, they too would be fundamentally connected with each other and with the particles of 
physical reality and the sharp distinction between the mind and objective reality would disappear. 
This brief account indicates that, having identified the relationship between thought and reality 
as a significant question in need of clarification, FUNDAEC has not been able to advance 
sufficiently towards a well-reasoned answer by looking into Bohm's work. In my search in the 
philosophical literature, I find that McDowell's Mind and World can be a source in which 
valuable insights pointing to the desired direction can be found. To analyze and express his ideas 
is not an easy task and I can only present an outline of what is nothing but an inadequate reading 
of a few elements of his thought. The argument of Mind and World seems to begin by looking at 
the age-old anxiety in philosophy between the plausibility of what McDowell calls "minimal 
empiricism"—the idea that experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating the way our thinking 
is answerable to the world—and the frame of mind that makes it hard to see how experience 
could function as such. He identifies the root of the anxiety with "the possibility of thought" in 
the empirical sense rather than the possibility of empirical knowledge. The problems of the latter 
constitute "more or less inept expressions" of this deeper anxiety: 
...an inchoately felt threat that a way of thinking we find ourselves falling into leaves 
minds simply out of touch with the rest of reality, not just questionably capable of getting 
to know about it. A problem about crediting ourselves with knowledge is just one shape, 
and not the most fundamental, in which that anxiety can make itself felt. (McDowell, 
1994, pp. xii-xiv) 
McDowell associates the criticism of minimal empiricism with Wilfred Sellars' attack on the 
"myth of the given".21 He particularly focuses on Sellars' formulation of the logical space of 
reasons according to which: "in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are 
not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space 
of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says" (Sellars, 1956, pp. 298-9). 
According to McDowell, Sellars is identifying the natural "with the subject matter of a mode of 
discourse that is to be contrasted with placing something in the normative framework constituted 
by the logical space of reasons" (McDowell, 1994, p. xiv). This means separating "concepts that 
21 
Givenness does not pertain only to the notion that empirical knowledge rests on a foundation, but also assumes that mental 
states including private and privileged access to one's own mental states as fundamental features of experience are both logically 
and epistemologically prior to intersubjective concepts pertaining to inner episodes. 
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are intelligible only in terms of how they serve to place things in the logical space of reasons, 
such as the concept of knowledge," from "concepts that can be employed in 'empirical 
description' (ibid.), which according to McDowell can be understood as placing things in the 
logical space of nature. The division leads one, he argues, to the conclusion that the relations that 
make up each logical space are inevitably different in kind. Those of the logical space of nature 
"do not include relations such as one thing's being warranted, or—for the general case—correct, 
in the light of another" (ibid., p. xv). Acceptance of this dichotomy is to place experience 
conceived as "impressions" and "impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory 
capacities" in a logical space other than the logical space of reasons—"a logical space whose 
structure consists in some of its occupants being, for instance, warranted or correct in light of 
others" (p. xv). Experience, in the above sense, cannot serve as a tribunal: mediating a way of 
thinking that is answerable to the world. 
Two resolutions of this tension immediately suggest themselves. The first is to renounce 
empiricism, at least the way experience is construed in terms of impingements on our sensory 
capacities. McDowell sees Sellars' solution in this category, forcing us to abandon empiricism 
"in the relevant sense". This is because he thinks the logical space of reasons to be of a different 
nature when compared with the logical space to which "empirical descriptions" belong. However, 
abandoning empiricism, he is quick to point out, will not explain away its attractions. A second 
way in which the dichotomy between the two logical spaces could be resolved is to consider the 
logical space of reason as part of the logical space of nature. McDowell labels the outlook 
shaped by this approach "bald naturalism". Bald naturalism refuses to accept that relations 
comprising the logical space of reasons are anything but natural and sets out to reconstruct the 
normative relations out of the "conceptual materials whose home is the logical space that Sellars, 
wrongly on this view, contrasts with the logical space of reasons" (p. xviii). McDowell does not 
deny that the programme upon which bald naturalism is embarked may be executable and agrees 
that in fact it does exorcise the philosophical tension in question. However he proposes another 
alternative, which according to him "undercuts a philosophical motivation...for supposing the 
programme must be feasible. It is not philosophically threatening to suppose there is insight in 
the thought that reason is not natural, in the only sense of 'natural' countenanced by bald 
naturalism" (p. xxiii). 
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McDowell's alternative "holds on to the thought" that the "structure of the logical space of 
reasons is sui generis, as compared with the structure of the logical space within which natural 
scientific description situates things" (p. xix). Yet, he argues that accepting "the idea of 
experience" as "the idea of something natural", does not necessarily have to mean that the idea 
has no place in the logical space of reason. This becomes possible if we do not identify "the 
dichotomy of logical spaces with a dichotomy between the natural and the normative" (ibid.). 
McDowell then goes on to consider a second nature which human beings acquire "in part by 
being initiated into conceptual capacities whose interrelations belong in the logical space of 
reasons" (p. xx). By remembering that this second nature exists, we can see that "the operations 
of nature can include circumstances whose descriptions place them in the logical space of 
reasons..." (ibid.). 
In discussing so briefly at the end of this chapter a few insights gained from McDowell, my 
intention has not been to delve into his profound exploration of Mind and World. This is not a 
challenge I need to, or I am even able to take on. What I have tried to do is first to show how 
McDowell's ideas help address FUNDAEC's anxiety about the relationship between thought and 
reality at a profound philosophical level. But in addition there is the question of why a process of 
moral empowerment would put so much emphasis on the development of capabilities in the 
realm of science, particularly the natural sciences. One of the underlying claims of my arguments 
in this thesis is that many intellectual and spiritual qualities and attitudes are common to 
capabilities in both the scientific and ethical domains. McDowell's statement that "the 
conceptual sphere does not exclude the world", in other words, "what we experience is not 
external to the realm of the kind of intelligibility that is proper to meaning" (McDowell, 1994, p. 
72), reveals a fundamental relationship between the two. What is an exciting prospect is that in 
nurturing understanding education need not be confined by the boundaries created around the 
natural and the normative, realizing that "conceptual capacities, capacities for the kind of 
understanding whose correlate is the kind of intelligibility that is proper to meaning, are 
operative also in our perception of the world apart from human beings" (ibid.). 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPLEMENTARITY 
Having identified nurturing understanding as a main concern of educational programmes seeking 
moral empowerment, I dedicated the previous two chapters to an exploration of the nature of the 
subject of the verb 'to understand', the object of the verb 'to understand' and the process of 
understanding itself. These three themes, I have suggested, cannot be studied in isolation from 
each other, and in my analysis I have tried to take into account their interconnections. The 
discussion of the object of understanding up to now has been at the most general level of reality 
in its physical, social, moral and spiritual dimensions. Unless extreme constructivism, in which 
the only aim is to offer students tools to construct their own knowledge, is to be adopted, 
education has to draw upon the universe of knowledge that humanity continually gathers, 
evaluates and organizes about the various aspects of this reality. This chapter is meant to bring 
me a step closer to the question of how the challenge of integrating knowledge in the content of 
the educational programmes in question may be met. How are 'objects of understanding' selected, 
organized and treated in a curriculum which aims to build capacity in students to pursue their 
own intellectual and moral growth and to contribute to the transformation of society? And, which 
are the sources of such elements of knowledge and the 'virtues' with which the student is to be 
endowed? 
A starting point for exploring these questions is Paul Hirst's analysis of such concepts as 
disciplines, fields, and forms of knowledge. In the next chapter, I will examine his ideas in more 
detail; for now, it is sufficient to refer to the classification he proposed of disciplines or forms of 
knowledge—mathematics, physical and biological sciences, human and social sciences, history, 
moral understanding, literature and the fine arts, philosophy and religion—as well as his 
designation of fields of knowledge as theoretical and practical. Hirst used this classification to 
examine the planning and practical conduct of liberal education (Hirst, 1974b). But educational 
programmes with other aims would also look into these disciplines and forms, with all the 
nuances and modifications introduced later, as sources of knowledge from which elements would 
be selected for the elaboration of content. The criteria used to determine which elements should 
be chosen, and in what combination, would depend on the specific aims and the philosophical 
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framework of the programme. When moral empowerment is a major concern, the way religion 
would enter as one of the sources of knowledge is a question that cannot be ignored. 
A number of issues immediately present themselves in this connection. Hirst simply lists 
religion22 along with the other forms; but although disagreements about the contribution each 
discipline makes to education do exist among educators, the divergence of views on the value and 
the possible role of religion is of a different nature. Is the study of religion to be carried out in the 
fashion of humanities as is done in many liberal arts programmes? Is it to be examined as a social 
phenomenon and studied within the discipline of human and social sciences? What is to be done 
about the kind of religious instruction bent on shaping the mind according to dogmas that indeed 
do contradict the logic and the knowledge of the other forms in the above list? An option, one 
that is followed by a number of programmes, is to leave the inculcation of religious belief to 
religious communities, incorporate ethical issues in various areas of secular education as needed, 
and offer 'moral education' separately, drawing on different moral systems as sources of 
knowledge. A Band'i-inspired educational process would not deny the fruitfulness of appropriate 
avenues for the study of religion, but would strive to find a proper space in its curriculum for 
religious concepts and insights—from the major religions of the world in general and the Band'i 
Faith in particular—not as seen from the lens of another discipline but as expressed by religion 
itself, in a way that the contributions of religion to the development of the student's capabilities 
would complement elements taken from other forms of knowledge. As far as I can see, such a 
task is next to impossible if a fresh examination of the relation between science and religion is 
not undertaken. The historical development of the two led to the widespread view that they 
somehow stand in opposition to each other. The problem here is not simply between religion and 
the natural sciences. All the other disciplines mentioned by Hirst are accepted to be in accord 
with human reason in one way or another, but religion, even when deemed reasonable, is often 
considered qualitatively different, fundamentally built on faith as opposed to reason. Religion, of 
22 
Hirst discusses 'religion' as a form of knowledge but also analyzes the value of 'religious education'. He argues for the 
autonomy of moral knowledge based on rational judgment. At the same time, according to him, understanding ourselves as moral 
beings allows for the establishment of a positive relationship between morals and religion. Hirst claims that while there exists a 
domain of religious belief, there is not as yet a "domain of publicly justifiable religious knowledge." As advances are made 
towards establishing such a domain, the content of education will need to include the corresponding knowledge. What is 
important is that schools teach 'about' religion-- not necessarily its history or psychology, but its concepts and truth criteria. The 
purpose is for the students to understand as fully as possible about religion, but this "does not imply belief in or acceptance of 
what its understood" (Hirst, 1974a, p. 187). 
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course, is not the same as faith and science is not the same thing as reason, yet the opposition 
between science and religion is closely associated with an assumed dichotomy between faith and 
reason. In this chapter 1 question this dichotomy, suggesting that it is based on a narrow 
definition of rationality, and argue for complementarity between religion and science—a claim 
that goes further than the assertion that they are not necessarily incompatible with each other. 
That in so many schools of thought science and religion have been held in opposition has 
enormously influenced the ethical and social environment in which 'modern man' lives. But in 
the process of moral empowerment students are to learn to contribute to the transformation of the 
very society in the building of which this modern man has played such a major role. In most 
societies in which Band'i-inspired endeavours are exploring education as moral empowerment, 
the project of modernization—with all its vicissitudes—was promoted by a worldwide enterprise 
called development which set out to save the masses of humanity from the throes of poverty and, 
in the process, managed to impose a particular rationality on these societies.23 It seems reasonable, 
then, to begin the discussion of this chapter with a cursory look at the nature of this enterprise, 
the kind of rationality that initially shaped it and the way it saw—or rather ignored—the spiritual 
dimension of the life of the populations it was intent on modernizing. The fact that 'development' 
was the starting point for the work of FUNDAEC will also help me to continue drawing on its 
experience which was shaped to a great extent by its view of complementarity between science 
and religion. 
The Modernization Project 
Contributing to the transformation of society as discussed here is associated with the larger 
process of humanity's transition to the age of maturity mentioned in the introduction to this 
thesis, and the advance in both material and spiritual civilization that is envisioned to accompany 
it. The social and economic development of nations with substantial reduction in the gap that 
separates the rich and the poor is a significant component of this process. Cultivating the 
23 
M.P.Cowen and R.W. Shenton describe how "the positivists' faith in the potential contained within industrial society for the 
reconciliation of progress and order was only to be actualized, or so they believed, through trusteeship...Trust that industrial 
society would confer social benefit, rather than, promote self-development of the few had to be made active through the agency 
of trusteeship, thus the trusteeship of the few who possessed the knowledge to understand why development could be 
constructive, and were accepted as trustees because they were understood to be already developed, became integral to the 
intention to develop those who remained undeveloped" (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, pp. 116-7). 
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capacity of people to become participants in development rather than mere recipients of 
technological packages and political agendas prepared in centres of power is an important 
component of the empowerment process being examined in this thesis. 
The concept of progress is not new, and words such as 'advanced', 'cultured', 'backward' and 
`uncivilized' have existed in human vocabulary for a long time. Yet, the set of activities through 
which governments and international organizations would collaborate to 'modernize' the entire 
world took shape in the early 1950s, particularly in light of the successes of the reconstruction of 
war-torn Europe. Modernization implied rapid and far reaching changes. Institutions had to 
change in order to allow rational planning and execution of plans; the nation as a whole had to 
develop the capacity to apply modern technology to augment production, increase mobility, 
achieve equality of opportunities and make possible higher standards of living. Out of this 
process, the 'modern man' was to emerge in every country of the world as it had in the 
industrialized nations. His outstanding attributes were efficiency, diligence, orderliness, 
punctuality, frugality, scrupulous honesty, rationality, preparedness for change, alertness to 
opportunities, integrity and self-reliance, and—although it may seem contradictory in light of 
how most people behave in the industrial world today—willingness to take the long view rather 
than seeking short term gains. 
The first two decades of development strategy focused almost exclusively on 'modernization 
through economic growth': capital formation, technological transfer, production stimulated by 
foreign aid, the building of infrastructure including the construction of schools, emphasizing 
planning at every step of the way. Once the World Bank declared in the early 1970s that the aim 
of development had hardly been achieved and that the number of people living in absolute 
poverty had risen to 800 million, confidence in the process was shaken. 
The critical examination by the renowned development thinker Mahbub ul Haq in his book The 
Poverty Curtain of the character of the "development planners"—including himself—who 
worked in the forefront of the enterprise to bring economic growth to their nations illustrates the 
soul searching that ensued. Referring mostly to the highly motivated technocrats labouring in 
developing nations, he stated: These were "men who had tremendous confidence in themselves 
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but little confidence in their own societies which they all wanted to transform in a hurry...They 
were generally men of good intentions, often products of Western liberal education, who played 
the game of development with deadly seriousness" (Haq, 1976, p. 12). He characterized the 
beliefs to which these men held with great conviction in statements such as the following: 
...it is well to recognize that economic growth is a brutal, sordid process...The essence of 
it lies in making the laborer produce more than he is allowed to consume for his 
immediate need...It is immaterial what one chooses to call this surplus—whether 
"surplus value" as Marx usually did, or "saving" or "capital formation," in the 
terminology of modern economic analysis...It would be wrong to dub the consequent 
emergence of surplus values as "exploitation": its justification is economic growth. (p. 3) 
These expressions were considered without question as the obvious products of rational thinking. 
Many of the modified sets of statements that were expressed with equal confidence in the next 
decades shared this same underlying rationality. And today, as the financial sector firms its grip 
on the economic life of the world, every effort is being made to convince the 'modem man' of 
the efficacy of a tough, 'bottom line' approach to the future of humanity, ostensibly a product of 
the proper use of reason. 
It is not necessary to mention in any detail the many changes that the field of development went 
through in the period following the years to which Mahbub ul Haq refers. Suffice it to say that a 
great deal of knowledge was accumulated. A number of essential concepts were introduced into 
both development theory and practice. Basic needs, appropriate technology, participative 
planning, people centred development, participation of women, environmental protection and 
human rights, are a few examples. Slogans like 'development is not a package to be delivered by 
the so-called developed to the underdeveloped' or 'it is better to teach a man how to fish than to 
give him one' became commonplace. Yet despite all the sophistication in planning and execution, 
the number of those living in absolute poverty rose steadily. 
My inquiry is being carried out at a time when 'development' is not as much a central issue in 
global discourse as it used to be. The reason is not that gross injustices have been overcome. The 
crisis of civilization has taken such dimensions that the failure of development is considered only 
one of the many ills humanity is facing. It is, however, instructive to look into the possible 
causes of such an evident failure, for example, how the literature of development during its early 
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years dealt with people's religious convictions, deemed useful only if they promoted some of the 
abovementioned characteristics of the modern man, but more often considered as obstacles in the 
path of modernization. Even the notion of solidarity so central to traditional value systems was 
suspicious, as were the ties of the extended family which interfered with the logic of the market. 
But although the ideals of modernization have penetrated every society on earth, the transition 
from traditional to modern has generated so many negative forces that the stability of the entire 
world is being threatened. Particularly, religion has not gone away. Its resurgence among both 
the materially prosperous and the poor is an undeniable fact in the early years of the 21st century. 
That so much of it seeks a particular kind of change with narrowly focussed and, at times, 
fanatical passion has to be a major concern of educational processes that seek to empower 
students to contribute to social transformation. Is the answer to misdirected religious devotion, 
the rationality of the modern man with 'science', 'philosophy' and 'the humanities' at its centre? 
Or does the experience of the past decades point to the need for another modernity, one in which 
faith and reason are not held in opposition? 
To explore these questions, I adopt and expand on a conception initially introduced into the 
discussion of Band'i-inspired education by FUNDAEC according to which science and religion are 
examined as complementary systems of knowledge and practice. In a world where religious 
fanaticism and extreme relativism are simultaneously on the rise, drawing parallels between 
science and religion is not an easy task. In fact, even talking about religion as a single 
phenomenon, the way one does of science, is usually frowned upon. "Religions not religion" is 
the immediate objection raised. I hope the discussion of this chapter will help justify treating 
religion, at least the totality of the major religions of the world, as a system of knowledge with a 
diversity of communities of practice. As mentioned in chapter 2, the Band'i teachings point to a 
kind of relativism of religious truth in time. I do not need to draw on the specific narrative of 
`progressive revelation' expounded in these teachings. All I need is to suggest that, through 
whatever means, the expression and understanding of religious truth advances, as do science, 
technology and the organization of human society. 
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Scientific Knowledge 
The proposition that science is a system of knowledge and practice is a general statement about 
science that does not depend greatly on the intricacies of demarcation criteria or theoretical 
stances on how scientific knowledge advances. The question is whether there are parallels 
between some of the characteristics of this system of knowledge and religion. Once the existence 
of such parallels is argued and it is accepted that religion can also be examined as a system of 
knowledge and practice in its own right, then it becomes easier to explore the question of 
complementarity of the two systems. 
The first task, that of looking into parallel—but by no means identical—characteristics of science 
and religion as systems of knowledge and practice involves a number of steps, some of which 
have to do with the clarification of the nature of science. This is not a matter to be addressed here 
in any length; a few points should suffice to demonstrate the plausibility of the relevant 
arguments. To begin, naïve descriptions of science which adhere to some rigid conceptions of 
`the scientific method' leave little room for religion as a rational system. In a somewhat 
simplistic summary, such conceptions would consist of the claim that science, the occupation of 
people who have been trained to use their senses, begins with objective observation of 
phenomena. Repeated observations make possible general conclusions reached by minds 
educated to apply carefully the principle of induction. Once universal statements are discovered, 
deduction is used to explain other observed facts and to derive consequences that can then be 
checked through experimentation. The power of science to make predictions which can be tested 
is one of its essential characteristics that helps establish its authority. The application of such 
proven method leads to proven knowledge (FUNDAEC, 2000, pp. 25-6). 
Evidently decades of advance in philosophy of science have made this naïve view obsolete. It is, 
however, possible to argue that more sophisticated explanations of science are not as yet 
widespread. Too often, even those who must be fully aware of the demise of positivism seem to 
employ rigid notions of scientific knowledge in opposition to religious belief. Simon 
Blackburn's rendering of the debate between William Clifford and William James is an 
92 
instructive example in this respect (Blackburn, 2005) 24. Not only does it illustrate the difficulties 
one faces when one holds to a strict duality between faith and reason, but it also shows how 
deep-rooted certain attitudes towards convictions of a religious temperament are in rational 
discourse. 
According to Blackburn, in order to establish "the rigor of reason" Clifford begins the debate 
with the story of a ship-owner who convinced himself, despite the doubts he entertained, that an 
old ship was seaworthy. He told himself that the ship had been on many a voyage and returned 
safely. He dismissed his suspicions and put his trust in Providence to protect the emigrant 
families on board. The ship took to the sea and it sank. The ship-owner received his insurance-
money and "told no tales". The story is to demonstrate the danger that lies in faith. Clifford 
remarks that the "sacred tradition of humanity" consists not in "propositions or statements which 
are to be accepted and believed on the authority of the tradition", but in "questions rightly asked, 
in conceptions which enable us to ask further questions, and in methods of answering questions" 
(Clifford, 1999, p. 91). The rigor of reason lies in its capacity to test things "day by day". 
The counterargument offered by William James, Blackburn contends, suggests the promptings of 
the "passional nature" fed by faith. In his response, James identifies belief as the choice between 
options. At a particular time, we are faced with a "live hypothesis", a belief that has some chance 
of being true. We have two alternatives—either to believe it or to avoid believing—and leaving 
the question open is in itself a "passional decision", with the same risk of losing truth. 
To preach skepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found, is 
tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to 
yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may 
be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion 
laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion 
warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much 
worse than dupery through fear? (James, 2005, pp. 107-8) 
Blackburn criticizes James for deploying rhetorical devices and accuses him of objectifying and 
privatizing belief. He scorns the supposition that when an issue cannot be decided by other 
24 
 Simon Blackburn in his book refers to William K. Clifford's classic essay, "The Ethics of Belief, and William James's reply 
to it. 
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means it is a leap of faith that gives us the "blessings of real knowledge". Suppose, he argues, it 
occurs to you that the oak tree in your garden might contain the spirit of Napoleon and you 
convince yourself of it. Where, he asks, does "real knowledge" come in? Further, he reminds us 
that "against the alleged blessings" of such convictions, we have to lay a "train of social and 
practical disasters, ready to explode. If the oak tree contains the spirit of Napoleon, perhaps the 
child contains the spirit of the devil, and the people next door are all creatures of Satan, and need 
dealing with accordingly" (Blackburn, 2005, p. 11). The intensity of faith—Blackburn agrees 
with Clifford—is hazardous as it leads to actions that would be disastrous. He sees James playing 
the battle between faith and reason as if it were a question of costs and benefits of each. 
"Refusal to believe in something," he observes, and rightly so, "is not a kind of faith" (ibid., p. 
13). His concern is the consequences of dogmatic conviction and the habit of taking risks in the 
name of faith. 
The more such faiths you absorb, the more your risks fail to pay off. You make an 
expensive partner, but is it any worse than that? Clifford, of course, tells us that it is. 
Your habit is dangerous. Your disrespect for caution, for evidence, for plausibility may 
lead anywhere. 'Those who can make you believe absurdities,' said Voltaire, 'can make 
you commit atrocities.' By contrast, my caution cannot do any such thing. (ibid.) 
Blackburn is analyzing and commenting on a sophisticated debate between reason and faith, and 
there is no doubt that his analysis offers valuable insights into the workings of these two human 
faculties. It seems to me, however, that the entire argument is based on an assumption about the 
nature of faith that defines it as lack of knowledge. But can knowledge and faith be so easily 
separated from each other? The conviction in science that there is order in the universe and that 
this order allows itself to be understood by the human mind shows how complex the relationship 
between knowledge and faith can be. Although such a conviction can be the object of 
philosophical scrutiny and there can even be ways of thinking that doubt its validity, it holds 
such a foundational position in science that without it scientific practice seems meaningless. No 
one can, of course, claim that it arises from blind faith. For one thing, scientific investigation 
confirms it at every step. But to attribute its origins to empirical observation would be to 
contradict human experience. In fact, the universe does not present itself to the human being in 
daily life as an ordered entity. The conclusion of the primitive man to assign wilful spirits to 
everything around him is a more immediate response to what we experience in our interactions 
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with the physical universe. That there is order in the universe susceptible to discovery is a 
conviction that humanity acquires collectively; it seems to be driven by something inherent to 
human spirit, confirmed in well-designed experimental arrangements and refined by elaborate 
theoretical explanations. 
Belief in the existence of a certain kind of order in the universe is only one example of the 
convictions upheld by science the acceptance of which involves some degree of faith, although 
not the caricature presented by Blackburn. That the scientific enterprise at any given time 
cherishes beliefs not open to negotiation is a statement which finds support in current 
philosophical discourse. The following passage from a commentary by Laudan is one example: 
...historical and sociological researchers on science strongly suggest that the scientists of 
any epoch...regard some of their beliefs as so fundamental as not to be open to 
repudiation or negotiation. Would Newton, for instance, have been tentative about the 
claim that there were forces in the world? Are quantum mechanicians willing to 
contemplate giving up the uncertainty relation? Are physicists willing to specify 
circumstances under which they would give up energy conservation? Numerous 
historians and philosophers of science (e.g., Kuhn, Mitroff, Feyerabend, Lakatos) have 
documented the existence of a certain degree of dogmatism about core commitments to 
scientific research and have argued that such dogmatism plays a constructive role in 
promoting the aims of science. (Laudan, 1982, p. 17) 
Examples cited by Laudan are of nonnegotiable convictions underlying mega theories of nature. 
But there are also convictions that, when altered, change the nature of the way science as a whole 
looks at the universe. Today, a basic premise of science, for example, is that the laws of physics 
are the same throughout the known universe. This is not a provable fact, and indeed before 
Newton, it was generally accepted that laws governing heavenly bodies and earthly objects were 
different (FUNDAEC, 2000, p. 26). In a collection of articles published under the title New 
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, the contributors try to look into the nature of the 
metaphysical commitments of science, a term covering assumptions and convictions of the kind 
mentioned above. The few statements cited below are simply to demonstrate how different the 
view of modern science has to be from its positivist beginnings. Willis Harman, for example, 
points to what he calls "an ontological assumption of separateness" at the heart of science, 
modified somewhat with the advent of quantum mechanics: 
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...separability of observer from observed, subjective from objective, causes from effects; 
separateness of organism from environment, man from nature, mind from matter, science 
from religion; separateness of "fundamental particles" from one another, of things in 
general unless there is some "mechanism" to connect them ("action at a distance" 
precluded); separability of the parts of a system or organism to understand how it "really" 
works; separateness of scientific disciplines, of investigators, competing over who was 
first discoverer (Harman, 1994, p. 8). 
The change this "ontological assumption" should or should not go through is not the point of my 
argument. That evidence suggests its existence is sufficient to help one move away from naïve 
representations of scientific truth. A highly insightful article in the collection is by Lynn H. 
Nelson. She sets out to show that the positivist and the Kuhnian positions do not exhaust the 
"possible understandings of the relationships between metaphysics and science." Building on 
the position advocated by W.V.Quine 25 she argues that "metaphysical commitments are 
incorporated in theories, methodologies, research questions, and hypotheses—indeed in 
everything we say about that world" (Nelson, 1994, p. 17). Nelson further states that "attention 
to the metaphysical commitments incorporated in models, methods, and theories needs to 
become part of doing science" (ibid.). The fact that she substantiates her claim by deciphering 
the distortions introduced by a "male perspective" in two kinds of theories, "Man the Hunter 
theories" and "Master Molecule theories" indicates how relevant her line of thinking actually is. 
For my purposes here it represents another example of the complexity inherent in the notion of 
scientific truth and of the extent to which the work of science entails metaphysical commitments. 
Moving Beyond the Dichotomy of Faith and Reason 
What I have suggested so far in this chapter is that before any kind of complementarity between 
science and religion is contemplated—a notion that takes on special significance when an 
educational process intends to use the two as sources of knowledge, from which appropriate 
objects of understanding could be identified and explored in the teaching-learning experience—it 
has to be accepted that religion too can be seen as a system of knowledge and practice, and that 
such a conclusion involves staying away from rigid definitions of science that, although rejected 
25 
Harman summarizes Quine's position: According to Harman, Quine argued that the "scientific explanation of any 
phenomenon is embedded in a theoretical network which involves multitudinous assumptions." These include "assumptions 
involved in the observation of the phenomenon"; " hypothesis about the context of the phenomenon"; "underlying theoretical 
hypothesis"; "basic laws of the pertinent area of science"; " the accepted nature of the scientific methodology"; "epistemological 
assumptions underlying scientific inquiry"; and "ontological assumptions about the basic nature of reality" (Harman, 1994, p. 7). 
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by rigorous scrutiny of philosophers of science, continue to govern much of the thinking in many 
fields including education. An essential step to embracing more accurate descriptions of science, 
I believe, is to move beyond a false dichotomy between faith and reason. 
Let us consider for a moment Blackburn's analysis of the subject discussed in the previous 
section. For him the link between faith and action seems to begin with faith, a faith that is blind. 
It is private; it operates independently of truth26, and easily leads to irrational action with 
disastrous consequences. Knowledge is given its own space outside faith, and it is attained 
through "caution," "evidence" and "plausibility". However, this and similar debates about faith 
and reason do not give us much insight into articles of faith indispensable to knowledge—not the 
superstitious belief that Napoleon's spirit resides in a given tree or the deceitful belief of the ship 
owner in Clifford's story, but articles of faith without which humanity would not have made it 
through its tortuous evolutionary path. Neither are we given a conception of reason expansive 
enough to include 'reasonable' convictions present in both science and religion. Faith is reduced 
to wishful fanciful thinking, while reason is presented as an endless process of questioning. To 
callously identify faith with superstition can be viewed as the expression of a passion. Would it 
be unreasonable to argue that, in fact, knowledge leads to faith and faith to knowledge? 
The answer to this question can be positive if one agrees to let go of conceptions of rationality 
that identify it with narrowly defined methods of the 'verification of truth'. Dunne's discussion 
of J. H. Newman's critique of such definitions of rationality is relevant here. Dunne reminds his 
reader that the significance of Newman's work "lies precisely in his diagnosis of the problem [of 
rationalism] as a generic one that required less a defence of religion than a challenge to the 
paradigm of rationality which would so summarily discredit it—and in his consequent 
articulation of a rationality which would not only leave room for religious belief but, while doing 
so, would also do justice to the many ways of being reasonable that are embedded in our social 
practices" (Dunne, 1992, p. 32). Elasticity is required in the processes of reasoning that leads to 
assent as Dunne reminds us of Newman's words: "the processes of reasoning which legitimately 
26 
Blackburn sometimes uses the terms 'belief and 'faith' interchangeably. He mentions that for an individual there are times 
when it is expedient to believe in something untrue as well as occasions when it is uncomfortable and threatening to believe in 
something true. "Truth", however, "has rights and privileges of its own, and they are not the same as those of utility" (Blackburn, 
2005, p. 9). 
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lead to assent...are in fact too multiform, subtle, omnigenous, too implicit, to allow of being 
measured by rule" (Newman, 1985, p. 196). 
The proposition that education needs to embrace a broad conception of rationality is relevant 
when considering the role various sources of knowledge are to play in the elaboration of 
educational content. But it also affects the vision of the subject of understanding that inspires the 
process of moral empowerment. Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to the modern man 
in the context of development. A certain kind of rationality is to characterize this individual, the 
nurturance of which, as the early literature of the field shows, was considered a requirement of 
progress. Over the years, repeated failure resulted in the questioning of development strategies, 
but it is not clear whether the inadequacies of this rationality have ever been seriously taken into 
account. Yet, there are so many indications that this conception of a rational human being 
distorts our view of human nature, imposing on society the image of the modern man as a 
soulless entity set on fulfilling its many wants and desires. The moral shortcomings of this entity 
are becoming increasingly apparent as the crisis of the kind of modernity that has dominated 
thought for decades deepens. The subject of understanding that I seek here is as different from 
this 'modern man' as it is from the `emotivist self, the 'computer' and the 'radical 
constructivist', the candidates found inadequate in chapter 2. If education were able to move 
away from the dichotomy between faith and reason, I believe, a clearer picture of the desired 
subject of understanding would emerge. It is reasonable to hope that such a picture would not be 
so fragmented. Mind would not be so separated from heart and the relationship between the 
cognitive and the normative, between intelligence and morals would not be distorted. Dunne 
reminds us that "in human affairs a merely calculative intelligence is no more capable of truth 
than it is of goodness—or, rather, that without goodness even the most subtle intelligence will 
find truth itself beyond reach" (Dunne, 1992, pp. 36-7). He draws on Newman's assertion that 
the rays of truth "stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual 
beings: and that in consequence that perception of its first principles which is natural to us is 
enfeebled, obstructed and perverted by allurements of sense and the supremacy of the self' (ibid., 
p. 37). Dunne further brings into focus Aristotle's notion of the indivisible connection that exists 
between phronesis and being good: " and this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not 
without the aid of excellence...and this is not evident except to the good man; for wickedness 
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perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is 
evident that it is impossible to have phronesis without being good"27. 
Processes and Methods in Science and Religion 
The demonstration, no matter how convincing, that science has its own metaphysical 
commitments and un-provable premises does not imply by itself that religion can be seen as a 
compatible, and somehow comparable, system of knowledge. One has to go beyond questions of 
faith and conviction to examine the processes and the methods through which both science and 
religion produce, validate, apply and diffuse knowledge. Even when the existence of spiritual 
reality is accepted, it could still not be claimed that the knowledge making up the two systems is 
of the same kind; the knowledge of the existence of an even 'unseen' elementary particle is 
unlike the knowledge a believer confesses to have of the soul and its existence. But apart from 
the relationship between humanity and the divine, religion is concerned with the life of the 
human being on earth—a life, it asserts, should be imbued with spirituality and thus qualitatively 
different from a mere physical existence.' As such it is a source of meaningful knowledge about 
the essential relationships the transformation of which is the focus of the process of moral 
empowerment. It can be argued that in relation to this kind of knowledge, religion too is 
characterized by processes and methods that correspond to some degree to certain features of 
science. 
To be open to the possibility of certain similarities between the way the two systems deal with 
knowledge, one has to bear in mind that while generalization, the formulation of hypotheses, 
deduction, the testing of predictions and falsification are vital components of scientific methods, 
they are not carried out mechanically by programmed entities but by scientific communities that 
work within certain worldviews and theoretical frameworks. These determine the kinds of 
questions to be asked and the kinds of answers to be explored. The way Thomas Kuhn employed 
the concept of paradigm may not be universally valid, but it cannot be denied that scientific 
27 See Ross's translation, (Aristotle, E.N., Book VI) 
28 „
... religious experience does not suggest a special kind of experience, akin to telepathy or clairvoyance; rather, it suggests a 
different level of experience made possible by concepts which enable us to understand the fact of a more mundane level of life in 
a new light" (Peters, 1972, p. 111). 
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knowledge is accumulative only to some degree; notable advances in science have occurred 
through pronounced shifts in paradigm, the dynamics of which evoke images of a revolution 
(Kuhn, 1996). The way co-existing research programmes help advance science is another feature 
of the scientific enterprise. No community of scientists sets out to answer all the questions in the 
world; much work goes on to extend the range of validity of theories that have already proven 
their capacity to explain a significant set of interrelated phenomena. During this process, the 
main statements of the overall theory are never questioned. Finally, however, the range of 
validity of any theory proves to be finite and new theories arise to explain new phenomena which 
have come to the attention of the scientific community. More advanced theories do not 
necessarily prove previous ones wrong but clarify the limits within which they operate and 
provide an understanding of why they work inside those limits. 
How does religion, we need to ask, deal with the knowledge it acquires—from both the reading 
of what it considers revealed truth and the articulation of what it learns in its day to day 
practice—about individual and collective human existence on earth? To see if there are any 
similarities between its processes and methods in relation to knowledge—albeit according to 
different dynamics—and those of science, one has to be able to separate religious knowledge 
from widespread superstition and fanaticism propagated in the name of religion. This is by no 
means an easy task, but nor is the identification of demarcation criteria that separate science from 
pseudoscience. The task becomes more difficult when one considers the sensitivity with which it 
has to be approached; one has to be acutely aware of requirements of freedom of belief and avoid 
unwarranted judgments of people's cherished convictions. In what follows, I limit myself to the 
expression of what Band'is are willing to demand of religion. 
Induction, deduction and falsification represent the workings of the human faculty of reason; 
religion as opposed to fanaticism can and should employ them in the generation, application and 
diffusion of the knowledge with which it deals. The principle of the equality of women and men 
provides a useful example in this respect. Having embraced as an article of faith the existence of 
the human soul with no sex, colour or ethnicity, Band'is adhere to this principle as part of their 
core religious belief. Yet, for such a conviction to become firmly established in their own lives, 
in their communities and in their efforts to contribute to the transformation of society, it must be 
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scrutinized by reason. Numerous observations followed by generalizations and deductions, 
rational argumentation on to the various applications of the principle, and struggle against 
ongoing efforts by forces of tradition to falsify the principle are all necessary for a belief instilled 
in a Band'i child to become a veritable element of her or his religious knowledge. 
This example of the principle of equality of women and men allows me to go further in my 
analysis of the way religion deals with its knowledge about life here on earth. In broadening my 
understanding of this principle and the way it has to be established in human society, how would 
I deal with other religious beliefs that consider women inferior to men? Can I explain 
disagreements on such a fundamental issue without rejecting the validity of all the teachings of 
such religions? This I can do precisely if, rather than reducing religion to an assortment of 
creeds in conflict, I view it as a system of knowledge in evolution. What is necessary is the 
ability to step back and look at the phenomenon of religion from a historic perspective, the way it 
has been done in the case of science, not by people who are determined to explain it away but by 
those who have accepted its existence as a valid system of knowledge. The picture of science 
that has emerged from such an examination includes the co-existence at any given time of 
scientific communities each working within a given research programme. It is even possible at a 
given moment to identify co-existing scientific communities with different worldviews and 
paradigms, a condition that is quite prevalent in the social sciences (FUNDAEC, 2000, p. 27). 
Such communities show signs of conflict particularly at the time of the appearance of a new 
paradigm, although animosity seldom takes the dimensions of the persecutions that occur when 
the founder of a new religion appears and organizes the perception of spiritual reality in new 
terms. The repeated appearance of such historical figures, the circumstances under which they 
appear, and the way their religion flourishes and influences the advancement of civilization, as 
well as the crises that beset the community of their followers with the passage of time, are 
historical facts that, when interpreted in a certain way, make possible a vision of religion as a 
system of knowledge with its own dynamics of progress. In one way or another, these founders 
of major religious movements all claim to 'reveal' aspects of spiritual reality, and once revealed, 
their utterances "become the subject of exploration, not only by the individual... but also by 
entire populations" (Arbab, 2000, p. 184). In this way, a series of "Revealed Texts", or "Chapters 
of the same Text", define the "paradigms" within which religious communities carry out their 
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practices. Without them "spirituality would be an expression of personal experience, never to be 
validated by the intellectual interactions that create social knowledge" (ibid.). And it is important 
to note that what religious communities have historically done cannot be reduced to 
administering a set of rituals; they have created and applied knowledge that has influenced the 
advancement of civilization. Moreover, the process through which they have dealt with 
knowledge as they have read their revealed texts, applied what they have read and generated new 
knowledge, is not totally unlike what scientific communities have done in their efforts to read the 
`Book of the Universe'29. 
An excellent source of insight into the way knowledge is dealt with in both science and religion 
is Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, in which he examines in detail 
the emergence and establishment of the following fact: Wassermann reaction, which is a 
serodiagnostic procedure developed in the 1920s, indicates, within acceptable statistical limits, 
the presence of syphilis in a patient. In analyzing the history of a "completely 'empirical' 
finding", he explains: 
Thoughts pass from one individual to another, each time a little transformed, for each 
individual can attach to them somewhat different associations... Whether an individual 
construes it as truth or error, understands it correctly or not, a set of findings meanders 
throughout the community, becoming polished, transformed, reinforced, or attenuated, 
while influencing other findings, concept formation, opinions, and habits of thought... 
(Fleck, 1979, p. 42) 
Fleck's emphatic statement that "cognition is the most socially-conditioned activity of man, and 
knowledge is the paramount social creation" (ibid.) has relevance to both scientific and religious 
knowledge. In the same way that scientific knowledge is not the simple imposition of 'nature' on 
the human mind, religion as a system of knowledge is not a straightforward reading of 
`revelation'; it is based on revelation but elaborated through a continual process of learning 
through social interaction. 
29 
Charles Taylor offers profound insights into the rise of modern secularism. He explains that "increasing interest in nature...for 
its own sake, not simply as a manifestation of God" contributed to several historical developments including the emergence of 
modern scientific outlook. In one narrative, as interest in "nature-for-its-own-sake" grows, "reference to the divine atrophies." 
The latter emerges as the "natural stance" and the correct one. Taylor disagrees with this narrative, for, the perfection in nature 
which elicits the "dimension of grace" does not "cancel or set aside" the perfection inherent in nature. The two go together. The 
"autonomy of nature" does not need to deny the "symbolic or allegorical meaning of things": one "focuses on God's speech acts, 
the other on the marvellous systematic language which makes these acts possible" (Taylor, 2007, pp. 90-92). 
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The parallels I have drawn between some of the processes of science and religion in relation to 
knowledge do not go far enough particularly when the ultimate purpose is to find a way for 
certain educational programmes to draw on religion as a source of knowledge complementary to 
science. To evoke the image of paradigms or co-existing research programmes in science in 
order to explain the existence of the variety of religious beliefs has its own dangers. For one 
thing, left alone it makes it too easy for fanaticism to operate in the name of religion. In science, 
not every research programme is believed by the community of scientists to lead to valid 
scientific knowledge. The way Lakatos describes such programmes gives an indication of the 
kind of criteria that exist to sort through processes that claim to be scientific (Lakatos, 1978). A 
"research programme is the sum of various stages through which a leading scientific idea passes" 
(Larvor, 1998, p. 51). At the heart of every research programme is a "hard core"—"a set of 
commitments which cannot be abandoned without abandoning the programme itself' (ibid.). 
There is also "a 'protective belt' of auxiliary hypotheses which shields the hard core from 
falsification" (ibid., p. 52). This protective belt changes in response to new empirical facts and 
criticism, allowing the programme to continue extending the central idea. Further, each research 
programme has its own collection of characteristic problem-solving techniques referred to as its 
heuristic. "Methodology is separated from heuristics rather as value judgments are separated 
from 'ought' statements" (Lakatos, 1978, pp. 103, n.1). Lakatos considered the history of science 
as one of "extended wars of attrition" between research programmes that are "progressing" and 
those that are "degenerating". In the former, change comes from its own inner logic, from the use 
of its own heuristic. In the latter, change occurs in response to external criticism. "A discipline is 
scientific so long as progressive programmes triumph over degenerating ones" (Larvor, 1998, p. 
53). In looking for demarcation criteria between religion as a source of knowledge for moral 
empowerment and as a promoter of fanaticism—ironically also empowering—one would have to 
put further demands on religion than those implied by the use of reason; one could, for example, 
look into a given religion to see if, at the historical stage in which it finds itself, it has the 
capacity to allow progressive programmes to win over degenerating ones. 
One last comment seems necessary to end this section. In presenting the arguments in the 
previous paragraphs—to justify calling religion a system of knowledge in its own right—I have 
103 
focused on knowledge about human life on earth, and have not advanced any claims about the 
reasonableness of more mystical teachings including belief in the existence of a higher Power 
significant to that life. I did not wish, however, to imply that such fundamental aspects of 
religion do not admit the use of reason. In expounding on the kind of rationality that allows for 
induction to make sense, for example, Nagel states: "Observed regularities provide reason to 
believe that they will be repeated only to the extent that they provide evidence of hidden 
necessary connections, which hold timelessly. It is not a matter of assuming that the contingent 
future will be like the contingent past" (Nagel, 1986, p. 84). He goes on to say that the capacity 
to achieve higher and higher levels of conscious thought must exist in advance and be constituted 
by the natural capacity to achieve "harmony with the world far beyond the range of our particular 
experiences and surroundings" (ibid.). He further explains: 
When we use our minds to think about reality, we are not [...] performing an impossible 
leap from inside ourselves to the world outside. We are developing a relation to the world 
that is implied in our mental and physical makeup, and we can do this only if there are 
facts we do not know which account for the possibility. Our position is problematic so 
long as we have not even a candidate for such an account (ibid.). 
Nagel reminds us that Descartes tried to give us this candidate by "proving the existence of the 
right sort of God." Of course, he did not succeed, but according to Nagel "Descartes' God is a 
personification of the fit between ourselves and the world for which we have no explanation but 
which is necessary for our thoughts to yield knowledge" (ibid., p. 85). Although he has no idea 
what "unheard-of property of natural order" this might be, the supposition of the need for a basis 
for our beliefs in something global rather than just human, even if we are not able to discover it, 
is vital for human knowledge to be intelligible. 
Complementary Systems of Knowledge 
If the argument so far in favour of the comparability of science and religion in certain of their 
features is plausible, then the stage is set to explore the question of complementarity between 
them at various levels. The first has to do with the question of the knowledge of reality itself. 
Referring back to Nagel's discussion of an expanded reality, to what extent can science in its 
broad sense—ways of knowing that try to depend exclusively on the senses and reasoning—lead 
to an adequate knowledge of such reality? Particularly, if there is a spiritual dimension to human 
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existence and not just one that is constructed from the physical one, is not religion a necessary 
system of knowledge that complements science? This is not a question that admits a simple 
answer; the following argument based on ideas proposed by FUNDAEC offers insights into the 
nature of the kind of inquiry that may be undertaken. 
Although the application of ideas from physics to other areas of thought is fraught with 
difficulties, the way the notion of complementarity is employed in certain interpretations of 
quantum mechanics can serve as a metaphor that clarifies the relationship between the two 
systems. The concepts of 'particle' and 'wave' in ordinary physics refer to two entirely distinct 
phenomena. In explaining these phenomena, two different sets of concepts and vocabulary, 
inseparable from theoretical constructs and experimental arrangements, are used. Position and 
momentum are examples of concepts related to particles, and wavelength and intensity examples 
of those pertaining to waves. Particles need a path available to them and a finite amount of time 
to go from one point to another; two particles cannot be in the same place at the same time. 
Waves are not restricted in this way; rays of light can interfere with each other at various points 
of space producing patterns of light and darkness. In this sense two distinct languages are used, 
one of waves and one of particles, to describe and explain two distinct phenomena. One would 
never dream of something being both a particle and a wave. Yet, experiments that observe the 
behaviour of extremely small constituents of matter, say the electron, show that these exhibit 
both characteristics. However, the situation is not chaotic; if one sets up one's instruments to 
look for a wave, electrons behave only as waves and under another experimental arrangement 
they behave like particles. The answer to this apparently bizarre behaviour of nature, at least 
according to the most prevalent interpretation, is to abandon the notion of 'either/or' as well as 
the notion of 'both' and use the concept of complementarity instead. The fundamental 
constituents of matter are too complex to be described in either the language of waves or the 
language of particles. The question is not 'what electrons really are', but simply that under 
certain conditions we can explain their behaviour in the language of particles and under other 
conditions in the language of waves. Thus, at a basic level, nature seems to require 
complementary sets of measurements and descriptions. Underlying the arrangement of 
instruments in experimental setups are theoretical models, basically structures in language. 
Complementarity as applied to particles and waves seems to be saying something fundamental 
105 
about reality and the way humanity can know it. It appears to be an indication of the complexity 
of nature and the inability of the human mind to comprehend it in its entirety. But if this is true 
for the physical universe, FUNDAEC asks: 
Is it unreasonable to assume that when the object of exploration is the sum of both 
spiritual and physical reality, an object far more complex than the material universe, a 
single description would also prove to be inadequate? Is it not possible that to understand 
and explain this reality, humanity needs at least two systems of knowledge, each with its 
own language, which together enable it to penetrate its mysteries?" (FUNDAEC, 2000, p. 
71) 
Complementarity in Conviction and Action 
Moral empowerment demands action on the part of the subject of understanding as an active 
protagonist of social transformation. In this context, one needs to ask: is the connection between 
understanding and action in the process of empowerment immediate? It seems that in most cases, 
if not all, understanding must be first transformed into conviction and that the educational 
process must face this challenge. If this is true then one may further ask whether scientific and 
religious convictions do not both need to be cultivated alongside each other in the process of 
moral empowerment. A brief discussion of what I mean by scientific and religious conviction is 
necessary here: 
In chapter 3, I discussed briefly the content of a few lessons in one of FUNDAEC's texts called 
Properties concerned with the enhancement of capabilities related to the power of expression, 
beginning with the examination of words and concepts that help students describe the world 
around them with clarity. Among the concepts that are introduced in these lessons is truthfulness 
as a 'property of the human soul' and the purpose of the discussion was to show how 'spiritual 
qualities' could be examined without entering a religious discourse. What I need to query now is 
the extent to which this type of analysis, say, of truthfulness in terms of related concepts such as 
truth and lie, accuracy and error, investigation of reality, honesty, and sincerity, actually 
convinces the student that he should be truthful. The immediate response is that one must go 
beyond cognition and face the challenge of developing attributes that include appropriate 
attitudes, skills and habits. But suppose this is done, as I will discuss in later chapters on 
capabilities. Does not the question persist? Even when understanding is nurtured in the context 
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of a complex set of capabilities, does it not have to be transformed into conviction before it is 
translated into consistent moral action? The question can be asked in a different way. Is not 
conviction an aspect of the kind of understanding that engenders action? Further, would not any 
conviction such as "I must be truthful" only make sense if it were part of a whole system of 
knowledge and practice within which the moral nature of a given action would be assessed? 
The extended reality proposed by Nagel, seems to be relevant here. In nurturing the belief that "I 
must be truthful"—not as the habit of a well trained child but as a strong conviction that can 
resist rampant forces of corruption in the world—we can ask if it is necessary to argue that 
truthfulness is an element of a reality, one that goes beyond the physical, and if one needs to 
introduce the concept of a soul as an element of that reality to which truthfulness is somehow 
attached as a property. Nagel himself sets his limits categorically. He sees no reason for the 
assumption that a soul exists. He recognizes that the assumption has other implications, for 
example the possibility of life after death. What is interesting is that the language Nagel uses in 
this regard is one of belief; he does not attempt, as far as I can see, to prove or disprove the 
existence of the soul. He simply explains that he does not believe in such a continuation of 
individual life and, while lamenting death, accepts it as an end to his consciousness. A Band'i-
inspired educational framework would necessarily disagree with Nagel on this point. It would 
assume the existence of a soul, although it would not pretend that there is an objective way to 
understand its nature. In this sense it would venture a little further into the exploration of the 
non-physical than Nagel seems willing to do. As mentioned before in this document, it would 
call part of the expanded reality spiritual reality and try to understand some of the attributes 
associated with it. But it would be wary of speculations about the nature of that reality. It would 
agree with Nagel that all of reality is not available to some transcendental perspective we can 
reach. In fact, it would claim that most of it is beyond our reach. Yet it would not be willing to 
abandon religion's claim that there is a spiritual dimension to reality. It would argue that the 
exploration of this dimension through religion at least facilitates the transformation that 
understanding gained through ethical reasoning must undergo to become the kind of conviction 
that is conducive to moral action. 
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In the context of science education, Howard Gardner's example of the results of research on the 
extent to which students of leading American universities mastered what they studied illustrates 
how ephemeral understanding of scientific facts is if it is not translated into a proper set of 
convictions. He states: 
In a typical example, college students were asked to indicate the forces acting on a coin 
that has been tossed straight up in the air and has reached the midway point of its upward 
trajectory. The correct answer is that once the coin is airborne, only gravitational pull 
toward the earth is present. Yet 70 percent of college students who had completed a 
course in mechanics gave the same naïve answer as untrained students: they cited two 
forces, a downward one representing gravity and an upward one from the "original 
upward force of the hand". (Gardner, 1991, p. 3) 
We could explain away this and similar results of the research, by asserting that the students had 
not understood things well. But whatever our definition of 'understanding well' may be, we 
would have to accept that what was operating in the minds of the students was a set of beliefs 
acquired since childhood, beliefs that scientific knowledge had not been able to replace. In the 
case of the above example, the belief in question is that "an object cannot move unless an active 
force has somehow been transmitted to it from an original impelling source (in this instance, the 
hand or arm of the coin tosser) and that such a force must gradually be spent" (ibid). 
Gardner attributes this predicament of American education to the failure of educators to realize 
that "in nearly every student there is a five year-old 'unschooled' mind struggling to get out and 
express itself' (ibid, p. 5). Valid as this statement may be, the challenge of education cannot be 
to empty the mind of the student from 'belief in order to fill it with 'scientific knowledge'. The 
constant process of formulation, modification and sometimes destruction and reconstruction of 
scientific conviction cannot be ignored. Every text of modern science teaches the atomic theory 
of matter, for example, as one of the grand scientific theories of physics. Teaching the theory 
clearly involves nurturing the understanding of such concepts as particles, atoms and molecules, 
chemical bonds and so on. But there is a point at which the understanding of 'matter is made of 
particles' becomes a conviction; a profound conviction wins over naïve beliefs that seem to 
contradict it." This is particularly so because the conviction that matter is made of atoms is not 
30  
It is true that at a more advanced stage the student of physics recognizes the limitation of the theory, which after all is a model 
of reality. However, the conviction that matter is made of particles is fundamental to the overall thinking of a physicist. In his 
celebrated lectures on physics, for example, Richard Feynman states: If in some cataclysm, all of scientific knowledge were to 
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equivalent to the acceptance that, say, such and such a beach is made of innumerable particles of 
sand. The former does not arise from direct observation but is the result of the ownership of a 
scientific theory by a person who has internalized its claims. The anti-realist, of course, 
advocates "an attitude of complete agnosticism towards claims about the unobservable parts of 
reality" (Okasha, 2002, p. 70). The realist would argue that seeing through different instruments 
such as glasses, binoculars, and low-and high-power microscopes represents a continuum. While 
the concept of the observable varies in each case, the sophistication of the device used cannot be 
the criterion by which one can draw a line between observation and theory. In order to strengthen 
the conviction about the all-pervading existence of atoms and molecules, then, an educational 
process would have to, among other things, help develop the mindset of a realist in the student. 
The same mindset is required when it comes to convictions in the moral realm if search for 
understanding spiritual reality is not to degenerate into the play of a fanciful and superstitious 
imagination, if the premise of the existence of the soul--which should be explored soberly—is to 
exclude the possibility of the belief that Napoleon's spirit resides in a tree. Here is another facet 
of the relationship between science and religion: Religion without science degenerates into 
superstition. 
Complementarity of Languages 
Complementarity also needs to be examined in the context of the languages that characterize 
various "forms of knowledge". It is possible to think of a number of concepts usually associated 
with science itself as attributes of its language. In one of its texts, FUNDAEC examines the 
language of science, not so much as what it is, but in terms of what it seeks, exploring such 
statements as "the language of science seeks to eliminate ambiguities", "the language of science 
seeks objectivity" and "the language of science seeks rationality". In this exploration, scientific 
language ceases to be viewed as a series of exact definitions, precise observation statements, 
sound hypotheses and unquestionable conclusions reached through flawless logical reasoning. 
This rigid language would not permit the operation of such faculties as intuition and imagination 
be destroyed and only one sentence passed on to the next generation of creatures, what statement would contain the most 
information in the fewest words? I believe it is the atomic hypothesis (or the atomic fact, or whatever you wish to call it) that All 
things are made of atoms --little particles that move around in perpetual motion, attracting each other when they are a little 
distance apart, but repelling upon being squeezed into one another" (Feynman, 1963, p. 4). 
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in scientific inquiry. Scientists do find it necessary to speak a language in which words and 
concepts mean the same to everyone in a given community. Yet, they are not intolerant of 
ambiguities. They seek to overcome ambiguity through a process of progressive clarification of 
ideas—a process which allows a notion, vague and intuitive in the beginning, to gradually evolve 
into a relatively well-defined concept. The process involves sorting out implications and 
identifying subtle meanings. It demands the ability to see possible contradictions further down 
the road, and depends on "the capacity of the mind to take creative steps, not chaotic ones but 
calculated leaps that more often than not allow one to land on surer ground" (FUNDAEC, 2009, 
p. 40). 
This process of progressive clarification coded into the scientific language enables scientific 
communities to clarify ambiguities and reach agreement in relation to certain concepts.' The 
most common concepts in science have evolved over decades and centuries to mean the same 
things to all scientists. For a long time, for example, words such as force, energy and power were 
used by scientists in different ways. As the field of physics advanced, each concept became 
better and better defined and, today, phrases like solar energy, kinetic energy, gravitational force, 
or electrical power, have unique meanings understood by all physicists. 
The objectivity sought by scientific language is achieved progressively through an iterative 
process. This process is in accord with Nagel's view regarding objectivity as a method of 
understanding. Objectivity as the way to detach ourselves from how things appear to us in order 
to make statements about reality is valid if we are willing to include in a later stage our 
perceptions as part of a larger reality. Scientific language has to allow for this iterative process. 
The rationality that scientific language seeks cannot be defined too narrowly either. Not only 
does it have to include statements that employ such tools of reasoning as deduction, induction, 
falsification, analysis, inference, contextualization, justification, but it also has to leave room for 
conclusions that result from the workings of intuition, intelligent guess, and leaps of faith. 
The above three characteristics can also be attributed to the language of philosophy which 
science has to use, at least if it is to reflect on itself In a sense, it uses the languages of 
31 See Williams' notion of convergence in chapter 4. 
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mathematics and philosophy to achieve two different objectives. The first allows it to become 
increasingly more precise, the latter ensures that it does not lose its awareness of context. The 
use of the language of science, in all its complexity, is not of course limited to the description of 
elements and properties of the physical universe, it extends its function by exploring social 
phenomena and the workings of the mind, as well as examining with the help of philosophy its 
own metaphysical foundations. However, it achieves what it seeks to a lesser degree, or at least 
with more difficulty, as it moves to aspects of reality less accessible to experiment. Take the 
question of objectivity. No one has difficulty accepting as an objective statement the sentence 
"the colour of things is a property arising from the way they interact with light". But in the realm 
of the social, the statement "the poor are lazy" only has the appearance of objectivity. It can 
easily be the expression of personal judgment, for example, of someone engaged in exploiting 
the poor, by paying them low wages, charging them exorbitant prices for the necessities of life 
and blocking ways in which they could change their conditions. Such a person would be 
reluctant to make the subjective statement "I like to amass riches at the expense of the poor" or 
"I will simply squeeze every ounce of energy out of these people". He would be apt to 
pronounce instead, the apparently objective statement "the poor are lazy; they don't try hard and 
therefore they stay poor" (FUNDAEC, 2009, p. 62). There is a thin line between a language that 
seeks objectivity and one that tries to justify one's subjective stance. 
Clearly the need for the application of scientific language to the social and the metaphysical 
cannot, and should not, be denied. What has to be explored is whether the application of this 
language, though necessary, is sufficient or should be complemented by other languages. 
Concepts such as `the power of love', 'the power of unity' or 'the power of humble service' are 
good examples to consider, for they are all relevant to the question of moral empowerment as 
discussed in chapter 1. Today, these concepts have entirely different meanings for different 
groups, the very existence of such powers having little relevance to much of the prevalent 
discourse on power. Can the same clarification process, one may ask, that allowed scientists to 
reach agreement on the concept of physical power in terms of the expenditure of energy per unit 
of time, be used so that statements about these other kinds of power become increasingly clear, 
objective and rational, and incorporated in a language that can then be employed in an 
educational process aspiring to be scientific? While, I believe, this is a process worth undertaking, 
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it would not by itself prove adequate partly because the language of science does not exhaust 
meaning. It would certainly not enable the students to appreciate the role such powers play in the 
pursuit of their own twofold moral purpose. 
That languages other than the one associated with science are needed to convey meaning is, of 
course, a rather trivial statement. The languages of the arts and of poetry are clearly 
indispensable, and an educational process of the kind being considered here has to employ them. 
"Where science does not reach, art, literature, and narrative often help us comprehend the reality 
in which we live" (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 18). To illustrate this point for its students, FUNDAEC 
presents them with two statements about the daffodil. The first is: "A daffodil is a species of 
narcissus with a large bell-shaped corona growing from the perianth, cultivated for its 
ornamental yellow flowers." The second is a poem by William Wordsworth in which he 
describes a field of daffodils he saw "as he wander'd lonely as a cloud that floats on high o'er 
vales and hills." To this "crowd" he refers as "a host of golden daffodils"; "fluttering and 
dancing in the breeze"; "a jocund company" that would often "flash upon that inward eye which 
is the bliss of solitude"; and his "heart with pleasure" fill. 
The first statement, students are reminded, is only the beginning of a series that would lead to a 
scientific description of the plant. Such a description would give insights into many aspects of 
the plant's existence, its evolution, the functions of its various parts and their relationships, its 
interactions with the environment and its uses; it could even include the fact that the daffodil has 
been the subject of a poem by Wordsworth. But can this set of statements ever express the kind 
of meaning that the poem conveys? And vice versa, is the language of poetry an appropriate tool 
for describing a set of increasingly more complex scientific models of the plant? In reflecting on 
the characteristics of the two languages, students are asked to avoid simple claims that, for 
example, the language of poetry is subjective, or that it thrives on ambiguity. Why, it is asked, is 
not the heart of the poet dancing with the daffodils as much a part of reality as the flower itself? 
After all, once Wordsworth calls our attention to it, we too see the images he had in mind 
and our heart too is moved by the imagery. Could it not be said that there is inter-
subjective agreement on the dance of the daffodils? Yet the agreement is not of the same 
kind as the one we can reach on a scientific description of the plant. What are the 
differences? And as to ambiguity...it would not be fair to call the language of the poem 
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ambiguous either; it certainly conveys meaning with admirable clarity (FUNDAEC, 2009, 
p. 66). 
The distinction FUNDAEC identifies in the above two languages seems to be present in the way 
the designative theory of language and the expressivist view of it are viewed in linguistic 
philosophy. The designative theory treats words as representatives of things and objects and 
sentences as "unambiguous and incontrovertible statements about the world itself' (Lawn, 2006, 
p. 78). The task of linguistic philosophy in this case is to test the logical validity of propositions 
both on their own and in relation to other propositions. The expressivist view, on the other hand, 
focuses on the "power of language to express, specifically to express what it is to be human" 
(ibid.). In the arts, for example, the expression of emotions has a central role. As Collingwood 
puts it, expressing emotions is a prerequisite of being conscious of them: "Until a man has 
expressed his emotion he does not yet know what emotion it is. The act of expressing it is, 
therefore, an exploration of his emotions" (Collingwood, 1938, p. 111). By coming at language 
from the side of expression, it seems as if Collingwood is attacking a certain view of language: 
...the view that language consists of a set of signs which have or ought to have, clear and 
precise meanings and whose combinations are, or ought to be, subject to invariant rules—
a double 'ought' which at the limit would sanction the abandonment of natural languages 
altogether as "ill designed for their purposes," and their replacement by a "scientifically 
planned philosophical language" (Dunne, 1992, p. 64, citations from [Collingwood, 1938, 
pp. 226-7]). 
However, according to Dunne, Collingwood did not envision the expressivist language of arts in 
conflict with this orthodox view of language as long as the limitations it contains (of grammar, 
logic and so on) were realized in relation to "language in actual use or as an activity" (ibid.). 
Collingwood's treatment of language and his refusal to make it an instrument, even for 
expression, but rather an activity in which we are caught up that is already expressive, is helpful 
in thinking about various 'languages' students need to be taught. The question being posed here 
is this: Is it sufficient for an educational process identifying itself with moral empowerment to 
initiate students in the languages of science and the arts and humanities viewed as activities, or is 
there need for initiation in the language of religion as well? 
The answer to this question, in a Band'i-inspired educational framework, would, of course, be 
positive. Here is how I think one can begin to scrutinize this position: If religion is to be in 
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harmony with science and not superstition respectably dressed, its language cannot be 
characterized by irrationality, arbitrary opinions, complete subjectivity and impenetrable 
ambiguity. It too would have to lend itself to inter-subjective agreement, be able to express a 
rationality that does not contradict the one sought by science, and be a medium through which 
progressive clarity can be achieved. It is not difficult to point to numerous passages in religious 
literature that fulfil these conditions. But religion does not allow itself to be confined by these 
boundaries and, for example, employs metaphor' as well as poetic imagery to convey meaning 
beyond that which is possible for the language of science. Its value, however, is not simply in its 
freedom to move from one form of expression to another. The structure of its language, which 
allows for this freedom, is such that it can express commandments, exhortations, prohibitions, 
instructions, admonitions, which together with its more descriptive components give insights into 
the nature and purpose of human existence and elicit response to a set of moral imperatives. 
When it is not misused to create fear, it is a language that accommodates authority and love so as 
to nurture understanding in a unique way. This is particularly relevant to education which needs 
to tap the roots of motivation and arouse the noblest of sentiments. It is not clear whether a 
combination of science, philosophy, the arts and the humanities can accomplish this task. 
In the specific context of ethics, Haydon asks the following: 
Religious beliefs can help to make sense of morality by enabling moral demands to be 
experienced within a wider framework of meaning, so that, while they can still be seen as 
independently valid, they are not isolated from other aspects of a person's life. It seems to 
be true of us as human beings that we can act in a certain way, not just because doing so 
serves some self-interested desire, or even because it serves non-self-interested desires 
relating to particular others..., but because it makes sense as part of a life which is itself 
understood as part of something larger. Religion can provide a set of concepts and 
beliefs in which the 'something larger' can be expressed. It is worth asking whether there 
is some wider framework of meaning, within which morality can be located, which might 
be available to the non-believers. (Haydon, 2006c, p. 126) 
He then goes on to refer to the question of language: "Here it is interesting that some modern 
religious thinking has allowed traditional beliefs about God or the transcendent to be questioned, 
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Iris Murdoch states that "the development of consciousness is inseparably connected with the use of metaphor." They are not 
"merely peripheral decorations or even useful models, they are fundamental forms of our awareness of our condition: metaphors 
of space, metaphors of movement, metaphors of vision". "Metaphors often carry a moral charge, which analysis in simpler and 
plainer terms is designed to remove" (Murdoch, 1997, p. 99). They can be "a mode of understanding, and so of acting upon, our 
condition" (pp. 110-1). 
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while retaining the traditional language; so that the language can still provide a framework of 
meaning even though it is not interpreted in the traditional way" (ibid.). 
A Band'i-inspired educational programme, of course, acknowledges the existence of the infinite 
divine and the validity of religion. But with or without such a belief, a process of moral 
empowerment has to pay considerable attention to the language that provides the larger 
framework of meaning proposed by Haydon. But there are practical obstacles we need to 
overcome in this respect. Chief among them is the lack of convergence on the nature of the 
language of religion. The language of religion—not the language of salvation, the language of 
Greek metaphysics, or the language of rituals and sermons—needs to be analyzed in the same 
way the language of science has been so carefully scrutinized. 
The discussion of these two last sections, on the complementarity in conviction and action and of 
the languages of science and religion, is intended to expand and not to take focus away from the 
main theme of this chapter, namely the centrality of knowledge from both science and religion, 
treated as complementary sources, in the process of moral empowerment. The intention of the 
arguments in this chapter is to support the claim that the word 'knowledge' is in fact applicable 
to the content of both systems. This does not mean that faith, beliefs and convictions are not also 
present, admittedly much more in one system than the other. Both systems seek truth and the fact 
that the human mind can only approach truth in small steps—faith being capable of much larger 
leaps—does not alter this truth seeking nature of either of the two systems. The knowledge 
accumulating in both systems is fallible, but so is all human knowledge. In its generation, 
application and diffusion, the various faculties of the human soul as well as experience enter, 
often in different manners. Each system has its own ways to test knowledge and reach some level 
of certainty that allows it to go forward in its practice. Among the characteristics of each system, 
the language through which cognition as a social activity takes place is of paramount importance. 
It seems imperative for an educational process that seeks moral empowerment of its students to 
draw on both languages. 
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CHAPTER 6: INTEGRATION 
This is the third of the chapters in which I try to examine progressively the nature of objects of 
understanding, first in the most general context, then in relation to the sources of knowledge in 
which education has to seek these objects, and now from the point of view of the way knowledge 
needs to be integrated in the content of an educational programme seeking moral empowerment. 
I began the discussion of sources of knowledge in the last chapter with a brief reference to 
Hirst's conception of forms of knowledge. In suggesting complementarity between religion and 
science, I have argued that education should not deal exclusively with one part of reality—
consisting of what is accessible to the physical senses and that which the human mind produces 
in response to it—but should also draw on the abundance of insights to be gained from religion 
viewed as a system of knowledge and practice concerned with the spiritual dimension of an 
extended reality. 
The dual purpose of pursuing personal development and contributing to the transformation of 
society—which I have claimed lies at the heart of the process of moral empowerment—requires 
deliberate and sustained action. The knowledge that students must make their own through 
education cannot be learned in isolation from the imperative that they are to act on the reality of 
their own lives and of society. Reality, then, must be studied in a way that results in the 
understanding of concrete problems faced by individuals, groups and communities and the 
development of capacity to work on them. Students need to identify the causes of the problems 
with which they have to struggle and learn to deal with the forces that operate in society, fighting 
the negative forces of apathy and inaction and aligning themselves with positive constructive 
forces. How and in what form does knowledge come to play in this complex process, in the 
education of not only the privileged but also the marginalized peoples of the world? In trying to 
answer this question one faces an immediate challenge: There is no one-to-one correspondence 
between the many sets of profound and interwoven social, cultural, political and economic 
problems that societies face and the content of the disciplines that tend to define educational 
programmes. The knowledge and skills acquired in careers and professions may include 
elements critical of the present order, but more often than not, prepare the student to work in a 
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`normal' mode and not for the change in paradigm—to borrow Kuhn's terminology—that the 
transformation of society entails. 
There are, of course, certain approaches to the generation, application and diffusion of 
knowledge that try to meet this challenge. One is the establishment of interdisciplinary groups. 
Governments and organizations of civil society have often brought together groups of 'experts' 
from the various disciplines deemed pertinent to study a given set of problems and to devise 
strategies for action. Education itself is willing to put together knowledge from different fields to 
create new programmes that can deal with emerging realities, for example, by trying to 
incorporate relevant content from social sciences into technical fields. Disciplines themselves 
have not been static, they have grown, divided, and have given rise to new fields, as is the case 
of biophysics or biochemistry. 
However, in those areas of endeavour concerned with goals such as overcoming poverty or 
struggling against oppression, these approaches have not proven entirely adequate. In trying to 
address the problems of marginalized populations, interdisciplinary groups have often found it 
difficult to overcome the distance that separates not only the knowledge of experts in different 
fields but also the ideological positions that seem to characterize them. Emerging new fields 
often focus narrowly on certain problems, usually those that affect the industrialized world rather 
than the majority of humanity. The global network of universities, built according to the 
conception of a university in the industrialized nations, and engaged in the generation and 
diffusion of knowledge according to that conception, does not appear to have educational 
programmes that would go beyond a vision of 'modernization' to empower the masses of 
humanity to contribute to a fundamental transformation of their societies. Faced with this 
situation, many endeavours have sought answers in non-formal education, consciousness-raising 
and the delivery of specific training packages. These efforts have certainly had a positive impact 
on society, for example, by enabling millions of people to participate in struggles against 
injustice. But the polarization that has been created between such interventions—coupled with a 
romantic and exaggerated emphasis on 'what people already know'—and the formal education 
being universalized takes energy away from seeking a coherent approach to the empowerment, 
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particularly of young people who do wish to attend school and whose families see in education 
the only hope for improving their condition. 
The concept of integration enters the discussion of this thesis in the context of a need for 
educational programmes, structured and substantial in their knowledge content, that empower 
students to act on their reality and transform it. This involves the proper choice of objects of 
understanding as well as their integration into a structured whole in such a way that would enable 
the students to apply what they learn to complex sets of real problems they encounter as they 
progressively try to contribute to the transformation of society. That education in some form has 
to take on such a challenge is by no means a given. Many programmes, including the majority of 
today's Band'i-inspired endeavours, are content with incorporating ethical propositions into a 
curriculum that follows traditional subject matters of prevalent formal educational systems. Over 
the years a number of efforts to move away from curricula based on subject matters have also 
flourished here and there. Some of these have been formulated on the basis of hastily defined 
notions of 'fragmentation', 'compartmentalization of knowledge', and 'collection of unrelated 
experiences', on the one hand, and 'wholeness', 'synthesis' and 'unity', on the other. The results 
include units of instruction that, for example, try to teach physics, chemistry and biology around 
a theme or help students sort information and develop a few skills and attitudes through the 
discussion of some social issue. But at this level, integration and fragmentation tend to become a 
pair of labels implying good or bad for whatever it is—curriculum, method or any other aspect of 
a specific educational programme—that is either being promoted or attacked. If integration is to 
mean more than this, the concept needs to be scrutinized at more depth. I will make an attempt to 
carry out such an examination, in a rather limited way, by first presenting some of Paul Hirst's 
analysis of the problematic assumptions underlying criticisms raised against traditional subject 
based curricula which often have given rise to a call for integration. In light of this analysis, I 
present a few criteria for the organization of knowledge in curricula, showing in the process that 
replacing 'subject matter' with 'social practice', which is what Hirst himself later advocated, is 
not an entirely satisfactory solution. Apart from the organization of knowledge, integration needs 
to be dealt with in the context of the values knowledge embraces, and at a fundamental level, it 
has to overcome the dichotomy between thought and action. This chapter is intended to prepare 
the way for me to examine the notion of capability in the next. 
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Distinct and Interrelated: A Defence of Forms of Knowledge 
In the formulation of his original position, Hirst views 'integration' as the term used to attack 
`subject-structured' curriculum. He argues that the structure of a subject matter is not "entirely 
contingent" as it is based on the interplay of logical factors with social and historical forces. The 
knowledge of the physical world, for example, is different from the knowledge of the mind, and 
the difference lies in the nature of concepts, logical structures of propositions and the truth 
criteria involved in each. Based on these three criteria, Hirst identifies "forms of knowledge", to 
which reference was made in the last chapter, as autonomous entities distinct from other 
organizations of knowledge including the most longstanding university 'subjects' and 
`disciplines'. He asserts that by attacking the logical structure of existing knowledge, the critics 
of traditional curriculum are in effect attacking the wrong thing: the very nature of what most 
educators still want to teach (Hirst, 1974a, p. 137). 
A given form of knowledge, albeit not immune from change, is irreducible to other forms. 
Althought different forms of knowledge cannot be unified under the same kind of concepts, they 
are nevertheless interrelated. The concepts and truth criteria in one form of knowledge may well 
presuppose the concepts and truth criteria in another. For example, "many moral and religious 
concepts manifestly presuppose concepts we have for distinguishing features of the observable 
world. But religious or moral concepts do not thereby become reducible to physical concepts" 
(ibid, pp. 137-8). The inter-relations between concepts, truth criteria and the logical structures of 
different forms do not in themselves constitute "an integration of different forms of knowledge", 
rationalizing "an inter-form or topic structure", just as the "differentiating characteristics" of 
forms of knowledge do not justify "a curriculum of isolated 'subjects'. What is needed is, "a 
detailed map of the logical relations between objectives and then the best curriculum structure 
for attaining these, whatever that is" (p. 138). 
This short reference to Hirst's analysis confirms my intention not to deal with the question of 
integration as a mere reaction to the inadequacies of curricula based on subject matters, a 
reaction that does not appreciate the complexities, in theory and practice, of a sound 
interdisciplinary approach. A closer look at the nature of some of the objections made to such 
curricula and Hirst's answers to them will clarify the issues at hand further. The first objection 
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which Hirst refutes is expressed as "exclusive focus on abstract knowledge". He argues that the 
assumption of a division between common sense and theoretical knowledge underlying this 
objection is based on the mistaken notion that the former is not differentiated into logically 
distinct forms. It is true that the two types of knowledge represent different degrees of 
abstraction, but there is continuity in so far as the conceptual schemes and truth criteria in any 
given form run across different levels from the common-sense to the highly academic knowledge. 
That a subject structured curriculum is too theoretical for children, then, does not justify a claim 
for or against integration (Hirst, 1974a, pp. 141-2). 
The next criticism which Hirst contests relates to the lack of attention a traditional subject-based 
curriculum gives to the students' practical and moral concerns. Since the freer ways of 
organizing knowledge are just as prone to this weakness, the criticism, he points out, misses the 
cause of the problem. In certain cases, application of knowledge could be dealt with under 
subject matters by extending the theoretical to the practical. In other cases, where input from 
different areas is required, a more complex approach would have to be adopted. Certain inter-
relations between forms of knowledge rather than their distinctions, for example, become 
particularly significant when it comes to issues of a moral and practical nature. But such inter-
connections in themselves do not indicate the need for a "new non-subject type of curriculum 
unit". Moral education, for example, could be treated either as a subject that presupposes the 
knowledge of other forms or in the context of teaching the knowledge of other forms together 
with moral issues. It is immaterial whether the units that deal with moral and practical issue are 
called subjects or not. What is crucial is that curriculum units "come to recognize both the 
differences and the relations that are necessary features of knowledge" (ibid, pp. 144-5). 
The third type of objection, the flawed nature of which Hirst tries to expose, rests on a 
psychological premise. It is claimed that "the mind or consciousness of a person either is, or 
ought to be, a unity which we distort by the compartmentalization of the curriculum" (ibid., p. 
145). But the picture of the mind this conception evokes is, according to Hirst, faulty. The 
"structure of an individual's consciousness is certainly the structure of the concepts, knowledge, 
judgments that he has acquired and it has that unity which these elements possess" (ibid.). 
Education cannot aim at "unity of consciousness" outside these logically organized elements. 
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Concepts, truth criteria and logical structures are the very elements of consciousness students 
need to acquire and educational objectives should be organized around them. 
Yet another type of criticism, also based on a psychological premise, is expressed in terms of the 
curtailment of the freedom of mind introduced by the boundaries of subject areas. To condition 
the mind "to classify situations in pre-determined ways, to entertain limited considerations about 
them" (ibid, p. 146), it is said, will make it incapable not only of wider unrestricted thought but 
also of other forms of response and feeling. Hirst rejects this assumption and argues that any 
level of coherent thought beyond the merely superficial involves "the sustained, persistent use of 
limited ranges of concepts" (ibid.). Education should develop the ability of the mind to move 
between diverse forms of knowledge. At the same time, it should train the mind to sustain 
thought within a given category. Freedom of thought exists "within a rule-governed structure of 
concepts. Outside such structures freedom is, in general, only freedom to be irrational" (ibid.). 
There are lessons from this sketchy outline of Hirst's rebuttal of the assumptions of certain 
proposals for integration that I will carry forward in my exploration. The main one, particularly 
relevant in light of much contemporary practice, is that whatever the divisions of knowledge are 
called—forms, disciplines, subjects—there is a certain logic internal to them that cannot be 
ignored. To simply make weak connections between pieces of knowledge brought together from 
various disciplines because they are relevant to a problem or a topic does not create the kind of 
structure that integration should seek. 
Moral empowerment as discussed up to now sets a broad aim for integration. But much has to be 
said before objectives for curriculum-units are established in programmes that adhere to this 
conception of educational aim. I will discuss this further in the next two chapters on capabilities 
and pedagogical choices. In doing so I will need to be mindful of the pitfalls Hirst's analysis 
brings to our attention. Of particular value, in this respect, is his insistence that such objectives 
should be grounded firmly in the structure of knowledge. He actually agrees that when there are 
unclassifiable objectives that fall outside the distinct forms of knowledge, they "offer a basis for 
curriculum units which will demand some form of genuine integration and thus run counter to 
the construction of sharp subject divisions" (Hirst, 1974a, p. 143). However, mental activities 
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and qualities of mind like enquiry, imagination and critical thinking are not constant across the 
different forms of knowledge and cannot, therefore, be the basis for curriculum integration. 
There is not a common unit of "imagination" that could apply equally to "imaginative writing" 
and "imaginative scientific investigation". Where such general qualities exist, Hirst asks: "must 
they not be first developed within some specific area of knowledge and then be generalized to 
apply to other areas?" (ibid, pp. 142-3). He also points out: 
...the concepts on which our knowledge is built form distinctive networks of 
relationships. If we transgress the rules of the relationships which the concepts 
meaningfully permit, we necessarily produce nonsense. If we talk about magnetic fields 
being angry, actions being coloured, beauty having weight, or stones being right or wrong 
we have simply produced conceptual confusion. (ibid, p. 25) 
Criteria for Curricular Integration 
This brief examination of Hirst's early treatment of forms of knowledge, his criticism of the 
reasoning behind superficial conceptions of integration, and the caution with which the subject 
has to be approached opens the way for an exploration of certain basic characteristics of the 
process through which the content of curricula may be elaborated in the general context of moral 
empowerment. A discussion of a number of these characteristics follows: 
Structure 
There is a wide spectrum of efforts ranging from educational activities in which concepts are 
loosely organized and content from various areas of knowledge are brought together to address 
specific problems to programmes that strictly follow subject matters. One could say that the 
continuum goes from radical constructivism at one extreme to firm attachment to the boundaries 
and structures of disciplines at the other. Although Hirst's insightful analysis is a warning against 
schemes of integration that ignore the structure of knowledge, there are a number of difficulties 
with the concept of structure applied to knowledge. Some of these have been presented by D.C. 
Phillips and are relevant here. Phillips notes that Hirst's proposal for the anatomy of forms of 
knowledge falls short of demonstrating the distinction each form supposedly enjoys: There are 
overlaps between the forms with respect to their distinguishing criteria and there is more than 
one logical structure within some of the forms. Psychology as a branch of the human sciences, 
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for example, embraces both Freudianism and behaviourism with dissimilar central concepts, 
logical relations, tests against experience, techniques and skills (Phillips, 1993, p. 81). 
In seeking to ensure that the content of a curriculum does not ignore the structure of knowledge, 
we need to be reminded that the word 'structure' has different meanings in different contexts. As 
Phillips explains, it may loosely mean arrangement of parts, elements, or constituents. In this 
sense, as "most things have parts or constituents, most things have a structure" (ibid., p. 83). But 
`structure' carries with it normative connotations as well, which implies that some theory in each 
instance has to back up the usage of the term. Yet, too often, the underlying theory is not made 
explicit. Disparate domains become confused or conflated when various types of structure are 
not kept separate. The result is that "one type of structure is thought of, or discussed, in terms 
only appropriate to another; modes of measurement that are appropriate for one type of structure 
are misused in the forlorn attempt to measure other types of structure" (p. 84). Phillips illustrates 
these difficulties by showing how the successful acquisition of science by a pupil can become 
"isomorphic" with the structure of science that was learnt, or how the mental model that the 
cognitive scientist constructs can be considered isomorphic with what is located in the student's 
head. To do this is to postulate isomorphism between entities that occupy different "universes of 
discourse" (ibid, pp. 82-6). In research methodology, for example, a method appropriate for 
structures in one universe of discourse cannot, without some reasonable justification, be adopted 
in another. The research methodology that would shed light on the cognitive structure of the 
student cannot be conflated with that which would assist in discovering how well he or she has 
learned the concepts of a discipline. 
While Phillips analyzes all these difficulties, he is not willing to do away with the concept of 
structure as applied to the content of education. He even seems to hope for some kind of 
classification in which "ontological elements" and "functional units" are given different 
treatment. I share Phillips' caution and at the same time recognize that structure should be a 
distinguishing feature of curricula developed in the context of moral empowerment. As Phillips 
points out, there is a "heuristic" value to the notion of structure. 
...human experience...does seem to be orderly; it is not all 'booming, buzzing confusion'. 
But what is the nature of this order? Will cognitive psychology resolve the mystery? 
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What role is played by social forces of the sort that interested Vygotsky? And what 
role—if any—do the traditional disciplines play in helping me to order my experience? 
Are these disciplines themselves organized in some way? (ibid, p. 92) 
These, as well as the role structured practice would play in this respect, are worthwhile questions 
that have not yet been resolved. As far as the development of curricula is concerned, however, 
the mere heuristic value of the concept of structure points to promising directions. One can begin, 
for example, by examining structures within disciplines but then step over their boundaries to the 
degree needed and possible in order to organize the curriculum according to specific aims. In 
this way, it would be possible to retain the rigor of the educational programme—not trivializing 
the treatment of subject areas such as mathematics, science and language—while allowing 
sufficient fluidity to open space to deal with relevant theoretical and practical concerns, drawing 
on knowledge from various fields and practices. This dynamic interplay between an established 
form of knowledge at a given stage of its development and successful efforts to bend it, not only 
avoids the ossification of an existing organization of knowledge, but also safeguards against the 
kind of superficiality of which hasty attempts at integration are rightly accused. 
Relevance 
The process of integration being examined here needs to be informed of the danger of education 
becoming an exclusive enterprise. This implies that moral empowerment as a discourse cannot 
become too attached to the instrumentalism of the industrial world thus ignoring the role its 
protagonists, constituting the majority of the peoples of the planet, would have to play in 
humanity's transition to its age of maturity. A criticism of the liberal arts education offered by 
Richard Pring speaks to this concern. Pring draws on Oakeshott's metaphor of a "conversation" 
to make his point: We all inhabit "a world of ideas", ideas that make sense of who we are and of 
our experiences. What is significant is that we all participate in this world of ideas; we form our 
individual perceptions from sources that are publicly accessible. We thus learn about democratic 
values through separate experiences, but there is enough in common between them "to enable a 
`conversation' to take place about those democratic values—and the conversation itself becomes 
a part of [each individual's] self-enacted history" (Pring, 1993, p. 52). Education as a transaction 
between generations of human beings in which newcomers are initiated into the world they are to 
inhabit, perpetuates this ongoing conversation. In Oakeshott's words, "we may recognize liberal 
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learning as, above all else, an education in imagination, an initiation into the art of this 
conversation in which we recognize the voices; to distinguish their different modes of utterance, 
to acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to this conversational relationship and 
thus to make our 'debut dans la vie humaine'" (ibid, pp. 52-3). Pring, citing the failure of liberal 
education to include the voices of the majority in "the conversation of mankind", asks: 
What sort of conversation is it which, dealing with issues that affect us all, excludes so 
many people? Ought not the topics of conversation to be extended to those which the 
majority find an interest in? And should not questions about the relevance of education to 
their future lives (the central concern of most young people) be regarded as legitimate 
within that conversation? The liberal ideal excludes so many and, unexamined, will 
continue to do so, for 'relevance' is seen as an irrelevant consideration in an activity 
which is engaged in for its own sake and for no external ends. (ibid, p. 57) 
Important as Pring's observations are, the requirement of relevance has pitfalls of its own, 
particularly when the notion that educational knowledge is 'socially constructed' is 
overemphasized. An example presented by Michael Young is instructive in this respect. In post 
apartheid South Africa it was natural for policy makers to wish to make a break with the past and 
"hand power to create a new curriculum to teachers, students and more broadly to the 
`democratic forces' (Young, 2008b, p. 110). In the process, however, the social construction of 
knowledge "became a slogan for opposing the idea that the role of the curriculum is to enable 
learners to develop their thinking through engagement with specialist bodies of knowledge that 
are not available to them in their everyday lives" (ibid.). The resulting 'outcome-based' 
curriculum intended to express broad educational goals of the democratic movement, but it 
ended up "largely free of content" as it refused to offer to Black South Africans the expertise and 
specialist knowledge from which they had been excluded under apartheid. Young's example 
illustrates the dangers of emphasis on narrowly defined notions of 'relevance' in the 
development of educational content. It points to the importance of the requirement that the 
integration of knowledge be carried out within an 'inclusive' discourse on education in which the 
structure of knowledge is respected. 
The role of the cognitive 
Whatever degree of attention to forms of knowledge the framework being sought in this thesis 
may recommend, it is important that the role of the cognitive is not exaggerated. In his initial 
125 
approach Hirst seems to go too far in making the concern for cognitive development the cardinal 
feature of curriculum design, hoping that "other objectives can be catered for adequately only by 
elaborating on a curriculum structure that copes with the cognitive" (Hirst, 1974a, p. 150). In 
later criticizing this position, he makes explicit the philosophical doctrines that influenced the 
thinking and practice in education during the sixties. 
Hirst's proposal for a liberal education presupposed a certain conception of the human being, 
whose diverse range of capacities was divided into three main categories: the cognitive, the 
affective and the conative. The latter two involved emotions, actions and dispositions, and were 
dependent for their intelligible operation upon "the concepts, beliefs and knowledge achieved by 
the cognitive capacities" (Hirst, 1993, p. 185). It was through developing these cognitive 
capacities that justifiable bodies of rational beliefs, rational actions and rational emotions could 
be acquired. Connected with this notion of what defined a rational person was the ideal form of 
life to which all should aspire, based on the argument that "there can be no more ultimately 
justifiable pursuits than the intrinsically worthwhile pursuit of reason in all its forms, and, second, 
in the successful ordering of all other human concerns in terms made possible by the 
achievements of reason into a coherent and consistent whole" (ibid.). This conception of a good 
life was consistent with the ideals of liberal democracy to which freedom of choice was central. 
Hirst highlights two main assumptions of this worldview: First, "the development of reason is 
seen as fundamentally social construction" (ibid., p. 186). Objective judgments are reached 
through shared conceptual schemes by drawing on cognitive capacities and knowledge formed 
through the creation of public languages. Second, "society is itself seen as simply a collection of 
freely associating individuals" (ibid.). Survival and achievement of goals necessitate the 
organization of human society into families, groups and communities. Bonds are formed 
primarily through each individual's pursuit of the good life according to rational principles. "It is 
the good will of each member that holds communities and groups together" (ibid.). It is not 
difficult to see how this particular view of the rational, autonomous life would provide a coherent 
framework for the formation of educational aims. Within this framework, the practice of 
education would be conceived in terms of "rational determination of the end to be pursued", 
"determination of the best means possible" and "the implementation of the conclusions reached" 
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(ibid, pp. 186-7). Moral education would be placed in the context of a wider education, at the 
core of which students are to be initiated into the forms of knowledge distinguished by their 
internal and logical features. Secondary aspects would contain useful knowledge and skills as 
well as "personal and social education to promote the developments of character necessary to the 
conduct of rational living both individually and in social contexts" (ibid, p. 187). 
According to Hirst, this rationalist approach to education was criticized for its "philosophical 
underpinnings" and its "internal contradictions" even as it was being developed. The value of the 
kind of "disengaged knowledge" it claimed reason would generate—isolated from both the 
external environment and from all human attributes including reason itself—was being seriously 
questioned. Parallel to it, the 'utilitarian' approach was gaining stature and power, bringing into 
focus the practical dimension of the good life. Reason, knowledge and understanding were no 
longer seen as capable of "determining from a detached point of view the ends that constitute the 
good life for individuals or society"; they became the very instruments that help us "discern, 
develop, and order coherently those basically given elements of wants and satisfactions from 
which the good life is to be composed" (ibid, p. 188). Capacities such as reason and will would 
have to be directed so that we could properly harness the dominating power wants and 
satisfactions have over our lives. This instrumentalist view of reason denies it any direct 
function in motivation. In this picture, society is just "a collection of atomic individuals 
associating together for their personal satisfactions", and social relations are nothing more than 
"contingent arrangements that promote personal satisfactions." Individualism is now particularly 
strong as "all judgments of what is good, and the motivation to attain that, rest ultimately in 
personal subjective states." In line with these presuppositions, education is a practice 
"rationalistically planned", and the goals it serves "are ultimately generated individually by 
rational choice in relation to personal wants and contextual constraints" (Hirst, 1993, pp. 189-90). 
Hirst's analysis demonstrates the shortcomings of the cognitive and the utilitarian approaches. 
The alternative conception of reason he offers, however, does not seem to represent a 
fundamental shift, but a convergence of the two approaches. He proposes that we should first 
acknowledge the motivating force behind the exercise of reason. This would mean that 
satisfaction derived from pursuing and achieving true beliefs and justifiable actions is as 
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motivating as that of fulfilling our other wants and desires. We should then realize the practical 
nature of reason and the extent to which it is directed by our interests. Our conceptual schemes 
discriminate between activities that lead to states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction and "these 
activities themselves become the objects of satisfaction" (ibid, p. 190). The practical nature of 
such activities involves know-how, skills and judgments which are often tacit. "Individual 
objects, situations or events are conceptually distinguished because of their practical significance 
for our wants and desires" (ibid.). Hirst is, of course, presenting a case for social practices, a 
topic I will discuss in the next section. Education in his modified proposal is to equip the 
individual to pursue the 'good life', one that allows each person to seek satisfaction of pursuing 
and achieving true beliefs and justifiable actions for its own sake alongside the satisfaction of 
practical needs and desires. 
This rationality, autonomous and at the same time directed by interests and desires, it seems to 
me, is the rationality of the well-educated, well-meaning proponents of modernization to whom I 
referred, quoting Mahbub ul Hach in the previous chapter. I have already expressed my 
misgivings about the rationality of the 'modern man' that makes him a poor candidate for the 
subject of understanding being sought. In trying to define the role of the cognitive, it is important 
to ask if an educational process shaped by the rationality at the heart of the approaches described 
in the above paragraphs, can lead students, particularly the youth of the villages and the 
marginalized neighbourhoods of the burgeoning cities of the world—a significant pool of human 
resources that has to be seriously taken into account if meaningful change is to occur—to 
participate in a process of transformation which, while global in outlook, is set in motion in the 
context of local community? The answer may well be positive if the task before humanity today 
is the mere reform of the present world. But will the qualities of mind acquired through such an 
education be up to the tasks that need attention in the transition of humanity from childhood to 
adulthood, the inevitability of which I have presented as one of the fundamental elements of the 
educational framework being explored here? Would such education prepare the kind of "radical" 
or "revolutionary" envisioned by Marc Belth in the following excerpt to acquire the capacity to 
contribute to the construction of a new order which humanity's transition to adulthood demands? 
...man is continuously shaping his experience into a whole which can be recalled readily 
and used in confronting and explaining new events. In this constant shaping, he borrows 
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from everywhere...The ordinary human being, growing up in his own culture, inherits all 
of the models available to him, and has no alternative but to use them... When he 
becomes a radical, a revolutionary, he is in fact coming to reject some or all of the 
models which he has inherited. (Belth, 1965, pp. 61-2) 
To determine the proper role for the cognitive in curricula in such a way that students do acquire 
the qualities of mind called for by the knowledge system that defines the modern world, but at 
the same time attain the freedom to reject 'inherited models' is not an easy task. In my inquiry, I 
have tried not to isolate the role of the cognitive in nurturing understanding or to reduce 
rationality to the satisfaction of wants and desires, no matter how legitimate they may be in a 
process of moral empowerment. It is for these reasons that I examined in chapter 3 the nurturing 
of understanding and the fostering of spiritual qualities as an inseparable whole. My attempt to 
refute narrow definitions of rationality in the context of complementarity of science and religion 
in the previous chapter was to some extent due to the same concern. 
Social Practice 
Attention to social practices, using them if necessary as contexts within which to elaborate 
specific educational content, is another valid criterion for integration. Once again, examining 
Hirst's views on the subject is instructive. His shift33 from a view of education centred on forms 
of knowledge to one primarily concerned with social practices occurred as he identified flaws in 
the conception of reason in both the 'rationalist' and the 'utilitarian' accounts. To what extent is 
his conception of the individual and society in the context of social practices substantially 
different from those found in the two approaches he tries to transcend? 
Hirst argues that persons "are necessarily social constructions," and society is a "network of 
socially constructed individuals who within that network have the capacities for choice for the 
formation of their own patterns of life and the modification of their social networks" (Hirst, 1993, 
p. 194). Thus, the good life for the individual is only possible within the networks of existing 
social relations and traditions. Initiation into practices is vital to the good life of the individual. In 
a way similar to Maclntyre's, Hirst defines practices as "patterns of activity engaged in 
33 Hirst later advocated that the shortcomings of a disciplined based curriculum are addressed by the priority given to the 
"consideration of current practice, the rules and principles it actually embodies and the knowledge, beliefs, and principles that the 
practitioners employ in both characterizing the practice and deciding what ought to be done" (Hirst, 1983, pp. 16-19). 
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individually or collectively which have been socially developed", as " complex interrelated 
packages of such elements as actions, knowledge, judgments, criteria of success, values, skills, 
dispositions, virtues, feelings..." (ibid, p. 195). Education, itself a practice,34 will have to select 
practices according to emerging capacities of individuals and their social and physical contexts. 
Hirst suggests that such practices fall in at least three domains: first "those very varied basic 
practices necessary for any individual to be rationally viable in their given everyday physical, 
personal and social contexts," second "practices from that much wider range of optional 
practices available for the construction of each individual rational life," and third those "second 
order" practices that constitute "critical reflection" on the first order practices that make up the 
first two (ibid, p. 196). 
I have already discussed in chapter 3 in the context of virtues the kinds of difficulty an 
educational programme would face were it to anchor moral development solely in the 'internal 
goods' and 'standards of excellence' found in practices. Hirst's proposal for a practice-centred 
educational approach, it seems to me, present other challenges. His categorization of practices 
with which education should be concerned is too broad, and the defining characteristic of each 
rather vague; as a result it is difficult to see how it would lead to the actual choice of relevant 
practices and ultimately to 'structured' educational content. But even assuming that such a task 
can be carried out, how useful is the hierarchy he establishes as an organizing principle of 
curricular design? A fundamental question to be asked in the context of moral empowerment is 
whether the aim of education is merely to initiate individuals into certain practices as they are or 
is it to also enable them to reshape existing practices. If the latter is the case, then one must 
decide to what extent the student should develop the capacity to reflect critically on the nature of 
the practice into which he or she is being initiated. Hirst, of course, recognizes the role education 
has to play in reshaping a given practice, but assigns this function which involves identifying 
presuppositions within a given practice through "abstracted theoretical study" to that part of 
education that deals with "initiation into the practices of critical reflection on the fundamental 
34 
Dunne agrees with Maclntyre, for whom 'teachers' are involved in a variety of practices and 'teaching' is an ingredient in any 
practice, that "the end of education is 'the development of the student's powers' and that these powers find their most reliable 
means of development through engagement with well-established practices—with their respective disciplines, standards and 
excellences 
	 so that in teaching students one also necessarily teaches subjects." But part of what makes Dunne "recognise 
teaching as a 'practice' is a sense of the importance of a teacher's care for the student as well as—and sometimes even 
independently of 	 his or her care for the subject" (Dunne, 2003, p. 355). 
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substantive practices" (ibid, p. 197). Further he envisions a small minority of people participating 
in such theoretical practice and suggests that "it is in general impossible for worthwhile 
education to engage directly in these theoretical pursuits." He places this social responsibility on 
"theoretical specialists" who should "engage in wide public dialogue about the significance of 
their work for non-theoretical pursuits, thus providing a context of public critical reflection on 
social practices on which educators can draw" (p. 198). 
That specialized theoretical pursuits involving critical reflection on social practices are desirable 
is a statement with which it would be difficult to disagree. But that such reflection should be 
mostly the concern of the relatively few in a hierarchical arrangement is a conclusion based on 
an unnecessary sharp division between the theoretical and the practical, between know-that and 
know-how. One important criterion for the kind of integration I am seeking here is the ability to 
transcend this dichotomy as much as possible. If this is done, theoretical knowledge needed for 
reflection on the nature of a practice into which one is being initiated would be incorporated in it 
from the beginning, albeit progressively. This does not necessarily invalidate Hirst's scheme of 
categorization, but does suggest that better ways of thinking about the role of practices in the 
design of curricula may be available. 
The sharp division between know-that and know-how present in Hirst's theory of forms of 
knowledge appears again when practical knowledge takes the centre stage. In both cases, 
insisting on such a dichotomy hides from view essential elements of the desired framework for 
curricular design. In the case of the former, Paddy Walsh, for example, in agreeing with Hirst's 
own criticism of his original position, questions the one-way dependence of every kind of 
development on propositional knowledge and points out that the theory of forms of knowledge 
ignores "the likelihood that the affective, the moral, and the practical are properly interdependent 
with the intellectual" (Walsh, 1993, p. 132). As a result, among other things, the effect of the 
environment, the importance of practice, the role of values, "the engagement of the heart to the 
propositional in contemplative-appreciative knowledge", and "the common belief that moral 
insight is as much a fruit as it is a condition of good will and right action" (ibid.) are not 
addressed. Walsh suggests that such a theoretical stance could legitimize "that distortion of many 
subjects that has resulted from isolating their propositional from their deliberative, technical and 
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contemplative elements"(ibid.). He also points to a next level of difficulty: overlooking the 
possibility that "the relationship of propositions to value and action within forms of knowledge is 
just as integral to their logic or 'grammar', and just as distinctive in each form and as significant 
a variable across forms, as those features of propositions," on which the theory stands (ibid.). 
As to the consequences of overemphasizing the value of practical knowledge, it seems sufficient 
to remind oneself that even in the moral, religious and aesthetic domains—areas where initiation 
into the corresponding practices is an imperative—education achieves relatively little if a good 
grasp of theoretical and propositional knowledge is not achieved. The statement "a kindly tongue 
is the lodestone of the hearts of men. It is the bread of the spirit, it clotheth the words with 
meaning, it is the fountain of the light of wisdom and understanding..." (Balla' i Publishing Trust, 
1978, p. 288) is an example of the kind of propositional knowledge that abounds in religious 
texts. It contributes as much to the desire to develop a kindly tongue on the part of a religious 
practitioner as does the practice of speaking kind words in the community in which she or he is a 
member. The relationship is not one in which the theoretical consideration of moral principles 
and religious teachings become secondary to the practical or vice versa, but one in which there is 
a multidimensional web of connections which education cannot disregard. 
Rather than choosing either forms of knowledge or practices as the axis of a scheme of curricular 
integration, it seems to me, the process should pay attention to the dynamic interplay between 
theoretical and practical knowledge. The mind seems not to move in only one direction. There is 
the dialectic of 'concrete' and 'abstract' which has to be respected. Young quotes Engestrom in 
expressing how the dialectic "instead of seeing 'concrete' phenomena as something sensually 
palpable and 'abstraction' as a conceptual or mentally constructed process," sees the concrete as 
referring to "the systematic interconnectedness of things. In other words, concrete phenomena 
are the outcome not the starting point of thinking" (Engestrom, 1991, quoted in [Young, 2008b, 
P. 55]). 
Pring's analysis of the interrelationship between theory and practice clarifies the issue further. 
He points out that "practical activities are themselves permeated by understandings that can be 
more or less intelligently held ...There is an embryonic theory contained within intelligent 
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practice" (Pring, 1993, p. 71). Once the theoretical understandings within practices are made 
explicit and systematically formulated they can be examined. It is also true that "the way into 
theory is often best reached through this intelligent reflection upon a practice that might 
otherwise have been pursued mechanically" (ibid.). Pring offers the example of attempts in 
theology to theorize about the intimations of immortality: "Theory, and the propositional 
knowledge which constitutes the theoretical position, are a provisional formulation of a set of 
ideas through which we make sense of reality, including the practical reality of worship, of work, 
or of moral struggle" (ibid.). 
As Pring points out, the duality between theory and practice is at the heart of the divide that 
separates liberal and vocational education. To close this gap, the need for reflection is often 
stressed, along with the idea that it is the process rather than the product that counts. He feels, 
however, that another false dichotomy is being introduced here. It results from the inability to 
see that the "process" itself "embodies ideas (bad as well as good) and beliefs (false as well as 
true) which can be rectified only through engagement with the critical conversation which is the 
product of other people's enquiries" (Pring, 1993, p. 72). The "doer" can become more 
intelligent in the doing by drawing on the knowledge of academic disciplines. It is not enough, 
for example, "to make explicit the quaint ideas of healthy living implicit in one's daily eating 
habits" without subjecting them "to some form of science-based criticism" (ibid.). 
In the context of the kind of curricula being explored here, overcoming the dichotomy between 
theoretical and practical would help guard against the kind of educational content that too easily 
relegates the majority of humanity, the very people who are to participate in the processes of 
change and reconstruction, to the acquisition of a few manual or technical skills. By focusing on 
the interplay of practical and theoretical knowledge, it will be possible to have the freedom to 
choose among different available options for integration according to the specific objective of a 
given set of educational activities. At times, initiation into social practice could be the starting 
point, but in such a way that the corresponding theoretical knowledge can be incorporated from 
the beginning so as to enhance the understanding of the students. On other occasions, it would be 
the logic and truth criteria of a discipline or form of knowledge which would start the process, 
while drawing on relevant practice in order to ground theory in experience. These two paths, 
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each in its own way, would bring together doing and knowing, but doing and knowing cannot be 
integrated in isolation from our state of being. It is in this respect that neither social practice, nor 
forms of knowledge would suffice to fulfil the aims of integration. It seems to me that truths such 
as 'the oneness of humankind' and 'the interconnectedness of existence in all its dimensions' 
correspond to our state of being; their source is neither social practice nor forms of knowledge. 
Spiritual qualities which I introduced in chapter 3—as distinct from virtues rooted in social 
practices—are other examples of such truths. These truths are not bound to a practice or a field 
of knowledge, although both could be used as contexts for the exercise and comprehension of 
such truths. 
Values of Knowledge 
Selection of objects of understanding and their organization into some structured but fluid whole 
requires the examination of values attached to knowledge. This may immediately suggest the 
often cited dichotomy between knowledge as an end in itself and knowledge as a means to other 
ends. But one is not obliged to be confined to the longstanding debate on the validity of one or 
the other. M. Degenhardt, for example, suggests that some knowledge "is valuable neither as a 
means to an end, nor as an end in itself, but because it helps us to determine our ends" 
(Degenhardt, 1982, p. 81). If one overcomes the duality, it will be possible to reflect on the 
values that knowledge itself embraces. Walsh's analysis offers a rich perspective in this regard. 
He orders four types of values—the possessive, the experiential, the ethical and the ecstatic—in a 
line of argument that "brings us up sharp against the idea of persons, objects, and aspects of the 
world having value in themselves as a condition of their being values for us, and of love of the 
world as a rational condition of our other prizings" (Walsh, 1993, p. 113). He compares the 
possessive values to those of wealth, status and power, in that all three can be possessed in 
different amounts and varying degrees of security, and cites unqualified vocationalism and 
encyclopaedism as manifestations of a rampant possessive instinct in education which he 
criticizes in a decisive way. 
The emphasis in experiential value is on the "richness of experience". Walsh suggests that 
experiential values should rest on "host values" of truth, respect and justice, as well as an 
acknowledgement of the independent value of objects of experience. He warns against the perils 
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of the kind of value placed, for example, by Dewey on experience, rejecting in a sense the 
proposition that "the objects of experience can possess values in themselves" (p. 109). By 
retaining the "wedge between experience and the world-in-itself in the notion of knowledge as 
fundamentally a construction," one destroys the wonder of the paradox that is knowledge: "an 
assimilation of the world that yet of itself leaves the world as it is" (p. 110). 
The ethical value of knowledge is associated with the regulative rationality held up by open-
ended formulations and injunctions evoking such notions as respect, care, authenticity and justice. 
These rational values are to be "added to possessive and experiential values as their ethically 
necessary corrective" (p. 111). But even a virtue such as respect for persons—defined as that 
virtue by which we treat people as ends rather than as means—loses its quality of ethical value if 
it does not "underline its basis in a positive acknowledgement of the independent value of other 
persons, the paradigm of which is a loving relationship" (p. 113). No amount of generalization 
and abstraction will lift "respect" from the level of a mere injunction if it is not shown as a 
"subsidiary to love." A lover's primary response is to the value inherent in the world. For the 
religious believer "the praise of God, just because He is God" is the "primary religious 
response—more fundamental than his search for salvation through relationship with God" (ibid.). 
The scientist, the artist, the historian find respectively that the order of the universe is marvellous, 
that beauty is to be contemplated because it is there, and that people are everywhere in history 
and they are in themselves worthy of our interest. "And education can be conceived as, in large 
part, the loving initiation into these, and other such, mysteries" (ibid.). 
In Walsh's argument, "security of possession" is subordinated to "richness of experience", which 
in turn "becomes a pursuit of one's tail unless, first, it allows itself to be constrained and limited 
by the demands of truth, respect and justice, and, second, it transcends both itself and a negative 
conception of its ethical limits, in an acknowledgement of the world that is properly called love" 
(p. 115). It seems to me that the contemplation of this love can yield many an insight into the 
values of knowledge that have to be taken into account in elaborating curricula. 
Love of the world in its broadest sense—and love of any particular object of understanding—has 
to be accompanied by consciousness of the interconnectedness of all things and of the oneness of 
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humankind. Love is always in danger of being individualistic. Love of the world has to help the 
`subject of understanding' transcend the possessive value of knowledge fully aware that 
knowledge gained is not to be guarded as an instrument of power. The self-absorbed lover can 
easily forget that generous sharing of knowledge and insight is a requisite of understanding. The 
same is true of experiential values, no matter how embedded they are in the objective world. 
Focus on the value inherent in the object of inquiry helps save education from the fetish of 
`radical constructivism', but it must be wary as well of the individualism that may become 
attached to independent discovery and mastery of intricacies of knowledge. Empty and 
generalized ethical injunctions are transformed through a love of the world that is continually 
deepened by a sense of belonging to the whole. The consciousness of the oneness of humankind 
breaks the individualistic limits of the values of knowledge and imbues love of the world—and 
hence love of an object of understanding—with a sense of the collective. What is at stake is not a 
search for understanding on which we embark individually; it is a journey we traverse together 
with others. To the extent that we act on the reciprocity the consciousness of the oneness of 
humankind evokes in us, we are empowered individually and collectively to transform ourselves 
and the world. 
The transformative power of knowledge is another value that is intertwined with the love of the 
world. In ordinary friendship to want to transform the object of one's love is to be frowned upon; 
friends are not our projects, we are to love them for who they are. But in the case of the world 
transformation is a requirement that existence itself demands from us. The transformative power 
of the physical sciences cannot be extracted and isolated from them; technology is not merely a 
product of science but embedded in it. Inherent in scientific knowledge of the universe is human 
ability to transform the physical environment. Placing love for the universe at the heart of one's 
determination to acquire knowledge of it and constantly being driven by the desire to rearrange 
its elements need not give rise to contradiction. 
The transformative power of knowledge is, of course, a value of great significance to the process 
of moral empowerment defined in terms of a twofold purpose of personal and societal 
transformation. At the level, of the individual, self-knowledge—not a mere awareness of one's 
thoughts, feelings and intentions, but a realistic growing understanding of one's abilities and 
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potential—has to accompany the transformation of character. Such knowledge is acquired 
against the background perception of human nature in general and the purpose of one's existence. 
In the context of a Band'i-inspired framework, human nature would be seen as that complex 
fusion of its material dimension, the product of physical evolution shaped by the struggle for 
survival, and its spiritual dimension, characterized by such qualities as love, mercy, generosity 
and justice. That the material nature is necessary and operating in its proper space helps the 
realization of human potential would not be denied. However, insights into one's own nature 
would be sought with the conviction that the human being is noble in essence, and to attain true 
nobility, one has to strengthen one's spiritual nature, recognizing that which leads to "loftiness or 
lowliness, glory or abasement, wealth or poverty" (Band'i Publishing Trust, 1988, p. 35). In the 
absence of such recognition it becomes impossible to set oneself commendable goals and choose 
worthy means to achieve them. Further, this self-knowledge is not possible without an 
understanding of the nature of the relationships that can be forged with other human beings. As 
D.W. Hamlyn puts it, "a case can be made for the thesis that no proper understanding of the 
concept of a person can be had in independence of an understanding of the concept of a human 
relationship" (Hamlyn, 1970, p. 248). The knowledge that empowers us to transform the 
relationships of dominance and control to those of reciprocity and cooperation impels us to 
transform our own character and the insights that aid me to have a generous personality are 
gained as I strive to create bonds of love and fellowship with others. 
Thought and Action 
I have approached the question of integration first with respect to knowledge itself and then in 
relation to values of knowledge. It seems to me, however, that integration cannot be achieved if, 
at a fundamental level, the dichotomy between 'thought' and 'action' is not transcended. The last 
chapter of this thesis is about the continuity of thought, language and action. A brief examination 
of the nature of the problem, however, seems warranted here. 
Whenever the powers of the individual are fragmented, it is so in correspondence to his or her 
interactions with the world, not in isolation from it. It follows that there is the complete bodily 
engagement in our embodied coping that makes us reach the summit of an expert versus the 
disembodied intellect that is used in de-contextualized thinking. It is claimed that the latter, 
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which involves the capacity to monitor what we are doing, can only take us to the level of 
"competence" (Dreyfus, 1980). Dreyfus in his argument against McDowell discloses a 
dichotomy between 'thought' and 'action' that is present deep in our psyche: As human beings, 
we have the freedom to step back from our actions and reflect on them, but we also have the 
freedom to get involved in non-conceptual bodily-coping. There is the world of "propositional 
structures" and the world of "solicitations to act". Dreyfus, unlike McDowell, sees openness to 
the world, as a state of "being" in which there is contact with one part of the world and not the 
other. We must "distinguish motor intentionality, and the interrelated solicitations our coping 
body is intertwined with, from conceptual intentionality and the world of propositional structures 
it opens onto" (Dreyfus, 2007, p. 352). McDowell points out in response that he does not 
consider "ground-floor" embodied coping devoid of rationality, distinct from "upper story" 
openness to the world characterized with pure reason. On the contrary, he views embodied 
coping skills to be permeated with "conceptual mindedness" (McDowell, 2007). I find Taylor's 
negation of the possibility of thought without context useful here: "We can't build our view of 
the world out of percepts like 'the goldenrod is out,' or even 'yellow here now,' because nothing 
would count as such a percept unless it already had its place in the world. Minimally, nothing 
could be a percept without a surrounding sense of myself as perceiving agent, moving in some 
surroundings, of which this bit of yellow is a feature" (Taylor, 2002, p. 112). Taylor states that 
"our understanding of the world is holistic from the start. There is no such thing as the single, 
independent percept. Something has this status only within a wider context which is understood, 
taken for granted, but for the most part not focussed on" (ibid, p. 113). 
It seems Dreyfus's position could easily give credence to the popular view that certain higher 
powers of thought are entirely removed from context, on the one hand, and that engagement with 
the world at certain levels is purely mechanical, on the other. The reductive reconstruction of the 
mind in cognitive psychology's computer model not only consolidates the latter position, but it 
also extends the model to abstract thought by virtue of the fact that it reconstructs the mind on 
the same "explanatory principles as disenchanted nature" (ibid., p. 107). That powers of mind are 
operative in everything we do, even in such actions which seem to require less reflective thought, 
is only one aspect of the relationship between thought and action. The other more significant 
dimension, at least for the purposes of this thesis, is the pervasiveness of context in all we 
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undertake, especially those activities that demand high levels of abstraction. Context cannot be 
understood by the students only in physical or even social terms, although this would be highly 
desirable; it should expand to include the extended reality examined in chapter 4. Otherwise, 
there is always the danger in education of reducing context-bound understanding of complex 
concepts to a number of predetermined algorithms. Although the many and varied ways in which 
an individual's powers of mind come into play differ according to circumstances, there is always 
the background understanding that furnishes each action with meaning. A grasp of this intimate 
connection between thought and action in a world, itself not broken into a world of 'inanimate 
causal interactions' and an 'animate', 'enchanted' world of reason, as elaborated in chapter 4, is 
fundamental to any genuine effort of integration in education.' 
35 
Toillustrate the way students can at an early stage be helped to appreciate the relevance of context to understanding, a lesson 
from one of FUNDAEC'S texts is included as Appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER 7: CAPABILITIES 
My examination of the philosophical framework of an educational process concerned with moral 
empowerment up to now has been mostly focused on three interrelated themes: the subject, the 
object and the process of understanding. In my search for the 'subject of understanding', I 
abandoned a number of candidates proposed, explicitly or implicitly, by various trends in 
education some of the presuppositions and arguments of which were analyzed. While the 
exploration so far has brought to light several inadequacies of the candidates I have considered, I 
have not said enough about the characteristics of the subject of understanding—a participant in 
the process of moral empowerment and its principal protagonist. It seems apparent that if this 
protagonist is not to be merely characterized by a set of virtues, competencies and skills, I need a 
way of thinking that would not confine me to these categories, as well as a language expansive 
enough to describe the subject of understanding and his or her progress on the path of moral 
empowerment, a path on which individual growth and contribution to social transformation are 
inseparably linked. In this chapter, I argue that the concept of capability—the notion that the 
moral empowerment of an individual may be described in terms of a wide range of capabilities 
he or she acquires progressively—is central to this way of thinking. 
The exploration in this thesis of the characteristics of the subject of understanding, as mentioned 
before, takes for granted the validity of the claim that humanity as a whole is entering its age of 
maturity and that during this transition the great majority of the human race will need to acquire 
capacities that the transformation it must undergo demands from them. In fact, the convulsions of 
the present day society are viewed according to this outlook, partially as results of the forces that 
destroy barriers to such realization of potential and while, admittedly, causing a great deal of 
suffering, give rise to possibilities for the gradual construction of a global civilization of 
unprecedented material and spiritual achievements. But this vision, no matter how fundamental 
at the level of conviction, is too general and has to be brought to bear on the immediate concerns 
of Band'i-inspired educational endeavours, key elements of the framework of which I am 
examining here. The arena of action where the educational process unfolds is, to a large extent, 
the community in which the student is immersed and many of the educational goals are related to 
the social, economic, cultural and spiritual development of the community. I already included, in 
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my examination of science and religion as two complementary sources of knowledge, a brief 
discussion of 'development' with its emphasis on modernization. As I now turn once again to the 
theme of the 'subject of understanding', I need to examine further the nature of development as 
the immediate context within which many Band'i-inspired educational programmes would be 
elaborated. The starting point for the analysis of the concept of capability, then, will be a 
discussion of its place in the discourse on development. 
As I have already mentioned in chapter 1, Band'i-inspired efforts adhere to the idea that man's 
inner life is organic with the environment, and that lasting change can only occur as a result of 
mutual transformative interaction of the two. However, it is not easy to translate the conviction 
that the human heart cannot be segregated from the environment outside it into an understanding 
of the dynamics of the social and economic development of a people. One condition is clearly 
necessary at the level of thought: An educational programme concerned with releasing the 
potentialities of individuals to contribute to the betterment of their communities needs to be 
embedded in an appropriate paradigm that would govern the development of the society in which 
these communities function. Above all, the subject of understanding imbued with the desired 
twofold moral purpose is to be a protagonist of the development of his or her people, not 
according to all theories of development, but those for which the empowerment of the people 
themselves is a central concern. 
Much has been said about the failure of development, particularly the global programmes that 
began in the mid-twentieth century. At least at the level of theory, the idea is sometimes 
expressed that the very notions of 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' suggest that nations and 
people are judged by standards which, claiming objectivity, are formulated by outsiders. The 
distorted and self-contradictory perception of reality at the heart of such divisions has been 
vehemently criticized for the way it has shaped the practice of development. Gustavo Esteva, for 
example, states that underdevelopment began on January 20, 1949 when President Truman in his 
inaugural speech announced a bold new programme to make the benefits of the scientific 
advances and industrial progress of his nation available for the improvement and growth of the 
underdeveloped areas. He remarks: 
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On that day, two billion people became underdeveloped...from that time on, they ceased 
being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted 
mirror of others' reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of the 
queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous and 
diverse majority, simply in terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority. (Esteva, 1993, 
P. 7) 
Social and economic development approaches that divide reality in this way and define the 
identity of the inhabitants of so many regions of the world as underdeveloped people reduced to 
`individual units with input requirement', to 'points below or above the poverty line' and to 
`mathematical aggregates revealing the rate of growth of a country' are incompatible with the 
kind of education being discussed in this thesis. If I had to question the suitability of candidates 
for the 'subject of understanding' suggested by certain educational theories because of the 
incomplete picture of the human being they painted, how much more will I have to stay away 
from the type of characterization in which individuals are depicted as immersed in the throes of 
underdevelopment—a status of malaise from which mainstream development efforts are 
supposedly trying to save them. In fact, the 'subject of understanding' I am seeking has no 
resemblance to the social character that, fabricated to benefit from development's global 
programmes, engraves in the mind images of need and dependency which serve to justify the 
enterprise and perpetuate it. 
Development as Freedom 
A notable departure from theories that fail to see the majority of the inhabitants of the planet as 
potential protagonists of development is Amartya Sen's conception of development as freedom. 
For Sen, development is principally the process through which people's real and substantive 
freedoms are expanded. By adopting this definition, he distances himself from views that 
identify development with 'growth of national products', with 'rise in personal income', with 
`industrialization', with 'technological advance' and 'social modernization'. These, he points 
out are means—not the only ones—through which freedoms are expanded, but they are often 
mistaken for goals. There are other factors that contribute to development, for example, social 
and economic arrangements that make available education and healthcare, as well as political 
and civil rights. Sen contends that viewing "development in terms of expanding substantive 
freedoms directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to 
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some of the means that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process" (Sen, 1999, p. 3). He 
draws on Aristotle's statement that "wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is 
merely useful and for the sake of something else" (Aristotle, E.N,. Book I) in order to argue that 
ends and means should be distinguished if we are to achieve a comprehensive grasp of the nature 
of development which cannot be reduced to economic growth. 
Placing the concept of freedom at the heart of development thinking moves it in a direction that 
allows greater focus on the protagonists of the process. It makes it possible to incorporate into 
the theory such factors as the liberty to participate in political affairs and the opportunity to 
receive basic education or healthcare not only as contributors to economic growth but more 
fundamentally as "constitutive components" of development. Freedoms are counted among both 
the primary ends of development and its principal means. A conception of development as a 
process through which freedoms are expanded does not neglect poverty, but demands its removal, 
along with conditions like tyranny, as sources of "unfreedom". It represents a shift from the more 
traditional approaches that adopt variables like utility, primary goods, procedural liberty and real 
income as informational base for evaluation. Moreover, expansion of freedoms fosters individual 
initiative and social effectiveness. It enhances the "ability of the people to help themselves and 
also to influence the world" (Sen, 1999, p. 18). 
These features, among others to be discussed in the next few sections, suggest that Sen's theory 
of development may serve as a suitable background to the exploration of the characteristics of 
the subject of understanding in the process of moral empowerment. Yet, to exploit insights from 
Sen's theory does not imply total adherence to it. There are also causes for uneasiness. Pursuit of 
individual freedom, even when it is in accord with the highest social ideals, can easily turn into 
the promotion of individualism. To be fair, Sen avoids the individualistic slant that one would 
expect from an approach to development with the notion of individual freedom at its core by 
situating his discourse in the context of the lives of distinct groups, particularly marginalized 
majorities suffering from a host of deprivations in so many nations. In doing so, he provides a 
picture of the empirical connections that link freedoms of different kinds. Social opportunities 
and participation in political processes promote economic security, just as provision of economic 
opportunities to take part in trade and production contributes not only to the generation of 
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personal wealth, but also to the enhancement of public life. His treatment of freedom 
acknowledges, in addition to the people's ability to choose and act, the indispensable role social 
arrangements and social structures play in providing opportunities for people's participation in 
the development process.' 
Notwithstanding the depth of Sen's analysis, an approach that would use freedom as a super-
value, an umbrella under which all other values exist without any tension faces certain problems. 
Nussbaum mentions some of the difficulties in the notion of development as freedom: "Some 
freedoms limit others" (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 44). For example, the "freedom of rich people to 
make large donations to political campaigns limits the equal worth of the right to vote... The 
freedom of the landowners to keep their land limits projects of land reform that might be argued 
to be central to many freedoms for the poor " (ibid.). Not all freedoms are "desirable social goals" 
and they cannot be given equal status. Some freedoms "lie at the heart of a view of political 
justice, and others do not. Among the ones that do not lie at the core, some are simply less 
important, but others may be positively bad" (ibid.). Sen, of course, would respond that only 
certain freedoms such as the liberty to participate in political affairs, to achieve basic nutrition or 
to receive basic education and healthcare, fall in the category of 'substantive' freedoms. But 
such an argument would only illustrate how, as stated by Gasper and Staveren, Sen "brings 
values other than those related to the independent self under his language of freedom..." As they 
explain, when "our agenda is not only evaluation, but also explanation and prescription ... a 
more differentiated language becomes essential" (Gasper and Staveren, 2003, p. 146). 
`Development as freedom' has clearly proven to be a valuable approach to the evaluation of 
development strategies and goals, as demonstrated by the prominence 'human development' has 
received over the years. However, in considering the development process itself, and within it 
the question of education, "explanations and prescriptions" do become necessary and a number 
of values, either implied by 'freedom' or not addressed by it at all, have to be brought into focus. 
This seems possible if the analysis of development goes beyond the exploration of enlightened 
social policies and their relevance to progress in the material realm. Of particular importance, at 
least as implied by the premises of this inquiry, is the explicit treatment of an extended reality 
36 See chapers 1-4 in (Sen, 1999) 
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which, as elaborated in chapter 4, would embrace both the material and social dimensions of 
civilization in the construction of which the protagonist of development will have to participate, 
a treatment that would pay sufficient attention to the spiritual dimension of human existence. 
Once such a step is contemplated, I would like to argue, development strategy would be required 
to seek coherence between the material and the spiritual. And to respond to this demand 
adequately, it would be necessary to consider religion as more than something one should simply 
have the freedom to choose. One would also need to avoid the temptation of viewing it as a mere 
instrument for the achievement of material progress. Yet even a sophisticated theory such as 
Sen's could assign no more than an instrumental role to religion in the development process. 
Dennis Goulet describes how religious beliefs are often viewed as means that could accelerate or 
slow down the achievement of development goals set by those outside a given value system. 
Even development agents who are sensitive to local values usually derive their goals 
from outside these values: from development models or the common assumptions of their 
respective scientific disciplines. Thus, a demographer will strive to "harness" local values 
to his objective of promoting contraception or achieving zero population growth. 
Similarly, the agronomist will search for a traditional practice upon which to "graft" his 
recommendation to use chemical pesticides. Similarly, the community organizer will 
`mobilize' a population for political ends around traditionally cherished symbols. (Goulet, 
1980, p. 484) 
In development strategy, science too is often viewed from an instrumental perspective. It is ever 
present in name, but mostly in the shadow of technology, an unfortunate condition contributing 
much to the ascendance of technique over substance. 
A common feature of development thinking that is slowly taking shape in Baha'i communities 
around the world is the conviction that in seeking coherence between the spiritual and the 
material, the flow of scientific and spiritual knowledge needs to be the main concern of 
development strategy. Like Sen's, this kind of thinking does not deny the significance of 
economic activity but suggests that it should be given its proper place in the context of the 
production and distribution of means. By focusing on the flow of knowledge, this view of 
development, the elements of which are barely taking shape in grassroots efforts of the Band'i 
communities worldwide, brings to the fore the role of science and religion as complementary 
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sources of knowledge in the development process, and regards the participation of a people in the 
generation and application of knowledge as vital to their progress. This emphasis on knowledge 
opens ways to examining the subject of understanding beyond that which the concept of 
development as freedom seems able to do. The assumption is that as a population becomes 
empowered to participate in the generation, application and diffusion of knowledge, it will be 
able to create the conditions in which it can exercise the substantive freedoms called for by Sen. 
But the process would achieve more. It would make explicit within the population the values 
now hidden under the umbrella of freedom, and would shed much needed light on the concept of 
freedom itself. 
As Bernard Williams has explained, various conceptions or understandings of freedom "involve 
a complex historical deposit" (Williams, 2001, p. 4). Take, for example, Sen's substantial 
freedom to participate in political affairs. So much of today's discussion on this kind of freedom 
is embedded in the political framework of liberal democracy. Such a framework is tied to 
conceptions of power which can be analyzed and evaluated through sophisticated arguments of 
political science some of which were included in my cursory treatment of the subject in chapter 1. 
But development thinking that would accept the complementarity of science and religion, as 
discussed in chapter 5, would also use the language of religion to gain insights into the nature of 
both power and freedom. In the language of religion, one can find explanations of the kind of 
freedom that inspires human beings to transcend various forms of inner bondage resulting in 
inaction or harmful action in the world. We may, for example, explain the environmental 
consequences of greed from a scientific perspective, but it is the language of religion that helps 
us see it as inner bondage, curtailing our freedom. The language of religion confirms the 
incompleteness of the objective view of reality, no matter how far we advance in that view. With 
this conviction, we do not only seek external freedom: "the absence of obstacles to doing what 
we want", as Nagel puts it. We want to be able to detach ourselves from "the motives and 
reasons and values" that influence our choices and "submit to them if they are acceptable" 
(Nagel, 1986, p. 127). 
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Agency 
Sen's 'freedom-centred' conception of development represents at the same time an 'agent-
oriented' approach. He makes a distinction between his use of the term 'agency' and how it is 
employed in, say, the economics literature, where it is attached to an individual who is acting on 
someone else's behalf and whose achievements are to be assessed in light of someone else's 
goals. Rather, the agent is "someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements 
can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms 
of some external criteria as well" (Sen, 1999, pp. 18-9). Sen claims that when processes that 
advance substantive freedoms also provide social opportunities, individuals will be able to shape 
their own futures; they will no longer be seen as constituents of an "inert population", objects of 
"fine-tuned 'targeting" (p. 19) of policy makers and "passive recipients of cunning 
development programmes" (p. 11). By the same token, the removal of "unfreedom" in its various 
forms is fundamental as these wipe away people's choices and do not allow them to exercise 
"their reasoned agency". In the case of women, for example, viewing their rights in a larger 
context, by including their role as free agents alongside other entitlements related to their well-
being, has helped transform the conception of women from "passive recipients of welfare-
enhancing help" to "active agents of change: the dynamic promoters of social transformation that 
can alter the lives of both women and men" (p. 189). 
Like freedom, the concept of agency as conceived by Sen helps define development in a way that 
could admit the notion of education as a process of moral empowerment. It brings into 
development thinking a conception of the human being as an active rather than a passive entity, 
as someone able to draw on his or her physical, mental and moral resources to affect change 
rather than a patient who, bereft of such resources, is waiting to be saved by others. Yet, as in the 
case of freedom, one has to be aware of the dangers of an individualistic interpretation of social 
existence. In formulating a conception of education for development, it is necessary to extend the 
notion of agency to the collective life of humanity. Communities and the institutions of society 
together with the individual constitute the three protagonists of the development process. The 
empowerment of the individual must advance in partnership with the other two protagonists. In a 
world where the individual continuously clamours for more and more freedom and institutions 
seek more and more control, directly or through propaganda and manipulation, the combination 
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of agency and freedom as concepts central to the social and economic development of peoples 
needs to be approached in the educational process with care. 
Capability 
A third concept closely connected to freedom and agency is 'capability'. Sen laments that the 
"technocratic sound" of the word does not contribute to the sense in which the expression was 
picked by him in order to "explore a particular approach to well-being and advantage in terms of 
a person's ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being" (Sen, 1993, p. 30). For 
him, the term represents "the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do or be—the 
various `functionings' he or she can achieve" (ibid.). Functionings in this context correspond to 
"parts of the state of a person—in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be 
in leading a life" (ibid., p. 31).They embrace such elemental states as being adequately nourished, 
being in good health, having mobility, as well as more complex ones, say, being happy, 
achieving self-respect or being socially integrated (pp. 36-7). Here is how Sen defines the 
concept of capability: "In the space of functionings any point, representing an n-tuple of 
functionings, reflects a combination of the person's beings and doings, relevant to the exercise 
[of evaluation]. The capability is a set of such functioning n-tuples, representing the various 
alternative combinations of beings and doings any one (combination) of which the person can 
choose" (p. 38). 
A primary concern of the "capability approach" is the "identification of value-objects" (Sen, 
1993, p. 32). The selection of objects of value is an evaluative exercise and the relative value of 
objects is determined through further evaluative procedures. The evaluative space in this 
approach is seen in terms of "functionings and capabilities to function" (ibid.). It includes "a 
variety of human acts and states as important in themselves" (ibid., p. 33), which are not 
evaluated merely on the basis of their ability to produce utility or the degree to which they yield 
such utility. Neither primary goods nor utility provide sufficient informational base for 
evaluation. Even when the list of goods includes such items as rights, opportunities, income or 
wealth, "it still is concerned with good things rather than with what these good things do to 
human beings" (Sen, 1979, p. 218). And, whether seen as happiness and pleasure in the full 
utilitarian tradition, as desire fulfilment in its more modern formulations or simply defined as 
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some numerical representation of a person's observable choices, utility, while concerned with 
"what these things do to human beings," uses "a metric that focuses not on the person's 
capabilities but on his mental reaction" (ibid.). 
According to Sen "the freedom to lead different types of life is reflected in the person's 
capability set" (Sen, 1993, p. 33); a person deprived of a capability set is not free to lead the type 
of life she values. His treatment of poverty, not synonymous with low income but as "capability 
deprivation", demonstrates the power of his approach to the evaluation of development strategy. 
Income is only one instrument in generating capabilities, and in formulating policy one should be 
aware that "the instrumental relation between low income and low capability is variable between 
different communities and even between different families and different individuals" (Sen, 1999, 
p. 88). Variations such as age, gender, social role, and physical location should be taken into 
consideration in efforts aimed at poverty reduction. Age, disability or illness do not only reduce 
the ability to earn an income, they also make it harder to convert income into capability. Thus 
real poverty in terms of capability deprivation may be significantly "more intense than what 
appears in the income space" (ibid, p. 88). Further, the income approach to poverty pays little 
attention to the distribution of income within the family. For example, if the family income is 
used predominantly on boys, then the extent of deprivation of girls will not be adequately taken 
into account. Such deprivations are better assessed by looking at "capability deprivation (in 
terms of greater mortality, morbidity, undernourishment, medical neglect, and so on)" (ibid.). 
Finally, "relative deprivation in terms of income can yield absolute deprivation in terms of 
capabilities" (ibid., p. 89). A relatively poor person in a rich country may earn a high income in 
terms of "world standards", but be more deprived in terms of capabilities, including participation 
in the social life of the community. 
As Sen explains, the capability perspective in poverty analysis enhances the understanding of the 
nature and causes of poverty by "shifting primary attention away from means to ends that people 
have reason to pursue" (ibid., p. 90). Emphasis is now on the freedoms that enable a person to 
pursue the desired ends. And deprivation is "seen at a more fundamental level—one closer to the 
informational demands of social justice" (ibid.). 
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Sen employs the concept of capability to explore the workings of development policy in 
impressive depth. He outlines "a fourfold classification of points of evaluative interest in 
assessing human advantage, based on two different distinctions" (Sen, 1993, p. 35). The first 
distinction is between "the promotion of the person's well-being" and "the pursuit of the person's 
overall agency goals", and the second between "achievement" and " freedom to achieve" (ibid.). 
His analysis sheds light on some of the reasons impelling him to go beyond mere functioning and 
introduce the concept of capability. He states, for example, that well-being achievement can be 
assessed by the different functionings—"the constituent elements of the person's being seen 
from the perspective of her own personal welfare" (ibid., p. 36) which can also include her 
concern for others. Functionings are thus seen as "central to the nature of well-being" (ibid), and 
the evaluation of a person's well-being takes the form "of an assessment of these constituent 
elements" (ibid., p. 37). Functionings, however, do not prove adequate for all evaluation 
purposes. One needs to look at capabilities when one moves from "well-being achievement" to 
"agency achievement." That Sen defines development goals in terms of capabilities rather than 
actual functioning points to the value he places on the exercise of choice. Freedom is intrinsic to 
one's well-being achievement and agency achievement. "Acting freely and being able to choose" 
is directly conducive to well-being because "choosing is seen as part of living" and 'doing x' is 
distinguished from 'choosing to do x and doing it' (ibid., p. 39). 
In Martha Nussbaum's treatment of capabilities—somewhat different from Sen's—the question 
of choice also receives particular attention. Nussbaum employs Aristotle's conception of political 
distribution, the aim of which is not the simple allotment of commodities, but the enabling of 
people to function in certain ways. Sen adopts the concept of capabilities in order to define the 
space within which quality of life is assessed; Nussbaum uses it "as a foundation for basic 
political principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees" (Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 70-1). 
She, unlike Sen, defines a list of "central human functional capabilities", emphasizing that any 
such list cannot be but "a proposal put forward in a Socratic fashion, to be tested against the most 
secure of our intuitions as we attempt to arrive at a type of reflective equilibrium for political 
purposes" (ibid, p. 77). The list covers capabilities having to do with life, bodily health; bodily 
integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; 
play; and control over one's environment, political and material. The composition of the list is, 
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according to Nussbaum, of "separate components" all of which have "central importance" and 
are "distinct in quality" (p. 81). Although the items on the list are interrelated in many ways, the 
increase in one item does not make up for the deficiency in another below a certain basic level. 
Nussbaum identifies the capabilities of practical reason and affiliation as paramount since "they 
both organize and suffuse all others and make them truly human" (p. 82). Her emphasis on 
practical reason—the ability to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one's life—is particularly significant as it relates to 'choice'. Practical 
reason is the activity that is common to all functionings in a truly human sense. She points out 
that from an Aristotelian perspective there is "something less than fully human about a life 
devoted to pleasure alone, the life that many humans claim to want. It seems to leave out 
something that we think a human life should have. This something is hinted at in the work of 
`choosing', ...namely the exercise of choice and practical reason" (Nussbaum, 1987, p. 44). 
Building Capacity 
Having discussed the concept of capability in the context of development as freedom, I can now 
turn to the task I set for myself in the beginning of this chapter: to examine the claim that the 
moral empowerment of the individual may be described in terms of the progressive acquisition 
by the student of a wide-range of capabilities. To analyze this claim, however, I will need to 
describe these capabilities in a language that is not identical to the one used by Sen and 
Nussbaum. It is not that their treatment of the concept of capability does not have meaningful 
application in the field of education. Nussbaum, for example, states: 
...an education for human development...has a twofold purpose. First, it must promote 
the human development of students. Second, it must promote in students an 
understanding of the goals of human development for all—as goals inherent in the very 
idea of decent, minimally just society—and it must do this in such a way that when they 
are empowered to make political choices, they will foster those capabilities for all, not 
only for themselves. (Nussbaum, 2009, p. 8) 
As to how education can accomplish this aim, she elaborates on the significance of three key 
abilities: the ability for critical thought, the ability to "see oneself as a member of a 
heterogeneous nation—and world—and to understand something of the history and character of 
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diverse groups that inhabit it" (ibid, p. 11) and the ability to feel sympathy. The type of education 
to nurture these abilities is one in which through "carefully crafted instruction in arts and 
humanities" students are brought into contact with "issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and cross-
cultural experience and understanding" (p. 13), and one in which critical thinking "informs the 
entire spirit of a school's pedagogy" (p. 11). She mentions that these abilities are being 
developed well in the liberal arts colleges and universities in the United States, while they are 
poorly treated in earlier stages of education, in the years K-12. 
Important as these insights are, such arguments deal with a set of heterogeneous ideas that are 
not easily translatable into actual curricular objectives and content. Moreover, they should be 
approached with caution. Attributes such as critical thinking and sympathy and outcomes such as 
choice and freedom have their place in education. But, as mentioned in the discussion of Hirst's 
conception of integration in the previous chapter, focusing on them—along with qualities of the 
mind like creativity and imagination—as key goals determining educational content and methods 
is not as fruitful as it may seem at first. As far as I can see the capability approach to 
development provides an appropriate background to the formulation of an approach to moral 
empowerment that employs the concept of capability to make appropriate pedagogical choices. 
To advance towards such a formulation, however, the notion of capability has to be recast in 
terms that are of more immediate use in education. In doing so, I turn once again to FUNDAEC's 
experience. Unfortunately, a straightforward account of how the organization developed the 
concept of capability is not easy to come by; its treatment of the concept is scattered and 
incomplete. What I will do is to draw on some 25 units' constituting the content of a two-year 
programme to prepare 'Promoters of Community Well-being' and relevant statements I can find 
in documents elaborated by the organization in order to analyze the notion of capability and its 
relation to moral empowerment. The next chapter will be dedicated to the examination of certain 
pedagogical implications of the concept of capability as advanced here. 
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Units are used here generically to refer to a combination of materials to be studied and discussed by a group with 
the aid of a tutor, as well as the corresponding 'guided action research in the community', analysis of results and 
reflection on the nature of activity being undertaken. 
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As already mentioned in chapter 1, FUNDAEC has used the concept of capability as "developed 
capacity to think and act in a particular sphere of activity and according to an explicit purpose" 
(FUNDAEC, 2008, p. 47). Capabilities in this particular sense refer to "complex spheres of 
thought and action". A capability is not something a student either has or does not have; it is 
developed progressively as one acquires a set of interrelated skills and abilities, assimilates the 
necessary information, advances in the understanding of relevant concepts, and acquires certain 
attitudes, habits and spiritual qualities. 
The conclusion I have reached after attempts to define the concept with more precision is that the 
exercise is counterproductive. FUNDAEC insisted from the outset that it would use the concept 
mostly as a heuristic device, a way of thinking about educational objectives and content, a 
strategy that would help organize elements of a curriculum according to a specified overall aim. I 
entered this inquiry believing that I could firm up the definition of the concept. But having 
examined the work of Sen and Nussbaum and then reflecting on the way an ongoing discussion 
of capabilities has assisted FUNDAEC to tackle the challenges of integration in determining 
curricular content and methods, I have come to realize that to be useful in making pedagogical 
choices, a given capability would not need to have a definable or measurable existence as might 
a skill, an attitude or the knowledge of something. The attributes that would contribute to it—the 
skills, the assimilated information, the understanding of concepts, the attitudes, habits and 
spiritual qualities—would not be its components; they would somehow interact and take on 
collective meaning in the context of action in the community. A capability would not be 
reducible to a list of such attributes. 
Language, of course, allows the word capability to be used in a wide variety of ways. To be 
capable of doing something may refer to a simple skill or to a most complex set of functionings, 
one of the n-tuples proposed by Sen. One could be considered capable of identifying types of 
nutrients in foods being bought in the market, or could be called capable of critical thinking. To 
be useful in formulating objectives corresponding to a given educational aim, only capabilities in 
a certain range of 'sizes' and certain levels of specificity would be admissible. For example, 
`typing' is too small and would be relegated to the realm of skills; 'critical analysis' would be 
too broad and the capabilities that assist in its realization would each be formulated in relation to 
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a specific objective. Again, no formula would exist for determining the range; 'rules of thumb' 
would emerge through action and reflection in the elaboration of educational content. 
I have already explained in the introduction to this chapter that the overall vision of a civilization 
manifesting the powers of humanity in its stage of maturity gives rise to the more immediate 
concerns of education in terms of the development of the community in its social, economic, 
cultural and spiritual dimensions. In the life of the individual student these concerns can be 
organized around the concept of 'service to the community'. As mentioned in chapter 3, the 
image being used widely in Band'i communities worldwide is that of walking a path of service. 
Walking the path implies study, action and reflection on action. As one advances on the path of 
service, one acquires progressively the set of capabilities that 'pursuing personal growth' and 
`contributing to the transformation of society' necessitate. 
Various kinds of capabilities are always present in a given set. A first category consists of 
capabilities that have to do with the moral dimension of the path of service. In any programme of 
the kind being explored here, the students would have to become increasingly capable, for 
example, of building unity, of participating in collective action, of managing personal and 
community affairs with rectitude of conduct, of engaging in conversations that make explicit the 
knowledge and experience of the local community, and of accompanying others in their efforts 
without imposing their own preferences. These and other similar capabilities are essential 
requirements of a path of service associated with moral empowerment. They also seem to be of 
the 'right size' to be included among the objectives of an educational programme, knowing that 
the objective would never be the definitive acquisition of a given capability, but advancing in it. 
The objectives of each unit would be expressed in terms of contributing in some measure to the 
understanding of the concepts, the assimilation of the information, the development of the skills, 
the habits, the attitudes and the spiritual qualities that together make advancing in some set of 
capabilities possible. A few words about one example, building unity, may be helpful here. To 
assist the students advance in this capability, the educational process would have to ensure that 
they give sufficient thought to such fundamental concepts as unity, diversity, unity in diversity, 
unity versus uniformity, unity of purpose, unity of thought, and unity in action—sometimes in 
theoretical discussions but often in practice in the context of the actual work for which they are 
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being prepared. Skills and habits would include those of listening carefully to others, of 
identifying elements of agreement in a given situation upon which unity can be built without 
trivializing differences, and of avoiding false dichotomies. A necessary attitude would be 
detachment, and one to be avoided at all cost a posture of superiority. General discussions as 
well as personal and collective reflection on the effectiveness of specific acts of service would 
contribute to the acquisition of the appropriate attitudes, but they would be fragile unless they are 
established on the firm foundation of certain spiritual qualities representing profound states of 
being such as love, humility and selflessness, and to these the programme would have to pay 
ample attention. Finally, the development of the capability would also imply a profound 
knowledge of the community based on a great deal of accurate information accumulated 
systematically in the context of various acts of service. 
A second category of capabilities to be addressed consists of those having direct bearing on the 
acts of service that help define the aims of a given programme. To move from an aim, no matter 
how well stated, to the identification of the needed capabilities calls for a definite procedure. In 
the case of the 'Promoter of Community Well-being' programme—community meaning a 
village or the neighbourhood of a city in a micro-region with clearly definable social and 
economic problems—FUNDAEC proceeded in the following way. It considered the chains of 
activities that people carry out in the micro-region and tried to conceptually organize them in 
what it called processes of community life. Examples of the wide range of such processes are 
production in small farms, preservation and improvement of the physical environment, 
socialization of small children, formal education of children and youth, individual and 
community healthcare, secondary production such as the processing of food, the buying and 
selling of primary and manufactured goods, artistic expression and cultural enrichment. In every 
micro-region, FUNDAEC observed, the processes of community life are being shaped by the 
forces of integration and disintegration characterizing the age of transition of humanity from 
childhood to maturity. In so many communities the destructive forces, generated globally or 
locally, are the strongest, disempowering the population and maintaining or deepening material 
poverty. FUNDAEC proceeded to set in motion, initially in one micro-region, learning processes 
alongside each of the processes of community life. These consisted of research and action close 
to the grassroots in which the population itself would increasingly participate. The purpose of 
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these learning processes was to apply and generate knowledge, thereby creating forces that 
would empower the population to take ownership of its own social and economic development. 
The moral empowerment of the promoters of community well being, the students of FUNDAEC, 
would involve acquiring capabilities that would enable them to engage in these learning 
processes, to promote them through acts of service, and to help individuals and groups in the 
micro-region to participate in them. 
A brief look at the problem of environment helps illustrate this approach. If a community is 
moving towards prosperity, people within it would be engaged in chains of activity that would 
not only maintain but, in the long run, improve the quality of the physical environment. In most 
communities of the world forces both from inside and outside are reversing the direction of this 
process leading to progressive environmental deterioration. A promoter of community well-
being should be able to promote the kind of learning within the population that leads to effective 
environmental action. One needed capability, FUNDAEC decided, would be that of raising the 
consciousness of a community about environmental issues, and another closely related to it the 
capability of making a diagnosis of the state of an ecosystem and participating in search for 
possible solutions to its problems. Again these capabilities are of a 'size' so as to become 
objectives of units of curriculum that would impart sufficient knowledge of environment, nurture 
a deep enough understanding of the relevant scientific and social concepts, and cultivate 
desirable skills, habits, attitudes and spiritual qualities. As already mentioned, the objective of 
such units would not be the definitive acquisition of these capabilities. All that a student can do 
is to advance in them, and the units could only contribute to this advancement. The capabilities 
themselves cannot be limited. The knowledge, the skills, the attitudes, the habits and spiritual 
qualities required of the promoter capable of raising the consciousness of the local community 
about environmental issues, for example, represent the beginnings of what would be needed if 
life were to take him or her to become the executive of a sophisticated agency concerned with 
environmental policy at the national level. 
A short mention of a few other capabilities directly concerned with acts of service in the 
`Promoter of Community Well-being' programme may shed further light on the nature of the 
approach undertaken. To participate in and promote effectively the learning process on 
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production of food on small farms would require that the promoter be capable of both designing 
and cultivating certain plots suitable for the ecological, social and cultural conditions of the 
micro region, and of using these plots as educational tools for the propagation of appropriate 
agricultural practices. Through extensive research, FUNDAEC developed over some two decades a 
methodology for the development of what it called "diversified high efficiency plots", applying 
the latest advances in the science of agriculture and animal husbandry, but with due regard for 
the rationality of small farmers and not in the manner of large commercial enterprises. Based on 
the results of its research it elaborated units of text focused on the development of the above two 
capabilities. In relation to the process of the education of children and youth, to take another 
example, one aspect of the learning process set in motion by FUNDAEC had to do with preschool 
education. Relevant capabilities in this respect range from those needed by preschool teachers 
and administrators all the way to those required of individuals engaged in educational research 
and the development of curricula. In the training of promoters of community well-being, it was 
decided, two capabilities would have to be addressed. The first would include concepts, 
information, skills and qualities that would enable them to carry out informal educational 
activities with small groups of children and the other the attributes that would enable them to 
converse with parents on issues related to the education of young children. Two units under the 
title Nurturing Young Minds focus on the development of these two capabilities. Similar lines of 
reasoning lead to the identification of other capabilities related, for example, to primary 
healthcare, the strengthening of the local economy, and theatre and other performing arts—both 
as powerful tools for raising social consciousness and as elements of the learning process related 
to the enrichment of culture. 
A significant characteristic of FUNDAEC's approach, and one that can be deduced from my 
discussion so far to be an essential element of the framework being explored in this thesis, is that 
the development of capabilities in the two categories described above does not take the student 
far enough on the path of moral empowerment. There are a large number of capabilities 
associated with the intellectual heritage of humankind—say, associated with the forms of 
knowledge described by Hirst—some of which would have to be carefully selected and 
addressed according to the specific aims of a given programme. Without these capabilities, it 
would be difficult to achieve a proper balance between knowing and doing, and between 
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information, skills and attitudes, on the one hand, and understanding and spiritual qualities, on 
the other. A few examples may be necessary to illustrate this point. 
In the case of the promoters of community well-being, an intimate knowledge of the micro-
region requires classification of a wide variety of things, from flora and fauna of the region to the 
occupations of its inhabitants. Classifying things is a capability built on certain basic 
mathematical concepts and logic, the understanding of which creates a foundation for its 
development. A unit dedicated to the enhancement of this capability, using the language of 
mathematics, mostly of set theory, containing an extensive treatment of taxonomy and guiding 
students in the collection and classification of data about the various physical and social features 
of the micro-region is among the first to be studied. The promoter would need other capabilities, 
also belonging to the realm of mathematics, that would, for example, enable him or her to make 
numerical statements of various degrees of precision about the world—capabilities that begin 
developing when a child learns to count and reach extraordinary levels of complexity in the 
application of mathematical equations to the workings of the universe. Another example is the 
capability of applying arithmetic, including operations with fractions, to the analysis of data. One 
of the units that contribute to this capability treats systematically the subject of fractions as any 
good text of arithmetic would do, but now in relation to a rather extensive survey of the state of 
health in the community. Such an analysis contributes to the development of other capabilities 
related to primary healthcare. 
That the promoter of community well-being is not to be a mere technician who applies formulae 
to a process of transformation demanding much more than technique gives rise to the need for 
another set of capabilities: capabilities of a scientist such as those of making organized 
observations of phenomena, of seeking patterns in data gathered about a phenomenon, of 
designing experiments to test a hypothesis and even of creating models within a theoretical 
structure. I will refer to these capabilities in the next chapter in the discussion of pedagogical 
choices. Here it suffices to mention that they are not treated superficially during the course of 
other activities but in units that teach science at the appropriate level of rigor, in the context of 
scientific inquiry as an essential component of the promoter's work. Another area in which the 
students have to develop a number of capabilities is language. The question of language, of 
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course, arises in a number of ways in relation to the aim of moral empowerment; I have treated 
the subject in chapter 5 in the context of the complementarity of science and religion, and will 
come back to it in the last chapter. Capabilities to be developed by promoters of community 
well-being in this area—and in any other programme that focuses on the twofold moral purpose 
explored in this inquiry—include those that have to do with describing the world around oneself, 
precisely when needed and in metaphors if required, with formulating ideas and expressing them 
clearly, with reading the literature of relevant fields with good comprehension and with 
describing events and processes in their historical contexts. 
Having described the nature of capabilities in the three broad categories—those related to the 
moral dimension of the path of service, those that have a direct bearing on the acts of service 
which help define the aims of a given programme and ones associated with the intellectual 
heritage of humankind—as outlined here, I can turn to the examination of certain pedagogical 
issues in the next chapter. Before bringing the present argument to a close, however, one point 
needs to be emphasised: The universe of concepts, information, skills, habits, attitudes and 
spiritual qualities is not being divided here into subsets each corresponding to a capability. 
Capability, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, is used heuristically to allow for a way 
of thinking about the attributes of the subject of understanding and their interconnections as one 
tries to formulate objectives and elaborate a curriculum for a programme of specified aims. 
There is no call for a taxonomy of desired attributes. A given attribute clearly contributes to 
more than one capability; thus there is overlap among capabilities. Relationships, however, are 
not simple. The treatment of an attribute, say, understanding a certain concept or possessing a 
certain quality, changes as one focuses on different capabilities. For example, the quality of 
honesty has to be addressed in the context of the capability of managing personal and public 
affairs with rectitude of conduct, together with related concepts, skills and attitudes as well as the 
knowledge of issues involved in specific situations. Developing the same quality needs to be 
treated together with other sets of attributes in the context of unity building or the capabilities 
that enable one to engage in scientific inquiry. In the totality of these contexts, honesty as a 
spiritual quality is endowed with far more meaning than when it is addressed in the context of a 
single capability. If an appropriate pedagogy is developed and adopted, capability can serve as 
an effective strategy to integrate theoretical and practical knowledge. This is of particular 
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importance when it is recognized that the way the concept is being used does not confine it to the 
space of functionings—in which a person should have the freedom to choose doings and beings 
that are of value to him or her—but brings in the space of learning in which knowing, being and 
doing are integrated in the context of a dual process of individual and social transformation. 
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CHAPTER 8: PEDOGOGICAL CHOICES 
The previous chapter was dedicated to a general discussion of the concept of capability, first in 
the context of development following the ideas set forth by Sen and Nussbaum, and then as a 
strategy to analyze and organize educational programmes concerned with moral empowerment. 
Throughout this inquiry, I have confined myself to insights gained from relevant literature so as 
to make explicit elements of a conceptual framework for such programmes, and have said little 
about the teaching-learning experience per se. It seems necessary at this point to enter the fuzzy 
area that separates philosophy and pedagogy' in order to clarify the nature of some of the 
challenges that I have already identified, particularly in dealing with the question of integration. 
Even when it is taken for granted that the concept of capability provides a valuable way of 
thinking about the organization of the teaching-learning experience and the formulation of 
objectives, there is no guarantee that its use will lead to a curriculum conducive to moral 
empowerment. For one thing, as it stands, the notion is too vague and can easily transmute into 
other concepts, for example, competencies or life skills. Numerous pedagogical choices have to 
be made if the proper experience is to be created. A full discussion of such choices is beyond the 
scope of this thesis; what I can do is to select a few pedagogical issues of significance for my 
inquiry, hoping that by so doing I will be able to make explicit some features of the desired 
teaching-learning experience. But first a few words about the way I envision progress in 
pedagogy to actually occur, at least in the space created by the expanding network of Band'i-
inspired organizations. The approach that is gradually finding acceptance by these organizations 
calls for groups of educators working at the grassroots to identify educational needs, consult on 
them, develop a coherent set of ideas and create ongoing teaching-learning experiences in which 
these ideas are put into practice. Each group is to see itself engaged in a systematic process that 
involves action—carrying out educational activities and evaluating them—reflection on action, 
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I use the concept of pedagogy here in the broad sense of the term, as everything that has to do with the teaching-learning 
experience, rather than simply the act of teaching a student by a teacher. The term covers several interrelated sets of issues: One 
set has to do with the functions of the teacher including her knowledge of content and approaches to teaching, communication 
with students and the manner of assistance provided to them, integration of instruction in one subject area with others, and 
reflection upon and revision of personal practice. Another set of issues concerns educational materials designed to structure 
learning. Yet another set of issues is focused on the student and the kind of environment that enhances his or her learning. 
Participation in learning, however, extends beyond the classroom; students are members of society and interact with its other 
members, its institutions, and the many forces operating within it. 
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consultation and the analysis of advances in educational theory, not as a linear sequence but 
often in parallel, leading to repeated modification of ideas, methods and materials. In this way, 
through a series of approximations, curricular elements emerge to be shared with others in the 
network engaged in a similar process. The development of these elements, it is accepted, does 
not need to await the emergence of a comprehensive theory of education for moral empowerment; 
the process itself contributes significantly to theoretical advance as long as action is carried out 
within an evolving conceptual framework, and the knowledge being generated from various 
experiences is systematized and shared, and theory, no matter how well established, is 
considered a source of insight and not a statement about reality as it is. 
The attitude towards theory being promoted by this approach has its roots in the belief that 
search for a pedagogy seeking moral empowerment will only be successful if those involved in 
the practice of education set aside a number of deeply-rooted dichotomies. Dewey expresses the 
challenge succinctly: 
Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites, it is given to formulating its beliefs 
in terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognizes no possible intermediate possibilities. 
When forced to recognize that the extremes cannot be acted upon, it is still inclined to 
hold that they are all right in theory but that when it comes to practical matters 
circumstances compel us to compromise. (Dewey, 1938, p. 17) 
In the field of education, this habit of thought seems to exert undue influence on theory, and even 
when not explicitly stated, certain dichotomies are able to engender endless debate on a host of 
other opposites. 'Development from within' against 'formation from without' is one such 
dichotomy as is its parallel 'progressive education' vs. 'traditional education' mentioned by 
Dewey. The concept of capability as elaborated and used by FUNDAEC has the potential to 
harmonize different elements related to subject, object and process of understanding, elements 
which educational debate has often held in opposition to each other. By bringing together, for 
example, the acquisition of skills, the assimilation of information and the understanding of 
profound concepts in the formulation of each objective it helps one get away from such 
categorical statements as 'schools must not aim at imparting knowledge but focus on offering 
tools for in-depth understanding and thought' or 'schools should reduce the amount of material 
students are required to learn and teach them how to think'. In an approach where theories are to 
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be treated as sources of insight and not positions to be defended at all cost, it seems more useful 
to consider sets of related ideas with all the tension that naturally exists among them and see how 
a pedagogy is built out of their interactions. In this chapter I will only discuss two such sets of 
ideas. 
Banking Education and Problem Posing 
A number of ideas to be sorted out in the search for a pedagogy centred on the development of 
capabilities are related to a dichotomy which is often expressed in terms of Banking vs. Problem-
posing education or rote learning vs. critical thinking. In my analysis of the notion of power in 
relation to the aims of an educational programme concerned with moral empowerment, I referred 
to the work of Paulo Freire and his exploration of the kind of education that would cultivate 
critical consciousness. In that context, he described masterfully a contrast that helped him 
criticize certain approaches to education and examine the characteristics of an alternative which 
proved to revolutionize thinking about adult literacy. But the two notions problem-posing 
education and banking education took on their own lives, and gradually became, as such extreme 
contrasts tend to do, synonymous with good and bad education. To make valid pedagogical 
choices that would allow the concept of capability to show its potential, any kind of debate that 
pitches process against content in education needs to be set aside. 
Freire's account of banking education does not simply refer to its substance and method, but 
more significantly to the interactions between the teacher and the students. He seems to suggest 
that the role assumed by the teacher determines the nature of banking education. The teacher in 
this case is a narrator whose task is to 'fill' the minds of students with the contents of his 
narration. Such contents, whether concerned with social, moral or physical dimensions of reality 
become "detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could 
give them significance" (Freire, 1998, p. 52). Students receive, file and store what teachers 
deposit in them and are themselves in the end "filed away through the lack of creativity, 
transformation, and knowledge..." (ibid., p. 53). 
Freire argues that inquiry and praxis are what makes us human and that knowledge "emerges 
only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing hopeful 
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inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other" (ibid). The 
process of inquiry cannot begin when knowledge is considered a gift bestowed by the so-called 
knowledgeable upon the so-called ignorant. In such a relationship, the teacher "presents himself 
to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies 
his own existence. The students, alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their 
ignorance as justifying the teacher's existence, but, unlike the slave, they never discover that 
they educate the teacher" (ibid). The contradiction is deeply ingrained in banking education and 
is reflected in the attitudes and practices that characterize oppressive societies. So, "the teacher 
teaches and the students are taught"; "the teacher knows everything and the students know 
nothing"; "the teacher thinks and the students are thought about"; "the teacher talks and the 
students listen meekly"; "the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined"; "the teacher 
chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply"; "the teacher acts and the students 
have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher"; "the teacher chooses the 
programme content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it"; "the teacher confuses 
the authority of knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in 
opposition to the freedom of the students"; "the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, 
while the pupils are mere objects" (ibid., p. 54). 
In banking education, the teacher dulls students' critical abilities and stifles their creativity 
because he first grasps "a cognizable object while he prepares his lesson in his study or his 
laboratory", and then he expounds "to his students about that object" (Freire, 1998, p. 61). The 
students do not "practice any act of cognition, since the object towards which that act should be 
directed is the property of the teacher rather than a medium evoking the critical reflection of both 
teacher and students" (ibid.). The students merely memorize what the teacher narrates. Education, 
therefore, in the name of "preservation of culture and knowledge", creates "a system which 
achieves neither true knowledge nor true culture" (ibid.). 
Freire calls for an education that frees human beings of their state of passivity and enables them 
to be active participants in the transformation of oppressive structures. Such liberating education 
"consists in acts of cognition, not transferals of information. It is a learning situation in which the 
cognizable object (far from being the end of the cognitive act) intermediates the cognitive 
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actors—teacher on the one hand and students on the other" (ibid, p. 60). He sees problem posing 
as the approach that would allow acts of cognition to take place and the solution to the teacher-
student contradiction to be found. It is in problem posing education that vertical patterns are 
broken and "dialogical relations—indispensable to the capacity of cognitive actors to cooperate 
in perceiving the same cognizable object" (pp. 60-1), are fostered. The teacher is no longer the 
absolute authority, neither is she "merely the one who teaches, but one who learns in dialogue 
with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach" (p. 61). 
No doubt, Freire's criticism of the practice of education he encountered is insightful, and the 
banking analogy imaginative. It is difficult to find fault with his analysis of the inability of such 
education to liberate oppressed peoples of the world from structures that imprison them. The 
success of his work in adult literacy testifies to the theoretical and practical contribution he has 
made to the field of education. For Freire, a problem-posing educator is a cognitive being and at 
no point assumes the role of a narrator. Objects that are to be problematized—cognizable objects 
as he calls them—are reflected upon in dialogue between the teacher and the students. The 
teacher "constantly re-forms his reflections in the reflection of the students" who are "critical co-
investigators in dialogue with the teacher" (Freire, 1998, pp. 61-2). The role of the teacher in this 
sense is "to create, together with the students, the conditions under which knowledge at the level 
of the doxa [opinion and magic] is superseded by true knowledge, at the level of the logos" (ibid., 
p. 62). This transformation corresponds to the passage of an individual from the state of semi-
intransitive to that of critical transitive consciousness (see chapter 1), a state in which the 
oppressed can no longer be manipulated by the internalized reality imposed on them by the 
oppressor. In the context of the political empowerment of Brazilian peasants, this formulation of 
an educational process, with its accompanying techniques such as the use of generative words 
and selected pictures, works extremely well. Yet, freedom from oppression is but one step in a 
people's path of development. It remains to be seen if a pedagogy so heavily dependent on 
problem posing is ever able to empower the students to deal with the complex reality they have 
to understand and transform. I find no evidence that a people thus liberated have been able to 
build a better society simply by the power of their new consciousness. Further, Freire and many 
others inspired by him have attempted to base even formal education in schools on the pedagogy 
of the oppressed. While it is easy to accept that in any kind of empowering education problem 
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posing as a method will be employed judiciously when the occasion calls for it, giving it a 
central position in the overall conception of education, particularly one addressing the 
development of a wide range of society building capabilities which is my concern here, seems 
unwarranted. I would like to raise two points in this respect, one having to do with sources of 
knowledge and the other with consciousness. 
In relation to educational materials that would act as both a "problem-situation" and "an antidote 
to the domesticating power of propaganda—from advertising commercials to ideological 
indoctrination" (Freire, 2000, p. 57), Freire gives the example of how the problem of cigarette 
advertising could be addressed by facilitating a discussion among a group of men who would 
"perceive the deceit in a cigarette advertisement featuring a beautiful, smiling woman in a bikini 
(i.e., the fact that she, her smile and her bikini have nothing to do with the cigarette)" (ibid.). 
They develop the ability to recognize subtle associations of unrelated ideas as a strategy of 
propaganda in contrast to their own discussions as a method of liberating education. In this 
example, the state of transitive consciousness reached by these men enables them to take definite 
steps towards confronting the problem, to begin by not allowing themselves to be fooled by such 
propaganda, consciously resisting what advertising tries to do to them. But looking for solutions 
to most problems requires far more complex actions, which in turn require knowledge. Where 
should one look for the knowledge that enables 'subjects' with a newly developed consciousness 
to participate in processes of transformation? In schools of thought akin to Freire's emphasis is 
on the knowledge already possessed by the people. He advocates, for example, that "popular 
education" should turn to "epistemological research, antecedent to or concomitant with teaching 
practices, especially in peasant regions." The purpose, he recommends, is "to know how rural 
popular groups, indigenous or not, know—how they organize their agronomic knowledge or 
science, for example, or their medicine, to which end they have developed a broadly 
systematized taxonomy of plants, herbs, teas, spices, roots" (Freire, 1995, p. 133). He observes 
with great interest that "they integrate their meticulous taxonomy with miraculous promises—for 
example an herbal tea that heals both cancer and the pangs of unrequited love, ..." (ibid., pp. 
133-4). He notes that "research in Brazilian universities has verified the actual medical 
usefulness of certain discoveries made by popular wisdom", and "to discuss with peasants this 
ongoing university-level verification of their knowledge is a political task of high pedagogical 
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importance" (ibid, p. 134). To hold that respecting such knowledge is a requisite of the education 
of the masses, and that, even in schools, a proper pedagogy would not neglect what the students 
know and a good teacher would interact with them as possessors of valuable knowledge seems 
entirely valid to me. It represents a pedagogical choice that should definitely be made in the 
development of many a capability. But care has to be exercised not to give the impression, by the 
emotional content of the dialogue, that the knowledge of the medicinal effects of certain local 
herbs, for example, can replace the accumulating knowledge of humanity in the field of biology, 
chemistry and medicine. When valuing what people know and helping them develop critical 
consciousness in the process of political empowerment gives way to an exaggerated romanticism 
about local knowledge and its transformative power, a kind of paternalism sets in that does not 
do justice to the oppressed. 
Not all approaches to the cultivation of critical thinking, of course, have the tendency to 
underestimate the value of knowledge organized in specialized disciplines and fields. Ira Shor, 
for example, suggests that the problem-posing approach "views human beings, knowledge and 
society as unfinished products in history, where various forces are still contending" (Shor, 1992, 
p. 35). According to him Freire's emphasis on "problem-posing as a democratic way for 
students to take part in the contention over knowledge and the shape of society" does not imply 
"that students have nothing to learn from biology or mathematics or engineering as they now 
exist" (ibid.). "As long as existing knowledge is not presented as facts and doctrines to be 
absorbed without question," he states, "as long as existing bodies of knowledge are critiqued and 
balanced from a multicultural perspective, and as long as students' own themes and idioms are 
valued along with standard usage, existing canons are part of critical education" (ibid.). But even 
this statement, it seems to me, does not go far enough to clarify the function of various sources of 
knowledge in education. Knowledge is not merely an instrument through which problems are 
posed. An individual who is learning to examine his or her physical and social reality at a less 
and less naïve level of consciousness would need, using Hirst's terminology, a grasp of concepts, 
logical structure, truth criteria of relevant forms of knowledge to achieve "depth in the 
interpretation of problems" and "guard against belief in magical explanations": ends that were 
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sought by Freire. But drawing on such knowledge requires `cooperation'39 with the source and 
not simply criticism. All the values represented by the knowledge of disciplines and subject 
matters cannot be contained in a series of contentious questions the purpose of which is to help 
students think critically. The "contention" suggested by Shor is, of course, connected with other 
elements of the thought he expresses in the few lines I have quoted. I would question the 
relativism underlying the conception of a human being as an unfinished product who has a claim 
on knowledge by virtue of his or her own perspective. And, why should all existing forms of 
knowledge be balanced and criticized from a multicultural perspective? An acceptable pedagogy 
will surely help students question what they are being taught, and there is certainly a place for 
problem posing and the cultivation of critical consciousness in education. But this does not 
justify enlarging the domain of the corresponding methods beyond reasonable limits. When 
views about the human being and knowledge are not shaped by extreme relativism, the teacher's 
role is not limited to that of a facilitator of dialogue who poses questions; he or she can also be a 
narrator and expounder of meaning. 
The second point I would like to raise has to do with the notion of consciousness. The atrocities 
that have occurred throughout human history were not perpetrated by individuals with a semi-
intransitive consciousness, but often by those who understood the forces operating in society, 
knew well what they wanted and strove to accomplish their aims. In seeking a pedagogy that 
would cultivate capabilities associated with the twofold moral purpose of individual and 
collective transformation, a transformation that would not simply make oppressors out of the 
oppressed, one has to take into account that consciousness can be distorted. Consciousness 
"shares in the bipolarity of all thought: it has an intrinsic responsibility to be truthful while at the 
same time it can succumb to falsehood" (Dunne, 1992, p. 57). The possibility of the corruption 
of consciousness is for me another reason not to overemphasize the value of consciousness-
raising in education. In a certain sense, the way capabilities have been conceptualized here 
allows one to resist the temptation to generalize and express educational objectives mainly in 
terms of critical consciousness. 
39 
M.J.Adler has treated this concept under the unfortunate term 'docility'. But his two essays on docility do give insights into 
this aspect of the relationship between the teacher and the student, for example, its contrast to subservience, passivity and a 
propensity to be indoctrinated (Adler, 1990). 
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One more thought about the dichotomy introduced by Freire is worth mentioning. The very 
image of a banking education, useful as it is at the time of initial diagnosis, creates difficulties 
when it is gradually extended to capture the totality of each and every educational process that 
intends to impart knowledge. It is true that "restless, impatient, continuing hopeful inquiry" 
generates knowledge. But knowledge is not just generated; it is also applied and diffused, 
processes that imply the transference of knowledge. Clearly in education, imparting knowledge 
should not be done according to banking procedures; a sophisticated pedagogy that trains the 
many complementary powers of the human heart and mind is needed. To cite an example, 
memory and comprehension are two such faculties. They complement and reinforce each other. 
Consequently, memorization is not the antithesis of cognition. In so many cultures the 
memorization and recital of poetry and meaningful passages has been the vehicle for collective 
deliberation on meaning. As stated in the previous chapter the assimilation of relevant 
information does play an important role in the development of capabilities, but the educational 
approach would have to meet at least two challenges. First it would have to pay due attention to 
sophisticated accounts of how information is assimilated, and second, it would have to associate 
the assimilation of information with the understanding of concepts. Within any given capability 
these two, while distinct, reinforce each other and are closely interrelated. It is not possible to 
think of one without the other. And care must be exercised not to reduce the latter to the former. 
Bruner's computational and cultural account of the mind, mentioned in chapter 2, provides an 
example of the kind of approach that can be adopted in education in order to address the first 
challenge. In this approach, Bruner associates assimilation of information with mastery of 
techniques. In evolution the selection process has favoured the use of technology and it is this 
ability that provides the means for future growth of the human being. The powers of intellect, 
therefore, are to be measured in terms of the skills that link them either to the amplifiers of 
human capacity, or to the toolkit of culture. In the computational approach, processing 
information is equivalent to the mastery of the technique of establishing coding systems, and the 
skill of generating new information based on available data; the learner crosses the barrier from 
storing facts into thinking by creating generic codes. Representations of the environment too 
depend upon techniques that "serve to amplify our motor acts, our perception, and our 
ratiocinative activities" (Bruner, 2006a, p. 68). In culturalism, capacities are unlocked by 
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techniques that allow "exposure to the specialized environment of a culture" (ibid., p. 87). Story 
telling, theatre, the forms of science and protoscience, even jurisprudence are all techniques for 
inflating the "forum-like" feature of culture, which education according to Bruner should imbibe 
(Bruner, 1999). 
But the manipulation and transformation of information to create more information cannot 
constitute the end of cognition. The second and more significant challenge noted above would 
need to be addressed. In this context, the mastery of the relevant techniques is more 
appropriately considered a necessary step towards the more challenging goal of advancing in 
understanding. One of the examples given by Bruner is helpful here: 
It would have been possible for Galileo to have published a handbook of the distances 
traversed per unit time by falling bodies. Schoolboys for centuries thereafter could easily 
have been tortured by the task of having to remember the Galilean tables. Such tables, 
cumbersome though they might have been, would have contained all the necessary 
information for dealing with free-falling bodies. Instead, Galileo had the inspiration to 
reorganize this welter of information into a highly simplified form. You recall the 
compact expression s =1/2 gt2 : it not only summarizes all possible handbooks but 
organizes their knowledge in a way that makes manipulation possible. (Bruner, 2006a, p. 
25) 
Yet, Bruner himself would have not been happy with a pedagogy that presents this 'formula' to 
the students and teaches them how to apply it to many situations of falling bodies, in tedious 
exercises, until they have mastered this coding of an infinite set of information. If the objective is 
the development of capabilities, in this case those associated with scientific inquiry, in parallel to 
acquiring the ability to work with information, students would need to 'understand' such 
concepts as acceleration, distance and time and what it means to measure them, and be able to 
place the expression in the historical discourse of science, appreciating its significance in 
breaking away from the Aristotelian version of free fall—a version that is suggested by every 
student's initial intuition. 
The Logical Order and the Psychological Method 
The second set of ideas I would like to discuss revolve around another dichotomy, not unrelated 
to the first. It is clear that in making pedagogical choices, one necessarily has to deal with 
170 
accumulated human knowledge as well as the attributes of the mind to be developed through 
education. Dewey points to some of the challenges that arise in the process by the contrast 
between teaching according to the logical order of the subject matter and through the 
"psychological method." He argues that "the intellectual (as distinct from the moral) end of 
education" is "the formation of careful, alert, and thorough habits of thinking" (Dewey, 1991, pp. 
57-8). This end cannot be achieved, however, if it is assumed that there is no relationship 
between an individual's psychological tendencies and his logical achievements. Ignoring this 
relationship leads to a perception of logical training as "something to be engrafted upon the 
individual from without" (ibid., p. 58). Dewey points out that schools of thought in education 
which are polarized on this question suffer from the consequences of this wrong assumption: In 
one way of thinking, "mottoes are freedom, self-expression, individuality, spontaneity, play, 
interest, natural unfolding, and so on," and method is conceived "to consist of various devices for 
stimulating and evoking, in their natural order of growth, the native potentialities of individuals" 
(ibid.). The other school of thought relies on, "subject-matter—upon matter already defined and 
classified", and its "mottoes are discipline, instruction, restraint, voluntary or conscious effort, 
the necessity of tasks, and so on" (ibid, pp. 58-9). Method in this case consists of devices that 
would imprint the logic of subject matters on the mind of the individual. Dewey argues that one 
should see logical order from the standpoint of subject-matter as representing the goal, "the last 
term of training, not the point of departure" (Dewey, 1991, p. 62). When this is not done, the 
perfected form of knowledge acts as a stumbling block for the learner, whereas a method of 
teaching based on "problems selected from the material of ordinary acquaintance" allows the 
student to gain "independent power to deal with material within their range" (Dewey, 2007, p. 
162). A good teacher would understand the "real problem of intellectual education" to be the 
"transformation of natural powers into expert, tested powers" (Dewey, 1991, p. 62). 
In developing curricula that employ the concept of capability as a strategy one has to pay 
attention to Dewey's analysis of the logical and the psychological, but avoid a step that will 
finally lead to adopting the psychological as the basis of pedagogy, leaving the logical for later 
when the aim is to create experts. It is too easy to interpret Dewey's words to mean that the 
purpose of learning should be a personal or 'psychological' organization of knowledge rather 
than a 'logical' organization appropriate for research specialists. This ignores the very continuity 
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that Dewey identifies between "earlier and later stages" of "normal growth". The challenge of 
finding a balance between the logical and the psychological appropriate for each stage of 
development persists even after Dewey's analysis is taken into account. When the 
"psychological method" becomes a sign of "progressive education", the pendulum swings too far 
towards the first of the two opposing schools of thought, which Dewey himself has rejected. 
Hirst made a similar observation early in the development of his own thought when he argued 
that if "our teaching methods are not to remain the hit and miss business they are at the moment, 
a more careful, detailed analysis of the logical features of the content matter is required" (Hirst, 
1974c, p. 130). 
Focusing on capabilities in the formulation of objectives and the organization of curricula, it 
seems to me, facilitates the search for balance between the logical and the psychological. To 
begin, there is a shift from the 'knowledge the student has to acquire' to the 'attributes of the 
student'. But the way these attributes are integrated into the concept of capability does not allow 
curriculum to be developed in the context of personal or group experience alone. Capabilities are 
concerned with doing and being, and being is viewed not only as 'functioning' but also in terms 
of the dynamics of advancing spiritual qualities together with knowing—the assimilation of 
information from relevant fields and the understanding of concepts that give structure to 
knowledge in that field with the nuances mentioned in chapter 6 in the context of integration. A 
brief discussion of FUNDAEC's attempt to incorporate content from the natural sciences into its 
two-year 'Promoter of Community Well-being' programme may prove useful here. Clearly the 
purpose of this thesis is not to argue the effectiveness of any of FUNDAEC's programmes. That a 
number of evaluations have been performed and, in general, have been positive is a mere fact in 
the background. Repeated reference to FUNDAEC's educational efforts is for me a way of 
illustrating not necessarily accomplishments but attempts to approach formidable challenges in 
developing curricula. 
The 'subject of understanding' in this example is the member of a group consisting of ten to 
fifteen students and one tutor that meets some 20 hours per week to study and to design, carry 
out and discuss the results of action and research in the community. The students are youth 
trying to balance their lives between an education they highly value and whatever work is 
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available in order to fulfil some of their obligations to their families. The tutor is not a teacher in 
the traditional sense, but neither is she a mere facilitator of discussion. She has received 
university level training and is considered a collaborator of FUNDAEC in its effort to engage the 
population of the region in the generation, application and diffusion of knowledge so as to take 
ownership of its own social and economic development. All the activities of the educational 
programme are guided by units of written text, in the form of a dialogue between FUNDAEC as an 
institution of research and education and the group of students, the tutor being a member of both. 
The objectives of any set of activities are formulated in terms of contribution to the development 
of capabilities from the three categories mentioned in the previous chapter. A primary function 
of the tutor is to accompany the students as they 'walk a path of service'. But acts of service are 
not seen as the 'practice component' or 'practical application' of a theoretical study; on the 
contrary, it is the experience being created along the path of service that engenders the need to 
develop certain capabilities, to gain insight and to acquire the associated knowledge. 
Among the capabilities the necessity of which arises naturally as experience advances are those 
associated with participation in scientific inquiry. The capability of making accurate observations 
and organizing the corresponding statements and data in a way that lends itself to rigorous 
examination, for example, is one that students soon come to see as a requirement of their work as 
promoters of community well-being. In this context, experience does not refer to haphazard 
occurrences in the students' lives, nor artificial situations created to facilitate some specific 
learning, but something that is being built systematically in the context of the transformation of 
processes of collective life in the micro-region, a transformation that admittedly is not scientific 
in a strict sense but must involve the use of scientific knowledge and its methods. In this 
connection, then, a narrative of what scientists do in general becomes gradually woven into the 
dialogue with the students; the narrative, or aspects of it, gets repeated time and again and 
becomes more sophisticated with each repetition. In its rather simple initial formulation it is 
something like the following: 
Scientists start with certain common observations that answer some of their questions and raise 
new ones. As questions become more complex, their observations need to become more 
sophisticated and this includes the development and use of instruments to make increasingly 
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precise measurements. Observation and measurement are not carried out haphazardly; scientists 
select one or more systems in which they can observe some aspect of the process they are 
exploring. Thus observing, measuring, coming up with questions and partial answers are not 
things they do once but repeatedly and not always in the same sequence. Intermingled with these 
activities are the important tasks of elaboration and clarification of concepts; ideas may begin 
vague but over time have to be cast in a language that is as unambiguous as possible and as 
rational and objective as the human mind permits. Another aspect of scientific work is the 
identification of patterns in the data collected on some aspect of the process being studied. When 
patterns keep appearing consistently one may discover a law that governs the unfoldment of the 
process. But scientists are not satisfied with the identification of patterns. Their main task is to 
make models of reality. Models are sets of statements that explain observations related to a part 
of or an entire system or process. One can have models, for example, that explain what happens 
when water boils or when ice melts. But these models are always based on theories that are sets 
of profound statements about the nature of reality. In the example of a model explaining the 
boiling and freezing of water, the underlying theory is the atomic theory of matter (FUNDAEC, 
2007). 
The pedagogical choices before FUNDAEC in relation to teaching science have had to do with the 
way students develop the capabilities that enable scientists to do what is briefly described in the 
above passage: which combination of information and concepts, skills and abilities, attitudes, 
habits and qualities would have to be addressed and in what manner so that an educational 
activity can contribute to the development of one or more of these capabilities? The most 
immediate answer, of course, is that the challenge should be addressed in the very development 
activity in which the student is engaged in the community. To begin working in the area of health, 
for example, students are asked to carry out research on the knowledge the inhabitants of their 
micro-region already possess about how to maintain the health of their small children as well as 
the operation of health services available to them. Here, the development of the capabilities of a 
scientist is one of the themes explicitly treated in the corresponding text, which does not shy 
away from presenting the knowledge of biology relevant to the health issues being investigated. 
The same holds for actions related to agriculture and environment. But what is important for my 
exploration is that FUNDAEC has found this aspect of its pedagogy necessary but insufficient in 
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relation to its goal of enabling promoters of community well-being to engage in scientific inquiry 
as an integral part of their work. It has felt that while acts of service related to the development 
of the community are valuable instances of learning about science in practice, they do not lend 
themselves to the kind of focused treatment of science that a systematic development of the 
desired capabilities requires. It has convinced itself that a step by step study of some areas of 
scientific knowledge respecting their 'logical order' is necessary for its purposes, albeit without 
ignoring the importance of the student's own experience. 
When it comes to bringing the students' experience into the teaching of science, there are not 
that many choices readily available. As Reiss puts it, most attempts leave the students with a 
"very narrow understanding of what science is and how it is carried out" (Reiss, 2001, p. 6). 
Children do not learn "to ask the sort of questions that scientists actually ask or to ask the sorts of 
questions that the rest of us ask and to which science can make a contribution" (ibid.). Instead, 
pupils are restricted "to mind-blowingly dull questions about the bouncing of squash balls or the 
dissolving of sugar in what are misleadingly termed 'scientific investigations' (ibid., pp. 6-7). 
Such an approach persuades "most people that they aren't good at science" (ibid., p. 7). 
FUNDAEC seems to have held similar views regarding the materials and methods associated with 
what has come to be known as 'learning by discovery'. It has observed that much of the 
experience artificially created for the student in the name of 'scientific investigation' often leaves 
the student with the impression of science as a collection of imaginative, and almost magical, 
discoveries. It is worth noting here that even Bruner whose article, 'The Act of Discovery' 
(Bruner, 1961), seems to have given the idea a boost became disillusioned with the direction it 
took over the years. Early on he had argued: 
...emphasis upon discovery in learning has precisely the effect upon the learner of 
leading him to be a constructionist, to organize what he is encountering in a manner not 
only designed to discover regularity and relatedness, but also to avoid the kind of 
information drift that fails to keep account of the uses to which information might have to 
be put. (Bruner, 2006a, p. 60) 
In a follow-up essay he distanced himself from the excesses that had set in. He confided that "I 
am not sure any more what discovery is" and complained that "discovery was being treated by 
some educators as if it were valuable in and of itself, no matter what it was a discovery of or in 
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whose service" (Bruner, 1966). Here again the popularization of an idea had led to extremes, to 
unwarranted slogans, for example, learning by doing vs. book learning. 
It seems that any attempt in education of science that tries to connect the logical order of the 
subject matter to the experience of the student would do well to reflect on Vygotsky's insightful 
treatment of everyday and scientific concepts. His suggestion that the development of the child's 
spontaneous concepts may be seen to be proceeding upwards and the development of his 
scientific concepts downwards creates an image of the way the two are connected: 
The development of a spontaneous concept must have reached a certain level for the child 
to be able to absorb a related scientific concept...In working its slow way upward, an 
everyday concept clears a path for the scientific concept and its downward development. 
It creates a series of structures necessary for the evolution of a concept's more primitive, 
elementary aspects, which give it body and vitality. Scientific concepts, in turn, supply 
structures for the upward development of the child's spontaneous concepts toward 
consciousness and deliberate use. Scientific concepts grow downward through 
spontaneous concepts; spontaneous concepts grow upward through scientific concepts. 
(Vygotsky, 1986, p. 194) 
In the example being considered here, the students were not children but youth whose 
commitment to pursue their own moral and intellectual growth and to contribute to the 
transformation of their communities was being firmed up in an empowering educational process. 
They were becoming increasingly conscious of the need to develop capabilities among which 
those associated with scientific inquiry were of particular value for the work ahead of them. 
Their experience, apart from the usual occurrences of daily life, included systematically guided 
activity that generated a wealth of concepts in need of "structures supplied by scientific concepts" 
in order to move towards "consciousness and deliberate use". This for me is an important 
justification for FUNDAEC'S decision to dedicate a part of its curriculum to the treatment of a few 
areas of science according to their 'logical order'. 
The approach is briefly as follows: FUNDAEC chose the atomic theory as the context within 
which the students would move time and again through the series of steps suggested by the 
narrative on the nature of scientific inquiry, each time by examining one familiar process. The 
first process is the heating and cooling of matter which can be studied in some depth within the 
context of the first and most general statement of the atomic theory, namely that matter is made 
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of extremely small particles in constant motion. The corresponding conversation organized in 
written text takes the students through an inquiry into the nature of the process: everyday 
observations are remembered and organized; a substantial number of questions are generated; 
ordinary concepts such as heat, temperature, force and pressure are clarified and are moved 
`upward' towards their scientific definitions (see Appendix 2); instruments for measuring these 
quantities are introduced as an aspect of the upward movement; measurements are made, data is 
collected and patterns are observed; the relationship between volume, temperature and pressure 
in an ideal gas is 'discovered' and discussed as an example of a law in science; a model of matter 
in its three phases—a solid as an organization of small particles bound together and oscillating 
around a point of equilibrium, a liquid as an aggregate of particles more loosely bound to each 
other and able to 'slide' over each other as do the particles of fine sand; and a gas as the 
aggregate of particles moving in all directions and bouncing against each other—is presented and 
used to explain as many observations made about the process and the patterns identified among 
them, as possible. Although at this early stage certain fundamental philosophical issues cannot be 
explicitly addressed, care is taken not to create notions of science in the mind of the student that 
later have to be erased. For example, the theory dependence of observation is clearly emphasized 
as is the finite range of validity of any set of theoretical statements. The study of the process ends 
with a discussion of the Aristotelian view of the universe in terms of the four elements of fire, air, 
water and earth. It is shown how that theory also explains certain observations about the process 
of the heating and cooling of matter; yet the explanatory power of even the first statement of 
atomic theory is far greater. In the study of three other processes, the growth of a plant, the 
transfer of energy, and photosynthesis, new statements are added to the atomic theory—the 
division of particles into atoms and molecules, the structure of atoms, the nature of chemical 
bonds, the transformation of energy from one form to another, the properties of photons and 
electrons—making it possible to create a number of theoretical models as sets of statements 
about the workings of such systems as the root of a plant, a cell or an electrical circuit. 
In addressing the development of capabilities associated with scientific inquiry, directly in an 
exploration of science as a "form of knowledge", the experience of the student in the community 
is not neglected. The approach is similar to the way these capabilities are treated in the texts 
concerned with areas of 'service' such as health and agriculture. There, science was brought in as 
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needed; here, constant reference is made to systematic action in the community showing the 
significance of scientific concepts, information, skills and attitudes being acquired. This is, of 
course, not the place to discuss and compare approaches to science education. My intention in 
presenting this brief account of one aspect of FUNDAEC's curriculum in a specific programme has 
been to demonstrate the way an approach based on capabilities lends itself to the resolution of a 
set of dichotomies revolving around the contrast between the 'psychological method' and the 
`logical order' of subject matters. 
In general, one could argue that any effective pedagogy should deal with the kind of difficulties 
to which the two sets of dichotomies mentioned above as well as a host of others—child-centred 
vs. subject-centred, process oriented vs. outcome based, moral vs. intellectual development, 
skills vs. cognition, just to mention a few—give rise. That so many of the popular pedagogies 
fall on one or another side of rigidly defined opposing camps indicates that finding the necessary 
balance is not as easy as it may appear. In this chapter, I have not argued that using the concept 
of capability by itself meets this formidable challenge. What I have suggested is that the 
approach is conducive to the kind of thinking that pays simultaneous attention, say, to the child 
and the subject matter, to the acquisition of skills and cognitive development, to the process and 
the outcome, to the intellectual and the moral. But achieving this requires that capabilities are not 
taken apart and analyzed in terms of their 'components'. The understanding of a set of concepts, 
the assimilation of relevant information, the acquisition of some skills, and the development of 
certain spiritual qualities, attitudes and habits all contribute to the enhancement of several 
interrelated capabilities, but at the same time, the capabilities give meaning to these attributes, 
serving as the context within which they are acquired. A given curricular element, of course, will 
necessarily focus on a few attributes—as little as one or two skills and a small set of related 
concepts—but in the context of the much larger set of attributes that contribute to the desired 
capabilities. Adopting such a discipline in the elaboration of curricula involves the acceptance of 
a certain claim that the many attributes to be developed in the mind and the heart of the 
individual do lend themselves to fluid arrangements that somehow correspond to definite states 
of being and doing to which capabilities refer. But, there seems to be a premise underlying this 
claim indicating that capabilities may not be mere arbitrary constructs. The correspondence with 
actual states of being and doing, however, is not a simple one. For one thing, these states are 
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moving in constant development. Those involved in the elaboration of curricula would have to 
be aware of the inadequacy, over time, of any description of a capability in terms of a given set 
of attributes that contribute to it. While focusing on one such set may be sufficient to help the 
student advance in a capability at a certain point, once a new state of being and doing is achieved, 
further movement may require additional attributes to enter into the description of the capability. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONTINUITY OF THOUGHT, LANGUAGE, ACTION 
The last two chapters were dedicated to an exploration of the promises and challenges of an 
approach that would use a particular interpretation of the concept of capability to organize the 
teaching-learning experience in educational processes aimed at the moral empowerment of the 
student. To illustrate the approach, certain features of a specific Band'i-inspired programme for 
the education of promoters of community well-being with notable achievements in certain areas 
of the world were presented. In that context, three categories of capabilities to be progressively 
acquired by the promoters were mentioned, those directly concerned with the moral dimension of 
empowerment, those pertaining to the realm of action as the promoters create for themselves a 
systematically growing body of experience through acts of service, and those related to 
humanity's accumulating knowledge in its various forms. Most of the discussion, however, was 
limited to the latter two categories; the only statement of consequence about the first was my 
claim that the development of the corresponding attributes—the understanding of concepts, the 
assimilation of information, the skills, attitudes, habits and spiritual qualities—would have to be 
addressed in educational activities concerned with capabilities in the other two categories as well 
and, not necessarily, in a separate part of the curriculum dedicated to moral education. I should 
now go further and explore a few major considerations that must inform the cultivation of 
attributes directly related to the moral dimension of empowerment. 
To begin, I would like to argue that, in an educational process aimed at moral empowerment, 
moral capabilities need to be developed in the context of what I have referred to as essential 
relationships in chapter 1—between human beings and nature, among individuals, between the 
individual and the institutions of society, and among the many elements of the community—
relationships that define the individual, the community and the institutions of society as 
protagonists of the immense transformation that entering the age of maturity implies for the 
human race. As mentioned before, the morality called for here is not a passive one focused on 
functioning in the world as it is today. Desirable as it is, for example, to work constructively in 
unity with others and avoid being a cause of conflict and dissension, it is the capability of 
building unity—briefly mentioned in chapter 7—that needs to be addressed by the empowering 
educational process. Honesty and truthfulness are qualities to be enhanced by any attempt at 
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moral education, but those capable of organizing personal and collective affairs with rectitude of 
conduct are in need of attributes that make them, for example, champions of justice and effective 
participants in struggles against corruption. To pursue happiness without harming others is a 
significant moral goal, but to be capable of bringing joy to others seems to be a challenge that 
presents itself at a more active level of morality. These and myriad other capabilities of the same 
kind seem to be directed among other things towards the creation of environments" within 
which the essential relationships characterizing a mature human race are to take shape and 
manifest themselves. What are some of the ideas essential to any educational programme hoping 
to enhance such capabilities? 
It seems that foremost among the challenges of a curriculum concerned with the development of 
moral capabilities is how to treat the question of language. Clearly, students engaged in an 
empowering educational process need to develop a language that will allow them to 
progressively articulate their thoughts and experience with clarity. The language becomes refined 
and acquires depth as students are able to express more and more accurately and completely a 
range of moral concepts and their interrelationships. This refinement needs to take place in the 
ongoing reflection of a group of students on its experience in pursuing a twofold moral purpose. 
However, this is not a theoretical exercise aimed at extracting general principles from particular 
instances of action. Profound collective reflection on action needs to be expressed in words that 
endow action with meaning and transform activity in the minds of the students from routine or 
dull performance of duty to that which is intrinsically linked to their aspirations and goals. 
The phrase "growing into our language" which Dunne uses in his analysis of Gadamer's work is 
relevant in this respect. Growing into our language is a process which introduces "differentiation 
and order into our world" (Dunne, 1992, p. 143). Gadamer states: "Experience is not wordless to 
begin with, subsequently becoming an object of reflection by being named, by being subsumed 
under the universality of the word. Rather, experience of itself seeks and finds words that express 
40 
In the case of the Promoter of Community Well-being' programme, discussed in previous chapters, the immediate 
environments in question are those of groups with which the student interacts in the context of the community. These exist in a 
larger world of ideas that form the ethical environment. The concept of ethical environment has been examined in its complexity 
by Haydon who has also explored the way values education has to take account of it (Haydon, 2006a). The development of the 
kind of capabilities suggested here presents one approach by the aid of which education can intervene in the ethical environment. 
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it" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 417). Dunne points out that "this seeking and finding is, in fact, the 
primary process of concept formation which keeps pace with the growing complexity of the way 
in which we are to experience the world" (Dunne, 1992, pp. 143-4). In the example of the 
promoters of community well-being, the students' arena of action is the community in a micro-
region, with its physical, social and moral environment. As the students each advance in the 
relevant capabilities at their own pace, they "grow into a language" that increasingly corresponds 
to the complexity of the world they experience and the conditions of which they endeavour to 
transform. The development of the power of expression in this sense is rooted in the experience 
that is being generated in the community. On a personal level, it reflects the continuity between 
thought, language and action. On a collective level, it lends impetus to the gradual elaboration of 
a shared framework which increasingly draws together the goals and aspirations of a growing 
number of people within a specific population.41  
I have already touched on the question of language in the context of science and religion as two 
complementary sources of knowledge. In that discussion, I argued that in addition to the 
language of science, an educational process concerned with moral empowerment needs to 
employ the language of religion which, with the rational, the normative and poetic forms of 
expression at its command, would speak to the heart and the mind in ways that are not easily 
accessible to the other one. At the time, I did not address the question of the arts in the kind of 
process being discussed here. The arts, of course, enter into education in their own right as 
essential aspects of humanity's cultural heritage. Depending on the nature of a given programme, 
the development of certain artistic capabilities, contributing to such faculties of the human mind 
and heart as creativity and imagination would constitute an important part of the totality of the 
objectives of the programme. In exploring in this final chapter the continuity of thought, 
language and action, I should at least mention that, beyond their own intrinsic value, the various 
forms of art expand human ability to express experience and need to be taken into account in the 
exploration of the language into which students 'grow' as they advance in a given set of 
capabilities. One reason is that feelings and emotions have an important role to play in moral 
choices and acts. The language of science, or philosophy, is clearly not the most effective 
41 
The main characteristic of modern life according to Charles Taylor is the failure to find a believable framework which brings 
with it a quest for meaning intimately connected with language: "... the invocation of meaning ... comes from our awareness of 
how much the search involves articulation. We find the sense of life through articulating it" (Taylor, 1990, p. 18). 
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instrument for the expression of emotions, although it can help analyze and understand them. 
The language of religion certainly deals with the affective sphere, but it does so in its own way, 
at a level of transcendence and authority. But this does not exhaust the demand feelings lay on 
expression. The power of expression that the student needs to develop in the process of moral 
empowerment involves a complex interaction between the languages of philosophy, of science, 
of religion and of one or more forms of the arts. 
In what follows I would like to argue that, in order to address continuity of thought, language 
and action, an educational process concerned with moral empowerment needs to resolve at least 
two sets of issues. The first has to do with the question of 'heart and mind' and the second with 
the 'individual and collective'. The lack of resolution of these two sets of issues, it seems to me, 
perpetuates an illusory tension regarding the role science and the arts play in education and 
contributes to the vision of a fragmented self in its various formations 
	 an emotivist, a computer, 
a modern being motivated by self-interest, a calculating rationalist or a smoothly functioning 
piece in the machinery created by the state or the market, among others—which I have already 
rejected as candidates for the subject of understanding in the kind of educational process under 
consideration. 
Oneness of Heart and Mind 
Feelings and emotions, up to now, have not entered explicitly into the exploration of the concept 
of capability, although they are clearly present in considerations of spiritual qualities, attitudes, 
habits and, somewhat differently, in understanding concepts. The decision not to treat emotions 
directly at the level of educational objectives, as is done for example in Bloom's taxonomy, but 
indirectly through attributes that define capabilities, has important philosophical underpinnings 
that I need to make explicit. What is being questioned is the division of the subject of 
understanding into the 'emotional' and the 'rational' attached to the heart and the mind 
respectively. To seek unity between the heart and mind, of course, is not to deny the value of 
virtues traditionally associated with the heart. An approach is needed that addresses the 
cultivation of desirable emotions without creating a false duality, thus safeguarding the integrity 
of the individual and resisting alienation from the world. The language in which moral 
capabilities are conceived and discussed needs to counteract the language of modern life in 
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which strong undercurrents contribute to ever separating fragmented spheres of being. Such a 
language was described to some extent in chapter 3 in the discussion of spiritual qualities as a 
particular category of virtues constituting properties of the human soul. Fostering spiritual 
qualities would be a fundamental concern in the development of every capability, independent of 
its particular emphasis on the intellectual, the social or the moral. 
The division of virtues into the intellectual and the moral—the former identified with the rational 
and the latter with the nutritive and desiring parts of the soul—has made it difficult to see in 
education the many unifying threads that if strengthened would contribute to the student's 
wholeness of character and organic unity with the world. Some would attribute the origins of this 
separation to Aristotle's words: "contemplative wisdom, understanding and practical wisdom 
being intellectual, generosity and temperance moral", and his suggestion that the growth of the 
former requires teaching, while the latter "come about as a result of habit... "42 Randall Curren 
reminds us that this widespread distinction is too simplistic an account of Aristotelian virtues, 
since " he also holds that no one is fully virtuous or has true moral virtue without having the 
intellectual virtue of wisdom,...and that no one can become practically wise without first 
possessing natural and habitual moral virtues, ..." (Curren, 1999, p. 68). Yet the crude 
interpretation persists in many a practice of education43. 
According to Midgley, "...many things on the current intellectual scene tend to make us 
disconnect feeling from thought, by narrowing our notions of both, and so to make human life as 
a whole unintelligible" (Midgley, 2003, p. 3). She points to the tendency to use words like "heart" 
and "feeling" to "describe just a few selected sentiments which are somewhat detached from the 
practical business of living—notably romantic, compassionate and tender sentiments—as if non-
romantic actions did not involve any feelings" (ibid.). Mean and vindictive action, she reminds 
us, "flows from and implies mean and vindictive feelings, and does so just as much when it is 
considered as when it is impulsive" (ibid.). She further argues that while there is the possibility 
of tension between thought and feeling, and between feeling and action, they are nevertheless 
42 See Ross's translation, (Aristotle, E.N., Book I) 
43 
There are, of course, more nuanced definitions of virtues available. Haydon, for example, refers to them in these terms: 
"Virtues, whatever else may distinguish them, are complex dispositions of human beings which involve feeling and motivation as 
well as perception and reason" (Haydon, 2006b). 
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interwoven: "We are in fact so constituted that we cannot act at all if feeling really fails. When it 
does fail, as in cases of extreme apathy and depression, people stop acting..." And, "feelings, to 
be effective, must take shape as thoughts, and thoughts, to be effective, must be powered by 
suitable feelings" (ibid., p. 4). 
The most obvious connection between feelings and action is motivation—the former motivate 
the latter. But this is only one aspect of the relationship between emotions and actions in which 
thought and language play essential roles. Some of the emotions that move us to act with fear or 
anger, for example, are temporary; learning to eliminate them when unwarranted and to manage 
them when justified, as would be anger towards injustice, can be an outcome expected from an 
educational process. Other feelings such as jealousy and greed can become permanent features of 
character and need to be taken into account accordingly. But all of these belong to the category 
of "self-referential" emotions. "Our interpretation of the world is inveterately self-referential," 
Peters has observed. "We find difficulty in peering out and seeing the world and others as they 
are, undistorted by our own fears, hopes and wishes" (Peters, 1975a, p. 90). Addressing feelings 
in the process of fostering spiritual qualities and cultivating understanding obliges an educational 
programme to pay attention to the development of "self-transcending emotions"—corresponding 
to "appraisals which lack this self-referential character, notably love, respect, the sense of justice 
and concern for truth." This, according to Peters, is "probably the most effective way of 
loosening the hold on us of the more primitive, self-referential ones" (ibid.). 
Focusing on "self-transcending emotions" requires the critical examination of a common 
assumption that everything which has anything to do with rational thought is abstract in its pure 
form and only later is it applied to concrete situations. In the realm of morality, principles are 
"products of reason" and are considered affectively neutral and inert. Thus "fairness" and 
"considering people's interest" are assumed to be abstractions for which meaning has to be found 
in concrete traditions (Peters, 1981, pp. 63-7). Conversely all emotions, whether rational or 
irrational, are situated in particular contexts infused with subjective states. For example, Nel 
Noddings mentions that "caring", which is essentially "nonrational" as "it requires a constitutive 
engrossment and displacement of motivation", may be gradually or abruptly "transformed into 
abstract problem solving" (Noddings, 2003, p. 25). She advocates that "rational-objective 
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thinking is to be put to the service of caring"; suggests that "we must at the right moments turn it 
away from the abstract toward which it tends and back to the concrete" and argues that at times 
we must "suspend" rational thinking "in favor of subjective thinking and reflection, allowing 
time and space for seeing and feeling" (ibid., p. 25). 
This contrast between reason and emotion is misconceived. Peters' use of the word appraisal in 
relation to emotion is significant. He argues that in so far as emotions involve a certain type of 
cognition in the form of appraisals, they are, "basically forms of cognition" (Peters, 1975a, p. 77). 
Another way to see cognition at work in the expression of emotions is via the operation of 
virtues44, particularly the category referred to as spiritual qualities in this thesis and incorporated 
into the notion of capability. None can dispute that virtues of this kind have emotional and 
attitudinal dimensions which when distorted will obstruct their inherent powers from manifesting 
themselves. 'Kindness' with an attitude of superiority becomes paternalism, and 'generosity' 
with feelings of pity could be a vehicle for the perpetuation of dependence. However, appropriate 
emotions that safeguard the integrity of virtues from distortion are not blind. Moral acts of 
benevolence, of courage and fortitude, even when manifested habitually, are not bereft of 
thought. And the seeing that endows those acts with significance does not require the suspension 
of rational thinking as Noddings suggests. 
A concept that I find helpful in seeking unity of mind and heart is 'perception'. While I cannot 
undertake the task of examining adequately the concept in the context of moral empowerment, I 
would like to suggest a possible line of inquiry. I have already argued against the duality of the 
`subjective' and the 'objective' in chapter 4, and have tried to position the subject of 
understanding in an extended reality. Within this reality, there is a spiritual as well as an 
intellectual dimension to perception in which both reason and feeling take part. To become 
increasingly empowered, the student stands in need of ever expanding 'moral perception' and a 
language in which it can be expressed. Moral perception in the sense being used here is akin to 
McDowell's "sensitivity" to a "certain sort of requirement which situations impose on behaviour" 
44 
Maclntyre explains, for example, that the process of transition from infantile intelligence to independent practical reasoning is 
one in which the impulse to satisfy purely personal desires gives way to an informed desire to pursue good. The "qualities that a 
child must develop, first to redirect and transform her or his desires, and subsequently to direct them consistently towards the 
goods of the different stages of her or his life" are "the intellectual and moral virtues" (Maclntyre, 1999, p. 87). 
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(McDowell, 1979, p. 142), which he identifies as perceptual capacity. The example he offers to 
clarify his point is kindness. The "reliably kind behaviour" of a kind person "is not the outcome 
of a blind, non-rational habit or instinct" (ibid.). On being kind in each occasion, the kind 
individual has a reliable sensitivity to the requirement which the situation imposes on behaviour. 
McDowell holds that "the deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge" and "the 
sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity" (ibid.). 
Enhancing this perceptual capacity in the subject of understanding, I feel, is an essential task of 
an empowering educational process. The task is enormously challenging. It demands the 
adoption of an expanded rationality as discussed in previous chapters, in which reason and faith 
are not held in opposition to each other. 
Another point worth mentioning is that it is difficult to conceive of the kind of active morality a 
process of moral empowerment is to engender, without passion. It is often said that to think 
rationally one needs to examine issues and situations dispassionately. But is the expanded 
rationality to be developed in an educational process concerned with moral empowerment 
divested of passion? According to Peters, "there are attitudes and appraisals which are the 
passionate side of the life of reason" (Peters, 1981, p. 68). Science and any other rational activity 
presuppose normative standards such as consistency, relevance, impartiality, truthfulness, 
accuracy, clarity and respect for evidence and other people. These standards are "intimately 
connected with the passion for truth which gives point to rational activities" (ibid., p. 67). 
In Peters' view, even distinct disciplines of knowledge are "more precise articulations of the 
more generalized passions which begin to exert an influence when reasoning of a less precise 
sort gets under weigh", when, for example, "primitive constructiveness passes into the love of 
order and system" (Peters, 1975b, pp. 76-77). The same is true in the moral realm. In helping 
students to enhance their moral capabilities, the educational process needs to ensure that the 
acquisition of moral perception goes hand in hand with the transformation of passion from lower 
to higher forms. Both developments go forward when, in the process of enhancing capabilities, 
ample attention is given to the nurturing of understanding and the fostering of spiritual qualities 
as an inseparable whole. 
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Interplay Between the Individual and the Collective 
Those capabilities that bring to the fore the moral dimension of knowing, being and doing are to 
a great degree shaped against a background of concepts and notions that define personhood 
within a complex web of communal and social relations. Capabilities refer to the attributes of 
individuals; in the context of an educational programme, it is the individual who progressively 
advances in a set of capabilities. But the discussion of the previous chapters should have made it 
clear that advancing along the path of moral empowerment is deemed possible only if the student 
is immersed in the life of society. It is worth mentioning here that Sen has been criticized for 
adopting "methodological individualism" in his capability approach to development. His 
response has been that the concern with "people's ability to live the kind of lives they have 
reason to value brings in social influences both in terms of what they value (for example, 'taking 
part in the life of the community') and what influences operate on their values (for example, the 
relevance of public reasoning in individual assessment)." He goes on to say that "perhaps the 
misconstruction in this critique arises from its unwillingness to distinguish adequately between 
the individual characteristics that are used in the capability approach and the social influences 
that operate on them" (Sen, 2009, pp. 244-5). 
In an educational process focused on the development of capabilities, raising awareness of the 
influence social forces exert on one's thought, language and action will definitely have to be 
addressed. So too will be the ability to analyze the operation of such forces and the way to deal 
with them. But somehow this treatment of social forces does not seem to go far enough towards 
the creation of the kind of relationship between the individual and society that is being suggested 
in this thesis. For one thing, the ability to articulate the effects of the negative forces operating in 
society—greed, prejudices of many kinds, unbridled individualism and oppression, to name a 
few—plays some role in the development of capabilities, particularly the ones being referred to 
as moral capabilities here; when overemphasized, it leads to cynicism and alienation. What is 
needed is a strong sense of belonging to the whole, not the detachment of a critical outsider. In 
chapter one, I began my argument by stating that there is no tension between the dual processes 
of personal and collective transformation and that in fact they should be considered two 
inseparable dimensions of one movement. But such a tension can only be avoided if the language 
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that is used to express thought and spur action in the process of the enhancement of capabilities 
describes a self that has incorporated into its very conception strong connections with other 
individuals, with the community and with the institutions of society. 
Maclntyre offers penetrating insights in this regard. He identifies a sharp split in our current 
social order between "the realm of the organizational" in which the ends are not to be questioned 
and "the realm of the personal" in which, by contrast, there is nothing but disputation about 
values. The two sides of the political debates that fan the supposed opposition between the 
individual and the collective are the "self-defined protagonist of individual liberty" and the "self-
defined protagonist of planning and organization". The apparent opposition masks the deep 
agreement between the two parties. For both, there are only two alternative modes of social life: 
"one in which the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the 
bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of 
individuals" (Maclntyre, 1981, p. 33). According to Maclntyre, these two apparently antagonistic 
ways of life are, in fact, partners in a common culture, and it is in this culture that the emotivist 
self finds an ideal home. 
The capabilities that are to be acquired by the student on the path of moral empowerment, must 
enable her to transcend manipulative and authoritarian relationships between individuals and 
social organizations—the results of arbitrary freedom and control. Once again, language 
becomes a vital concern here. So much of the language of our age—whether the language of the 
emotivist in which it is hard to distinguish between sentences expressing preferences and 
evaluative statements (see chapter 2, footnote 9) or the bureaucratic language of injunctions and 
rules—not only reflects the culture Maclntyre sharply describes but also plays a central role in 
shaping it. To achieve, even on a modest scale, the transformation of essential relationships—
requiring as mentioned in chapter one an expanded notion of power as well as new explanations 
of individuality and collectivity—one has to allow a different language to evolve, the language 
of harmonious and reciprocal relationships whereby institutions act as channels for the release of 
human potential and individuals aspire to contribute to the shaping of such institutions. 
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What are some of those characteristics of the language in which moral capabilities have to be 
expressed that directly bear on relationships between the individual and society? To begin, the 
way personhood is discussed must necessarily move away from narrow and misconstrued 
notions of 'self. At the individual level, the concept of self seems to have become barren and 
the modern age evokes a sense of loss of identity, highlighted in moments of sincere 
introspection. This is ironic when one witnesses how often the word 'self' is associated in 
today's language of many a practice with those of 'image', 'confidence', 'assertiveness' and 
`actualization'. But do these associations give rise to more than empty notions of 'grandeur' and 
`ego'? To say, for example, that an individual measures herself mainly by the degree of 
confidence she has acquired or by her self-image is to reduce personhood, and the individual in 
this reduced form cannot be at ease with the collective. Charles Taylor points out that although 
`self-image' is often associated with appearing in a good light in the eyes of others and caring 
about how we match up to certain social standards, it is not essential to who we are. 
On the contrary, what is usually studied under this head is what we can identify, outside 
the sterilized, "value-free" language of social science, as the all-too-human weakness of 
"ego" and "image" in the everyday sense of these terms (themselves, of course, 
incorporated in to the vernacular from social science). The ideally strong character would 
be maximally free of them, would not be deterred by the adverse opinion of others, and 
would be able to face unflinchingly the truth about himself or herself. (Taylor, 1990, p. 
33) 
As an alternative, Taylor suggests "orientation to good" as a crucial feature of the desired 
individuality, one that cannot be depicted without reference to its surroundings: 
What I am as a self, my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have 
significance for me, and the issue of my identity is worked out, only through a language 
of interpretation which I have come to accept as a valid articulation of these issues...we 
are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we seek and find an 
orientation to the good. (ibid, p. 34) 
To continue with Taylor's line of reasoning, our orientation to good—which is constitutive of 
who we are—involves articulation and continuing clarification of significant issues, which 
cannot be done by a lone self. A self exists only within "webs of interlocution": those 
"conversation partners" who in the early part of life were essential to our self-definition and with 
whom we first learn "our languages of moral and spiritual discernment" as well as others who 
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are now crucial to our "continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding" (p. 36). An 
important attribute of this language is that it only exists and can only "be maintained within a 
language community" (p. 35). Rootedness in a community, however, does not imply conformity. 
A human being can always be original, can step beyond the limits of thought and vision 
of contemporaries, can even be quite misunderstood by them. But the drive to original 
vision will be hampered, will ultimately be lost in inner confusion, unless it can be placed 
in some way in relation to the language and vision of others. (p. 37) 
The above paragraph seems to be pointing to a dynamic relationship between the individual and 
the community at the level of thought, language and action—the individual being rooted in the 
community as well as contributing to its change. To explore the nature of this relationship in 
more depth, however, some kind of theoretical framework on language and thought seems to be 
needed. Vygotsky's work offers valuable insight in this respect. According to Ellen Watson, 
Vygotsky avoids the problems associated with approaches—originated from the classical 
empiricist tradition—that consider thought primary and language its expression, in which the 
mind is the passive recipient and organizer of images produced by external objects. His work, 
however, does not embrace the radical social constructivism of approaches on the opposite camp, 
which consider language primary and responsible for shaping thought, and as a result, face the 
problem of communication across communities with varied languages. His theory lies 
somewhere between the two approaches (Watson, 1995, pp. 47-66). 
Vygotsky's work suggests that in order to understand the uniqueness of human behaviour we 
need to consider both the historical character and the social nature of human experience. With 
regard to the former, Vygotsky writes: "Man makes use not just of physically inherited 
experience: throughout his life, his work and his behaviour draw broadly on the experience of the 
former generations, which is not transmitted at birth from father to son. We may call this 
historical experience" (Vygotsky, 1979). As to the social character of human experience, it 
relies on interpersonal communication allowing a person to draw "on the almost infinite pool of 
experiences of others" (Kozulin, 1990, p. 81). Individual experience itself "becomes just one 
element in the field of experience" available to each person (ibid., p. 81). On the old 
psychological question of knowing another person's mind Vygotsky wrote that "We are aware of 
ourselves, for we are aware of others, and in the same way as we know others; and this is as it is 
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because we in relation to ourselves are in the same [position] as others are to us" (Vygotsky, 
1979, pp. 29-30). He observed that children understand others first and themselves later: 
... the child first learns to understand others and only afterwards, following the same 
model, learns to understand himself. It would be more exact to say that we know 
ourselves to the extent that we know others, or, even more exact, that we are conscious of 
ourselves only to the extent that we are another for ourselves, that is, a stranger. 
(Vygotsky, 1926) 
As R.Van Der Veer and J.Valsiner explain, Vygotsky reaches the conclusion that language, "the 
tool of social interaction, is at the same time the tool of intimate interaction with oneself' 
(VanDerVeer and Valsiner, 1991, pp. 57-8). 
This brief reference to Vygotsky only hints at the kind of language in which the development of 
every set of capabilities has to be conceptualized in an educational programme concerned with 
moral empowerment, if the resulting individuality of the student is not to contradict the very aim 
of the programme. This is of particular importance because in an empowering process, the 
student has to be fully aware of the objectives of every activity and be able to reflect on how 
advancing in a given capability is helping to fulfil his or her twofold moral purpose. There is a 
rise in consciousness as the student advances in a capability, but this consciousness is not the 
property of the individual alone. The student has to be aware, and work within a rising collective 
consciousness, that as Ilyenkov puts it "is not simply the sum of many individual 
consciousnesses" but rather "a historically formed and historically developing system of 
`objective representations', of forms and schemes of the 'objective spirit', the 'collective reason' 
of humanity" (Ilyenkov, 1977, p. 6). A premise of this thesis has been that the rising 
`consciousness of the oneness of humankind' is the most fundamental manifestation of the spirit 
of humanity today and should permeate every aspect of education seeking moral empowerment. 
Further, according to Vygotsky, "The social dimension of consciousness is primary in time and 
in fact"; the individual dimension is "derivative and secondary" (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 30). In his 
interpretation of Vygotsky's thought, Alex Kozulin underscores the "implicit conclusion" that if 
consciousness is to become a subject of psychological study, some other layer of reality should 
be referred to in the course of the explanation, and goes on to suggest that "socially meaningful 
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activity" may serve as such a layer (Kozulin, 1990, pp. 83-4). Accordingly in the process of 
moral empowerment the student should be able to assess his or her own growing consciousness 
with the aid of socially meaningful activity. This brings added meaning to my arguments in 
previous chapters that moral empowerment needs to be associated with progressively more 
effective and complex acts of service to the community—and by extension to the whole of 
humanity. When this is achieved, the consciousness of the oneness of humankind, always in 
danger of being a mere abstraction, is given concrete shape through the notion of service. The 
motivation to act on society is generated within the individual who—while not driven by selfish 
interest—is, nevertheless, seeking intellectual and moral growth. The way is open to a 
fundamental orientation to personhood that is not sabotaged by notions of individualism. 
Enlightened self-interest foresees the possibility of converging goods, but the urge to commit 
oneself to the common good defines a different identity. Taylor in probing "the relations of 
identity and community" distinguishes "the possible place of we-identities as against merely 
convergent I-identities, and the consequent role of common as against convergent goods" 
(Taylor, 2003, p. 201). It is not that I-identity knows no familial or communal bonds; such bonds 
are necessarily formed as individuals pursue their own inclinations, goals and life plans. In the 
corresponding worldview collective action also has a place, but its purpose is to obtain benefits 
which individuals on their own could not secure. Service, described in general terms in chapter 3 
and through examples in chapter 7, embraces a category of actions that impels individuals to 
come face to face with the collective dimension of their identity, to recognize common good in 
practice. Walking the path of service in the company of others—developing, for example, the 
capabilities to build unity, to manage personal and collective affairs with rectitude of conduct, 
and to gather and systematize knowledge being generated in the community—helps to shape the 
student's identity; service "unites the fulfilment of individual potential with the advancement of 
society" (FUNDAEC, 2006, p. 41). 
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this inquiry has been to explore the nature of an evolving conceptual framework that 
could guide programmes concerned with moral empowerment within a specific discourse on 
education to which I have referred as Band'i inspired. The approach has been to identify 
concepts that could be considered vital elements of such a framework, largely from the work of 
one of the participants in the discourse—Fundacion para la Aplicacion y Ensen anza de las 
Ciencias, FUNDAEC—that has made noteworthy and distinct contributions to it, and to examine 
these concepts in light of relevant discussions in the philosophical literature. The inquiry has 
been carried out on the basis of two premises: that we live in an age of transition leading 
humanity to its maturity, and that the hallmark of this age is the growing consciousness of the 
oneness of humankind. These two interrelated concepts are in themselves elements of the 
evolving framework in question, but more at the level of conviction, justifying the direction 
being set for the future development of the discourse commensurate with the progressive 
realization of human potential both at the individual and the collective levels. 
The purpose of the inquiry and the methodology adopted obliged me to look for specific insights 
in the work of a number of authors in both ethics and philosophy of mind—insights that would 
enable me to express each selected concept in a reflective language and to expand its meaning 
and application to the extent possible in relation to the other elements of the framework being 
considered. Since a sufficient number of concepts had to be discussed in order to give some 
shape to the framework, significant concepts, each of which could have been the topic of an 
entire thesis, had to be dealt with inadequately and weighty themes did not receive the attention 
they deserve. Further, given the nature of the thesis, I confined myself to gaining insights into 
each concept with little attempt to undertake a thorough critique of the work of each author. 
As I look at the totality of the argument presented in this thesis, it is clear to me that I did not 
advance an equal distance in my exploration of each concept. The question of power is one in the 
analysis of which I only took a few tentative steps. I argued the need to go beyond the political 
conception of power, but only hinted at representations of power found in religious and 
philosophical literature that could enter the proper conception of moral empowerment. The 
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comprehensive analysis of these dimensions of power and how they may modify the way power 
is understood in the political realm, as well as the relationship between power, justice and 
freedom, are significant topics that must be examined in much more depth if a clear concept of 
moral empowerment is to emerge. 
Issues related to understanding, a central element of the framework in question, were analyzed in 
more detail. I examined understanding as both a process and an attribute of the human soul and 
argued that the subject, object and process of understanding have to be treated together in the 
discourse of education, this in anticipation of the role capabilities would play in the formulation 
of educational objectives and the analysis of educational content. In this context, I explored the 
relationship between advancing in understanding and the development of spiritual qualities, 
which, I claimed, need to go hand in hand in an educational process. Yet, it is clear that the 
treatment of 'spiritual qualities' as a special category of virtues in this thesis only raises the need 
for systematic research—not bound to narrow studies in cognitive psychology—to clarify the 
nature of these attributes of the human soul and their contributions to the development of 
capabilities. 
In the examination of the 'subject of understanding', I found certain candidates, suggested by 
various philosophical approaches to education, inadequate as potential protagonists of moral 
empowerment, this because of some of their own characteristics as well as their relationship with 
the object of understanding and the way they would engage in the process of understanding. Yet, 
the examination of each candidate did offer insights into the desired characteristics of the 
protagonist of moral empowerment and allowed me to investigate aspects of the relationship 
between the subject and object of understanding. In positioning the subject of understanding in 
the larger context of physical, social and spiritual reality, I touched on some of the ontological 
elements of the conceptual framework being sought and found the relations that physicalism and 
naturalism establish between the subject and object of understanding restrictive. The notion of an 
extended reality as well as Nagel's conception of objectivity helped me to view the subject of 
understanding with the boundlessness she needs in order to advance significantly in 
understanding, and to examine the methods by which she can reach certain milestones along the 
way. 
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To prepare the way for the selection of 'objects of understanding' from an extended reality—the 
complexity of dealing with which demands not a single language, but multiple ones—I argued 
for complementarity between the languages of science and religion. But to do so, I first had to 
demonstrate the compatibility of the two by analyzing the parallels that exist between science 
and religion as two overlapping systems of knowledge and practice. On that foundation, I could 
then advance the claim that in enhancing the understanding of the student—a process inseparable 
from fostering spiritual qualities—and in strengthening a desired set of convictions in action, an 
educational process seeking moral empowerment would need to draw on both science and 
religion as complementary sources of knowledge and employ the languages of both properly. 
Although examples from FUNDAEC'S experience illustrated how the two languages could be 
employed without losing the rigor of the former and the penetrating power of the latter, much 
more has to be said on the way educational materials and methods can express the true nature of 
scientific inquiry freed from the limitations of positivism and of the insights of religion freed 
from dogma and rigid notions of truth—this in order to help students develop patterns of thought 
and action that reflect the coherence between the material and the spiritual. 
Selection and organization of objects of understanding into a structured whole was another 
aspect of the conceptual framework examined in some detail. This was done under the title of 
integration; first the question of integration of knowledge itself was analyzed, and then, several 
values of knowledge were examined, values that would govern the organization of the teaching-
learning experience. This led to an initial consideration of the intimacy of thought and action, a 
theme that was developed further in the context of the continuity of thought, language and action. 
Drawing on Hirst's criticism of the kind of thinking that has given rise to hasty attempts at 
integration, I argued for the need to respect forms of knowledge without having to accept the 
rigidity in the method of teaching and in the presentation of content often associated with subject 
based curricula. My analysis also identified certain challenges when, as an alternative, social 
practices act as the sole organizing principle of curricular design. 
The introduction of the notion of capability into the discussion helped bring together the desired 
elements of the framework of the educational process with eyes set on moral empowerment, 
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identified in the examination of issues related to empowerment, understanding, complementarity 
and integration. Once again, my treatment of the various features of capability as a way of 
thinking about the objectives, content and methods of education has been uneven. The analysis 
of its connection with the formulations set forth by Sen and Nussbaum is probably sufficient for 
my purposes. The role of knowledge in the development of capabilities—as far as the 
understanding of concepts and the assimilation of information is concerned—has been addressed 
to a reasonable extent. But issues related to skills, attitudes and habits have been left out almost 
entirely. And as mentioned above, the treatment of spiritual qualities has been only preliminary. 
Nevertheless, I hope I have succeeded in demonstrating the value of capability as a central 
concept associated with moral empowerment and in exposing some of the philosophical 
underpinnings of an educational process organized around the progressive development of 
capabilities. As to the effectiveness of such an approach, the Band'i-inspired discourse on 
education to which I have referred is too incipient to offer many instances of evaluation. By the 
way of illustration, I have presented in Appendix 3 several comments from a few students of 
FUNDAEC interviewed by M. Roosta as she cites them in her Ph.D. thesis (Roosta, 1999). 
In undertaking this inquiry, I hoped to bring together a number of threads of educational thought, 
often kept separate, which would enable Band'i-inspired educational programmes to weave the 
appropriate curricula. To the extent that I have succeeded, I may have made a modest 
contribution to the general discourse on education as well. That the educational experience I 
have repeatedly drawn upon has not been concerned so much with schools per se but more with 
education in the context of the social and economic development of peoples has, I feel, led me to 
areas of inquiry into which I would not have ventured otherwise. I believe this has been a source 
of strength for my thesis; for reflecting from time to time on the indispensable contributions it 
must make to the advancement of material and spiritual civilization helps education in general to 
resist the enticements of relativism prevalent in today's intellectual life and achieve more and 
more clarity about its purpose and its mission. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The following is a lesson from a unit in a series dedicated to the development of capabilities 
related to the power of expression in FUNDAEC's 'Promoter of Community Well-being' 
programme. It is to illustrate how considerations of contexts come into play in the organization of 
curriculum, in this case as part of reflection on acts of service that the students undertake in the 
community. 
*** 
Today let us consider the description of a very important act of service that many of you will carry out often in the 
coming years: One of you visits a village or small town, speaks with several people and organizes a class to study a 
course, for example, on sanitation. 
Let us look at the possible descriptions of this event in different contexts. We will begin by considering a 
description that emphasizes the physical or circumstantial aspects of the action: 
"On Monday afternoon I visited the community of La Dominga. I spoke with eight adults and twelve youth, 
spending approximately twenty minutes with each of them. We spoke about the importance of 
environmental sanitation and the possibility of organizing a study group on this subject. That evening at 
7:00 p.m., we had a meeting at the Community Center and after a pleasant discussion, in which all those 
present actively participated, we decided to hold a study class every Monday and Wednesday at 7:30 p.m. 
beginning next week." 
A description such as the above takes into account physical and circumstantial aspects of the action considered. 
When did it take place? Where? With how many people did you speak? How long did you speak to each one? 
What did you speak about with each person? When and where did the meeting take place? When will the study 
class be held? When will it begin? The type of information contained in this description is useful for certain 
purposes, for example, for gathering statistical data or administering a community educational program in a region. 
But it is possible to describe this same action in a wider context, that is, as an event that takes place within the 
context of the training you are receiving in order to serve your community. In this context, the aspects considered 
previously would take on new meaning, and other important aspects would appear. For example, let us read the 
following description of the same action: 
"It is my personal conviction that one of the most significant activities in my life, which allows me to work 
with the greatest personal satisfaction, is that of contributing to the education of a community. It is very 
disturbing to observe the precarious sanitary conditions in which many children are raised. I think that by 
teaching courses on sanitation I can effectively contribute to the welfare of my fellow human beings. 
Therefore, I have decided to organize a study and action group on environmental sanitation in a nearby 
village. On Monday afternoon I visited the community of La Dominga. I spoke with eight adults and 
twelve youth, spending approximately twenty minutes with each of them. We spoke about the importance 
of environmental sanitation and the possibility of organizing a study group on this subject. That evening at 
7:00 p.m., we had a meeting at the Community Center and after a pleasant discussion, in which all those 
present actively participated, we decided to hold a study class every Monday and Wednesday at 7:30 p.m. 
beginning next week. After the meeting, I went back home and thought about the challenge of facilitating 
community education. Assuming this responsibility will require that I continue to develop certain personal 
qualities and characteristics such as constancy, integrity, and patience. I must pursue my own education 
more vigorously than before." 
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Now, compare this description with the first. Are there similarities? Are there great differences? Which is more 
complete? Is the second description complete? Write your thoughts in the space below. 
In thinking about the last question, most of you must have realized that more complete descriptions are still possible. 
For example, let us look at the following description: 
"Some of the most serious health problems afflicting our communities result from poor sanitary conditions. 
The high rate of disease, especially among children, requires vigilant action by community organizations 
and by individuals who are familiar with health problems and are motivated by a spirit of service. For this 
reason, one of the objectives of a rural educational program must be to help the students and the 
communities it serves learn about environmental sanitation. This is one of the subjects I like most in my 
studies at FUNDAEC. It is my personal conviction that one of the most significant activities in my life, 
which allows me to work with the greatest personal satisfaction, is that of contributing to the education of a 
community. It is very disturbing to observe the precarious sanitary conditions in which many children are 
raised. I think that by teaching courses on sanitation I can effectively contribute to the welfare of my 
fellow human beings. Therefore, I have decided to organize a study and action group on environmental 
sanitation in a nearby village. On Monday afternoon I visited the community of La Dominga. I spoke with 
eight adults and twelve youth, spending approximately twenty minutes with each of them. We spoke about 
the importance of environmental sanitation and the possibility of organizing a study group on this subject. 
That evening at 7:00 p.m., we had a meeting at the Community Center and after a pleasant discussion, in 
which all those present actively participated, we decided to hold a study class every Monday and 
Wednesday at 7:30 p.m. beginning next week. After the meeting, I went back home and thought about the 
challenge of facilitating community education. Assuming this responsibility will require that I continue to 
develop certain personal qualities and characteristics such as constancy, integrity, and patience. I must 
pursue my own education more vigorously than before. Also, I am more convinced than ever of the great 
human potential and vast resources of rural communities, for many of those who attended the meeting 
seemed to be people willing to learn not only for themselves, but also for the betterment of society. I also 
believe that the meeting had a very positive effect, generating more unity in the community. We all agreed 
that achieving success in our endeavour to better our lives and those of our children will require resolution, 
concerted effort, and sacrifice." 
Let us now consider how this description relates to the two previous ones. How do they compare? Which is 
expressed in the widest context? When is the first sufficient? When is the second more desirable? When is the 
third necessary? 
To practice what you have learned, write a description of an educational activity that you have recently carried out 
in a community, referring only to the circumstantial aspects: Where? When? How? Then include this description 
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in a wider one that brings in those aspects that are related to you as an individual. For example, how did you feel? 
What importance did this action have for you? What did you learn from it? Include this second description in a still 
wider one that takes into account the community. For example, why was it important for the community? What 
effects did the action have on the community? 
Divide into small groups and discuss what you have written. Already your understanding of the meaning of the 
word "context" must have increased greatly. In fact, in doing the exercises for this lesson, you have taken a very 
important step. Not only have you examined the context of certain descriptions but you have also begun to think 
about the general context of your studies and actions. How does "community service" provide a general and 
important context for all your actions and your studies at FUNDAEC? 
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APPENDIX 2 
Below are three lessons of the first unit of a series, the aim of which is to help develop in the 
`Promoters of Community Well-being' some of the capabilities needed in scientific inquiry. The 
texts in this series use the atomic theory of matter as a sequence of progressively more complex 
statements to explore the behaviour of matter in different processes familiar to the students. The 
title of this unit is the 'Heating and Cooling of Matter'. The lessons are to illustrate how rigorous 
content can be studied in a manner which raises the consciousness of the students about the 
process of scientific inquiry itself placing it in the context of the overall aim to serve the 
community. 
2 	 Observation 
In this unit we will choose one process scientists have studied throughout the centuries, and use it to illustrate how 
science works. Make a list of some of the most common processes you see when you look around you. 
One of the processes that may be on your list is the heating and cooling of matter. This is something we see 
happening all the time. A rock sitting in the sun becomes warm. The air becomes cool at night. The water on the 
stove heats up. The piece of metal in the fire turns red-hot. The list of examples we could give of the process of 
heating and cooling is surely without end. How might we go about studying this process? What should we do first? 
What are some of the systems we could choose in which to study the process? 
Before choosing specific systems for the study of the process of the heating and cooling of matter, let us 
think of the many situations in which things heat up and cool down, and answer a few questions. 
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a. What happens to objects that are outside in direct sunlight? What happens to these same objects when the 
sun goes behind the clouds for several minutes? What happens to them after the sun goes down? 
b. When a pot of water is put on the stove, and the burner is turned on, what happens to the water over time? 
What is steam? 
c.  
d. What happens if you cool down a liquid until it is very cold? Does it become solid? 
e. If you heat up a piece of metal does it eventually turn into a liquid? 
f. What happens to a ceramic mug when you fill it with hot tea? What if you then pour out the tea and fill the 
mug with ice water? 
g. Imagine that you take a glass of very warm water and add ice to it. What happens to the ice? What happens 
to the water? What happens, in general, when you place a hot object next to a cold one, so that they are 
touching? Does something transfer from one object to the other? What is it that is transferred? 
h. How does hot air move? Does it rise or go downward? What about cold air? 
Does it also rise? 
. What do you feel when you put your hand near a light bulb that is turned on? Why do you feel heat if your 
hand is not touching the bulb? What do you feel when you stand out in the midday sun? Or near any hot 
object? 
Let us say that you have a group of objects made up of different materials, and you put them all at once out 
in the sun. Do some of the objects get hot very quickly while others take a long time to heat up? Do certain 
of the materials cool down faster than others when they are taken out of the sun? Does metal, for example, 
heat up and cool down more quickly than wood? Can you think of examples of materials that heat up and 
cool down slowly? 
202 
k. When things heat up, do they expand or contract? And when they cool down? Why do asphalt roads crack 
in parts of the world where it is very hot in the summer and very cold in the winter? 
1. If you look carefully at the flames in a gas stove you will see that they look blue and white. The flame of a 
candle, however, looks yellow and orange. Which flame is hotter? Is there a relationship between how hot 
something is and its color? 
m. What happens to a lidded pot when the water inside it is boiling vigorously? What causes the lid to rattle 
around or even pop off? Does heat have something to do with pressure? 
n. What happens when you rub your hands together vigorously? Do they become warm? 
o. What happens to your body when you have a fever? Or when you climb a tall flight of stairs? What is the 
purpose of sweating? 
The concept that best describes the kind of scientific activity you undertook in order to answer the above 
questions is observation. What you need to understand well in these early stages of your scientific activity is that 
observation is not the same as seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or feeling. In thinking about observation you should 
have at least the following three points in mind: 
First, observation clearly involves receiving information through the senses. For instance, rays of light are 
reflected by objects and enter your eyes. The front part of the eye acts as a lens and forms a tiny image of an object 
on the back part, known as the retina. Your sense of touch receives different kinds of stimuli as your skin interacts 
with the environment around you. Sound waves enter your ears and cause the eardrums and tiny ear bones to vibrate. 
The information that reaches your sense organs is then transmitted by various types of nerves to your brain. Thus, 
you see an object out in the sun. You touch something and feel that it is hot. You hear the lid of the pot on the stove 
rattle. 
Second, even though the image of a stone, for example, may be formed in the retina of your eyes, you will 
not necessarily see a stone unless your mind has been trained from childhood to recognize certain things as stones. 
Even though your eardrums and the tiny bones of your ears may vibrate to the sound waves produced by the rattling 
of the lid of a pot, all you will have is a sensation of confusing noise unless you have some knowledge of that 
specific sound from previous experience. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling involve more than the 
functioning of the sense organs; they require previous learning. 
Third, once you have the experience of seeing something such as the stone, you need to express what you see 
in a statement, for example, "there is a stone out in the sun." If you touch the stone as part of your observation, you 
may add to this statement the information you got from your sense of touch and say, "The stone left out in the sun 
became hot." In general, observing involves the careful use of language in order to make "observation statements." 
The answers you gave to the questions we asked about the process of the heating and cooling of things were all 
observation statements. 
As you can imagine, in science, one cannot accept just any observation statement. Observations need to be 
made carefully. Often the same observation needs to be repeated until one is sure that mistakes are not being made. 
Moreover, observation statements should be clear, precise and accurate. The observation statements you made in 
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this lesson address some very general questions about how things heat up and cool down. Later, as we will see in 
the rest of the unit, we will have to make rather detailed observation statements in order to explain with more and 
more precision the nature of the process and the way it works. 
II Reflections on the Development of the Mind 
The process we have selected to examine in this unit is a physical one. Science, of course, is also interested in 
the way human beings behave and in what goes on in society. Your understanding of science will be enhanced at 
this point if you choose a process from the human realm and come up with a series of statements about it in answer 
to a few questions. The process we propose is the development of the capacity of children between infancy and the 
age of ten to learn mathematics. This process is, of course, an extremely complex one. There are thousands upon 
thousands of questions one could ask about the process, and science does not have adequate explanations for most of 
them yet. But what we are asking you to do here is more or less simple. Gather with others in your group and discuss 
the process. Select four or five concepts or sets of skills children learn in mathematics as they grow up. Ask 
yourselves, then, at what age a child is able to learn each. Below is an example. 
Suppose the question you ask is, "What is the earliest age at which children are able to learn the multiplication 
table?" One of you may say, "My niece learned the multiplication table at the age of seven." Then others may try to 
remember their own observations in this respect and make similar statements. Do you think your observations will 
be sufficient to give a precise answer to the question you have asked? If it finally turns out that the earliest any one 
of you has seen a child learn the multiplication table is at the age of six, there may still be children in the world who 
can learn it at an earlier age. But this does not mean that you cannot make any accurate statements based on your 
observations. What you could say is, "At the age of six, a child may be able to learn the multiplication table." This 
in itself would be a valuable observation statement about the process of the development of the capacity of children 
to learn mathematics, a statement that can be improved upon as many more observations are made. 
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3 	 Temperature 
The statements we made in the previous lesson were all qualitative. For example, we referred to objects as hot, cold, 
hotter, or colder, and tried to describe what occurs when they touch or come close to each other. If we limit 
ourselves to such qualitative observation statements, we will not get very far in our understanding of the process we 
have chosen to study. To advance, we must first define with some precision what we mean by the words hot and 
cold. The concept that helps us achieve this goal is temperature, a quantity that can be measured and used in 
quantitative statements about the process of the heating and cooling of matter. 
We may begin our discussion of temperature by doing a simple experiment. Fill three bowls with water of 
different temperatures 
	 one bowl with cold water, one with warm water, and one with relatively hot water. Put one 
hand into the bowl of hot water and the other into the cold water, and leave them there for thirty seconds. Then 
transfer both hands at the same time to the third bowl. What do you observe? Does the hand that was in the hot 
water feel hot or cold? How does the hand from the cold water feel? 
From this simple observation we can conclude that our sense of hot and cold is not that reliable. How do we 
really know, then, how hot something is? The answer, of course, is that we have to learn to measure temperature. 
Write a few words on what you know about the concept of temperature and how to measure it. 
To measure temperature, we take advantage of the fact that when materials heat up or cool down many of 
their properties change. For example, the color of objects changes when they are heated. Think about an electric 
light bulb. The tiny wire inside is gray when the light is turned off and the wire is cool. But when the light bulb is 
connected to a source of electricity, the wire heats up and begins to shine yellow. Can you give other examples of 
things that change color when heated? Do you think we can use this property of objects to measure 
their temperatures? Is it easy to measure changes in color accurately? 
To measure temperature in everyday life, we use another characteristic of materials: they 
expand when heated. To illustrate how this property of matter is used to measure temperature, we 
will describe to you a very simple instrument, a kind of rudimentary thermometer. 
The instrument is made by heating one end of a thin, glass tube until it becomes soft. Next, air 
is blown gently into the tube from the cool end until a small bulb forms at the other end, as shown in 
the drawing on the right. Alcohol is then poured in until it fills the bulb and reaches about halfway 
up the tube. 
Suppose we submerge the bulb in ice water. What happens? The alcohol level in the tube moves down to a 
certain height. What happens to the column of alcohol if we take the tube out of the ice water and put it into a glass 
filled with tap water? Does it rise? Why? 
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Now consider the questions below. Although the answer to each one is rather obvious, this kind of thinking is 
necessary in order to ensure that the way we measure ordinary temperatures using thermometers similar to the 
rudimentary one we have described is not faulty. 
a. When immersed in ice water, is the alcohol in the bulb of our rudimentary thermometer at the same 
temperature as the water? 
b. Will the column of alcohol always settle at the same height when the bulb is placed in ice water for a 
while? 
c. When immersed in tap water, is the alcohol in the bulb the same temperature as the water? 
d. Suppose we pour tap water into a few glasses so that they all contain water at the same temperature. Will 
the height of the alcohol column change if we move the instrument from one glass to the next? 
e. Is it correct to assume that the difference between the two heights of the alcohol column 
	 one when the 
bulb is in ice water and the other when it is in tap water—is a measure of the difference in the temperatures 
of the two quantities of water? 
f. What will happen to the alcohol column if we put the bulb in a glass of water that is hotter than tap water? 
Will it rise higher? And what if we place it in water cooler than that from the tap but not as cold as ice 
water? 
g. Can we use this instrument to measure temperature? 
The rudimentary thermometer we have described is of rather limited use. As it stands now, it can only tell if 
something is hotter or colder than something else. If we have water at different temperatures in various glasses, for 
example, the instrument will allow us to compare their temperatures and order them from the hottest to the coldest. 
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But this is not all there is to measurement. We want to have an instrument that will help us assign a unique number 
to the temperature of all the objects at that temperature. 
The thermometer that will enable us to carry out such measurements is actually not very different from the 
one we have just described. The problem with alcohol is that it evaporates even at room temperature, so another 
liquid that evaporates only at a very high temperature is needed. Mercury is one such liquid, and it is used in the 
kind of thermometer we are most familiar with: a long, thin tube sealed at the top, with a bulb containing mercury at 
the other end. 
As was the case with the column of alcohol, it becomes clear over the course of many observations that every 
time the thermometer is placed in ice water the column of mercury settles at a specific height that is always the same. 
It can also be seen that whenever the thermometer is put into water that has just begun to boil, the mercury level 
settles at a different height, which is again the same each time. One way of building a thermometer is to mark the 
first height with a "0" and the second with a "100". To do so means to decide that the measurement of temperature 
will be based on a scale that sets the temperature at which water freezes at 0 and the temperature at which water 
boils at 100. The distance between the two heights can, then, be divided into one hundred parts each representing 
one degree. The scale constructed this way is called Celsius, and its unit is one "degree Celsius" or "centigrade 
(°C)". It is the scale of temperature used most widely in the world. 
Would it have been correct if we had assigned different numbers to the two heights 
of the mercury column, corresponding to the freezing and boiling of water? Would any 
two numbers do as long as the second were larger than the first? You probably know 
already of another scale that, although not as convenient as the Celsius, is used in some 
parts of the world extensively. In this scale, called Fahrenheit, the temperature at which 
water freezes is set to be 32 and the temperature at which it boils is set at 212. 
32.  
To measure the temperature of any object, then, all we have to do is to put the bulb 
of a thermometer, constructed according to some accepted scale, in contact with the object. 
The column of mercury will rise or fall until the bulb reaches the same temperature as the 
	
°C 	 °F 
object. When the mercury has stopped moving, we simply read the temperature on the scale marked along the side 
of the thermometer. The contact between the thermometer and the object, of course, has to be such that the mercury 
does reach the temperature of the object. For example, when measuring the temperature of your body, it is not 
sufficient to hold the thermometer in your hand. By placing it under the tongue, you ensure that the bulb is not 
exposed to the air outside and can thus read the temperature of the body correctly. Further, thermometers have to be 
built in such a way that they are suitable for the kind of measurements for which they are intended. Can you, for 
example, measure the temperature of air with the same thermometer you use to see if you have a fever? What 
differences would you find between thermometers used for these two purposes? 
n Extension 
1. With the help of your tutor, find the appropriate thermometers and measure the temperatures below. Use 
the scale with which you are most familiar. 
a. Your body temperature 
b. Room temperature 
c. The temperature of cold water from a faucet 
d. The temperature of hot water from a faucet 
e. The temperature of soil underneath grass 
f. The temperature of bare soil 
g. The temperature outside in the direct sun 
h. The temperature outside under a tree 
2. Take a mixture of water and ice and measure its temperature. Then add salt to the mixture little by little, 
stirring until it dissolves. As you stir, observe the temperature of the mixture. What is the lowest 
temperature reached by the mixture? 
102. 	 1 
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Time of Day 
Soil 
Temperature 
Near the 
Surface 
Depth Air 
Temperature 
3. Using a thermometer that reads air temperature, observe the temperature outside at different times of the 
day and write down your results in the table below. 
Time of Day Temperature Time of Day Temperature 
7:00 a.m. 3:00p.m. 
8:00 a.m. 4:00p.m. 
9:00 a.m. 5:00p.m. 
10:00 a.m. 6:00p.m. 
11:00 a.m. 7:00p.m. 
12:00 p.m. 8:00p.m. 
1:00p.m. 9:00 p.m. 
2:00p.m. 10:00 p.m. 
4. Find a small plot of earth and use a suitable thermometer to record the temperature of the soil at various 
depths. You should take readings at each depth at different times of day: some in the morning, some in the 
afternoon, and some in the evening. At each of these times, you should also measure the air temperature. 
Write down your results in the table below and then answer the questions that follow. 
a. Does the temperature of the soil increase or decrease with depth? 
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b. At approximately what time of day is the surface temperature of the soil the greatest? 
c. By how much does the air temperature differ from the surface temperature of the soil in the morning? At 
midday? 
d. How does air temperature affect the temperature of soil at, say, a depth of 20 centimeters? 
5. There is a scale of temperature used often in science called the Kelvin scale. It is based on the lowest 
possible temperature that any substance could ever reach, which is 
given the designation, "zero degrees Kelvin (0°K)". This temperature 
is also called absolute zero, and it is equal to —273°C. This is the 
coldest anything could ever be. The size of each degree in the Kelvin 
scale is the same as the size of one degree Celsius, so that water 
freezes at 273°K. 
Examine the diagram to the right and, on the basis of what you have just read, 
fill in the blanks in the sentences and equations that follow. 
a. 0°K = 	 °C 
b. —459°F = 	 °K 
c. —459°F = 	 °C 
d. 0°C = 
	 °F 
e. 	 °C = 212°F 
f. 50°C = 	 °K 
g. The temperature at which ice melts is 
	 °C or 	 °F or 	  
h. The temperature at which water boils is 
	 °C or 	 °F or 
i. The centigrade scale uses as its points of reference the melting point of 
	 and the boiling point of 
	  
j. The coldest possible temperature is 
	 °K. 
k. If the temperature outside were 323°K, then it would feel very 
	  
1. If the temperature outside were 250°K, then it would feel very 
	  
m. The normal body temperature of a human being is 
	 °C or 
6. What is the hottest thing you can think of? What is the coldest thing you have ever touched? What was the 
temperature of the hottest day you have experienced? And the coldest? 
Below is a table of some temperatures, from very hot to very cold. Examine the table and try to get a feeling for the 
range of temperatures that exist in our universe. The temperatures of the first three items in the table are 
approximate. 
3 
°K. 
°K. 
°F. 
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Temperature °K °C °F 
Core of the Sun 14 million 14 million 25 million 
Bolt of lightning 30,000 29,700 53,500 
Core of the Earth 4,000 3,700 6,700 
Temperature at which iron melts 1,811 1,538 2,800 
Temperature at which water boils 373 100 212 
Highest recorded air temperature on Earth 331 58 136 
Normal human body temperature 310 37 98.6 
Temperature at which water freezes 273 0 32 
Temperature at which mercury melts 234 —39 —38 
Lowest recorded air temperature on Earth 184 
—89 —128 
Temperature at which nitrogen boils 77 —196 —321 
Surface temperature of Pluto 43 —230 —382 
Temperature at which hydrogen boils 20 —253 —423 
Absolute zero 0 —273 —459 
7. Read the following paragraphs and discuss them with your group: 
Our planet's climate is extremely varied. There are places in Antarctica in which the temperature can 
go down to —88°C, and areas in Africa where it can reach 55°C. Naturally, these are the extremes of 
temperature on Earth; the climate in general is more hospitable. The majority of living beings thrive in 
temperatures between 0°C and 40°C. Nevertheless, there are certain organisms that live and reproduce in 
hot springs where temperatures can be as high as 90°C. Life also exists in the coldest parts of the world. 
Scientists have so far identified over one hundred species of animals and plants that live permanently in ice 
or snow. 
Some of the animals on our planet are warm blooded and can regulate their body temperatures. Others 
are cold blooded, and their body temperatures are dependent on the temperature of the environment around 
them. A cold-blooded animal cannot regulate its own temperature internally. Instead, it must search out 
places that can help it warm up or cool down. For example, if a cold-blooded animal becomes chilly, it 
might find a warm, sunny rock to lie on. If it is very hot outside, the animal might look for shelter in a cave, 
beneath a rock, or at the bottom of a pond. Some cold-blooded animals develop resourceful ways of 
managing their body temperatures. Termites, for example, construct special dwellings that are designed to 
remain at a fairly constant temperature. Termites that live in very hot countries build tall, thin, 
wedgeshaped mounds made of sun-baked mud. Some of these mounds have a network of tunnels and 
channels running through them that allow air to circulate. The mounds are often aligned in a north-south 
direction. In the morning the sun heats up the eastern side of the mound, and in the evening the western side 
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is heated. At midday, however, when the sun is hottest, the rays fall only on the upper edge of the mound, 
so that as a whole it is not exposed to excessive heat. In areas with a great deal of rain, termites may build 
"umbrellas" on top of their mounds to protect the nest from heavy rains. In windy or shady areas, they may 
orient the mound slightly more to the northwest, increasing the amount of heat received on the eastern side 
and thus compensating for the effects of the wind and shade. 
Another cold-blooded animal that regulates its temperature in an interesting way is the bee. A single 
bee cannot maintain its body at a constant temperature, but a family of bees has ways of regulating the 
temperature of the environment. Bees can keep their hive at 35°C even when the temperature outside is as 
low as 20°C. How do they do this? As soon as winter starts, they gather around the queen bee and form a 
large, compact ball. The bees nearest the queen eat large amounts of honey and generate enough heat to 
radiate outward and keep the bees on the outside areas of the ball warm. In summer, evaporation and 
ventilation prevent the temperature in the hive from getting too high. Some of the bees sprinkle the cells of 
the honeycombs with water, while others flap their wings to generate a breeze, accelerating the evaporation 
of water and cooling down the hive. 
Warm-blooded animals maintain their bodies at constant temperatures with the help of various 
mechanisms. When it is cold, for example, the pores of the skin contract so that the skin loses less heat. 
Also, the hair or feathers fluff up in order to keep in heat. If this does not work, and the animal is becoming 
cold, it begins to shiver, increasing considerably the production of heat by the body. When it is hot, warm-
blooded animals cool themselves through sweating or panting, which cause water to evaporate from the 
skin or the tongue. These mechanisms, of course, work well within certain ranges of temperature, outside 
of which the animal finds it more and more difficult to function. 
Reflections on the Capability of Making Precise Measurements 
One of the capabilities scientists must possess is that of measuring the many quantities they study with the 
necessary precision. To develop this capability, one must understand a number of concepts, acquire certain skills, 
and also be willing to carry out the required work with diligence and care. There is a great deal to be said on the 
subject of measurement in science; here, we only ask you to reflect on a couple of questions. Is it possible to make 
an exact measurement of any quantity? Can one, for example, measure the temperature of an object exactly? If you 
rightfully determine that exact measurements are impossible, you may wish to go on and ask: how would one decide 
the precision with which a measurement should be made? This is not an easy question and it may be best if you 
address it through an example. Identify with your group a number of situations in which the temperature of 
something has to be measured. In each case, determine how precise the measurement has to be. Are there situations, 
for instance, in which it is sufficient to know the temperature of something within four or five degrees? Is it 
necessary sometimes to know the temperature of an object within a tenth of a degree? Once you have examined 
several cases, try to discuss how you went about determining the precision with which one needs to measure 
temperature in each case. What factors influence such a decision? 
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4 Heat 
Temperature is the first concept we have learned to quantify and measure in our study of the process of the heating 
and cooling of matter. A second concept, equally basic, arises from the observation that something seems to flow 
from a hot object to a cold one when they are in contact. What is it that flows? Throughout history, scientists have 
had various answers to this question, but the one accepted today is that what flows is a form of energy we call heat. 
Energy is one of the most fundamental concepts with which scientists work and you will encounter it time and again 
in the course of your studies. For the time being, let us simply say that when we heat something, we are giving it 
more energy, which causes its temperature to rise. 
There are various ways in which heat can move from 
one object or place to another. We already referred to the 
transfer of heat when we were making general observations 
related to the process of the heating and cooling of things. We 
can now make our observation statements a little more precise. 
When a hot object touches a cold one, heat flows directly from 
the hotter to the colder object until they reach the same 
temperature. This form of heat transfer is called conduction. 
Take a rod of metal and a stick and put one end of each into a 
pot of very hot water for a few minutes. What happens when 
you touch the end of the wood? What would happen if you 
touched the metal? Which is a better conductor of heat, wood 
or metal? Heat, then, does not flow through all materials at the same rate. Find a number of different substances and, 
based on observations you have made in everyday life, compare their heat conductivities. Try to order them 
according to their conductivity. 
Conduction is not the only way in which heat moves. For example, the sun is a very 
hot object, and its heat reaches us even though we are not directly in contact with it. How 
does this happen? Heat is carried by the rays of the sun, and this form of heat transfer is 
called radiation. Can you think of other examples in which heat moves by radiation? When 
you put your hand near the hot burner of a stove, or near the flame of a candle, your hand 
becomes warmer even though you are not touching the hot objects. Is heat being transferred 
by radiation in these cases? 
Imagine now that you are standing some distance away from a large bonfire. You are far enough that you 
cannot feel the heat radiating from it, but from time to time a very warm breeze comes your way from the fire. This 
happens because the fire heats the air around it, and that body of air moves. This type of heat transfer is called 
convection. Convection occurs when a heated body of air, of some other gas, or of some liquid moves and carries 
heat from one place to another. Can you think of additional examples in which heat moves by convection? 
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- 1.11 Stirrer 
Insulating material --- 
The statements we have made about heat up to now are all qualitative. In 
order to make quantitative statements about heat, we need to learn to measure it. 
Doing so is the next step we must take in our study of the process of heating and 
cooling of matter. 
To measure heat, we first need to decide upon a unit. We know that if we 
add heat to any substance its temperature will increase, and we will use this fact to 
define our unit. We will say that one unit of heat is equal to the amount of heat it 
takes to raise the temperature of 1 gram of water by 1°C. This unit is called the 
calorie. How many calories does it take to increase the temperature of 1 gram of 
water by 10°C? How many calories are needed to increase the temperature of 10 grams of water by 1°C? 
You are probably already familiar with the term calorie since we use it often in the context of the food we eat. 
What does it mean that 100 grams of one food has more calories than 100 grams of another? Which has more 
calories, 1 gram of sugar or 1 gram of fat? 
In order to better understand how we measure heat, consider the following description of a simple experiment, 
in which an instrument called a calorimeter is used. This device is simply a lidded metal can surrounded by 
Styrofoam or some other insulating material, so that whatever is inside the calorimeter cannot lose heat to the 
outside quickly. A small hole in the top of the can allows for a thermometer to be placed inside. In this way, 
temperature changes within the calorimeter can be recorded. 
We begin our experiment by heating 150 grams of water to a temperature of 25°C and pouring it into the 
calorimeter. We then heat another 100 grams of water to 80°C and add this to the water already in the calorimeter. 
After a time, we observe that the mixture settles at a temperature of 47°C. Let us think about the meaning of these 
results. Did the water that started at 25°C gain or lose heat during the experiment? What about the water that started 
at 80°C? How might we calculate the number of calories gained or lost by each quantity of water? Should the heat 
gained by one quantity of water be equal to the heat lost by the other? 
Let us calculate how many calories were gained by the 150 grams of water. Since the 150 grams of water 
started at 25°C and ended up at 47°C, its temperature increased by 47 — 25 = 22°C. We know that it takes 22 calories 
for 1 gram of water to increase its temperature by 22°C. For 150 grams of water to go up by 22°C, therefore, it takes 
150 x 22 = 3300 calories. What about the 100 grams of water? How many calories did it lose? This quantity of 
water started at 80°C and went down to 47°C, a decrease of 80 — 47 = 33°C. When the temperature of 1 gram of 
water drops 33°C, it loses 33 calories. When 100 grams of water drops 33°C in temperature, then, it loses 100 x 33 
= 3300 calories. As expected, this is exactly the amount of heat gained by the 150 grams of water. This can be 
summarized in the following table: 
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Heat exchange between two amounts of water 
Amount of 
Water 
Initial 
Temperature 
Final 
Temperature 
Change in 
Temperature 
Calories Lost or 
Gained 
100 gr 80°C 47°C 33°C Decrease 100 x 33 = 3300 
calories lost 
150 gr 25°C 47°C 22°C Increase 150 x 22 = 3300 
calories gained 
In order to practice this way of measuring heat, construct a calorimeter and perform two or three experiments 
similar to the one just described. Use different amounts of water at various temperatures and in each case calculate 
how many calories are gained or lost by each quantity of water. When measuring the weight of the water, it will be 
useful for you to know that 1 gram of water is exactly equal to 1 cubic centimeter of water, which is in turn equal to 
1 milliliter. To obtain 100 grams of water then, you do not need to weigh it; you can simply measure 100 milliliters 
with a measuring cup. You can use the following tables to help organize your data: 
Experiment 1 
Amount of 
Water 
Initial 
Temperature 
Final 
Temperature 
Change in 
Temperature 
Calories Lost or 
Gained 
Experiment 2 
Amount of 
Water 
Initial 
Temperature 
Final 
Temperature 
Change in 
Temperature 
Calories Lost or 
Gained 
Now, if we give the same amount of heat to 1 gram of two different substances, do you think the temperature 
will rise equally in both? If you bring to mind the many occasions in which you have observed various objects being 
heated, you will readily reach the conclusion that the answer to this question is negative. The same amount of heat 
given, say, to 1 gram of iron and 1 gram of wood will cause their temperatures to rise by different amounts. By the 
same token, it takes different amounts of heat to raise the temperature of 1 gram of each of these two substances by 
one degree. 
The amount of heat required to raise the temperature of 1 gram of a substance by 1°C is a property specific to 
that substance. It is called the specific heat of the substance, and it is a quantity the study of which has helped 
scientists gain insights into the process of the heating and cooling of matter. 
Based on what we have just said, what is the specific heat of water? If we want to know the specific heat of a 
substance other than water, such as, say, copper, how would we figure it out? Let us describe an experiment, using 
the calorimeter, as an example of how the specific heat of many substances can be measured. 
We begin by taking 120 grams of water, heating it to 25°C, and pouring it into the calorimeter. Then we 
place a piece of copper weighing 200 grams into a pot of water and heat the water until it reaches a temperature of 
90°C. At this point, what is the temperature of the piece of copper? We remove the piece of copper from the water 
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and quickly place it inside the calorimeter. After a time, the temperature of the water in the calorimeter rises to 
33.5°C. 
From this information, we can calculate the specific heat of copper. First, we need to figure out how much 
heat was gained by the water in the calorimeter. We know that the 120 grams of water went from 25°C to 33.5°C, 
which is a change in temperature of 8.5 degrees. The heat required for 120 grams of water to increase in temperature 
by 8.5°C are 120 x 8.5 = 1020 calories. This is the total number of calories gained by the water, as well as the total 
number of calories lost by the piece of copper. Now we know that the 200 grams of copper loses 1020 calories when 
its temperature drops from 90°C to 33.5°C, a change of 56.5 degrees. What we really want to know is how many 
calories the copper loses when its temperature drops 1°C, so we divide 1020 calories by 56.5 degrees. This gives 
18.5 calories per degree, which is the heat lost by 200 grams of copper each time its temperature drops 1°C. To 
figure out how much heat is lost by 1 gram of the copper for each 1°C drop in temperature, we divide 18.5 by 200, 
obtaining 0.09. This is the specific heat of copper. If 1 gram of copper gives away 0.09 calories, its temperature 
drops by 1°C, and if we give 0.09 calories to 1 gram of copper, its temperature will increase by 1°C. This 
information can be organized in table format: 
Specific heat exchange of a substance 
Substance Initial 
Temperatures 
Final 
Temperatures 
Change in 
Temperatures 
Calories 
Lost or 
Gained 
Specific Heat 
Calculation 
120 gr of 
water 
25°C 33.5°C 8.5°C Increase 1020 1 
200 gr 
of copper 90°C 33.5°C 
56.5°C 
Decrease 
1020 
Specific heat: 
1020/56.5 = 18.5/.09 = 200 
Using your calorimeter and following the procedure outlined above, find the specific heat of one or two other 
substances such as wood, iron, or lead. Organize your data using the following tables: 
Substance Initial 
Temperatures 
Final 
Temperatures 
Change in 
Temperatures 
Calories 
Lost or 
Gained 
Specific Heat 
Calculation 
Substance Initial 
Temperatures 
Final 
Temperatures 
Change in 
Temperatures 
Calories 
Lost or 
Gained 
Specific Heat 
Calculation 
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11 Extension 
1. Decide whether the following statements are true or false: 
a. When two objects at different temperatures are put in contact, 
heat flows from one to the other until they 
reach the same temperature. 
b. All materials conduct heat at the same rate. 
c. Metal is a better conductor of heat than plastic. 
d. Conduction occurs when a body of air carries heat 
from one place to another. 
e. For heat to move from one object to another by radiation, 
the two objects must be touching. 
f. When two quantities of water at two different 
temperatures are mixed together, the heat gained by one 
quantity of water is equal to the heat lost by the other. 
g. It takes more heat to raise the temperature of 1 gram 
of water by 1°C than it does to raise 1 gram of copper 
by 10°C. 
h. The amount of heat required to raise the temperature 
of 1 gram of a substance by 1°C is a called the specific 
heat of that substance. 
i. The calorie is a unit of temperature. 
j. Heat and temperature are the same thing. 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
TO FO 
2. For each of the situations below, indicate how heat is being transferred: by conduction, convection, or 
radiation. 
Conduction Convection Radiation 
a. A piece of metal is heated by the sun. 
b. A piece of metal is heated in an oven. 
c. An ice cube is put into a glass of water to cool 
the water down. 
d. A person warms up on a cold night by sitting 
in front of a fire. 
e. A shirt is pressed with a hot iron. 
f. On a hot day, a person sitting in the shade 
is feeling very warm. 
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g. A hot water bottle warms up an aching muscle. 
h. Passing next to a large bonfire, 
a person feels a great deal of heat. 
3. The table below lists various substances and the specific heat of each. The values for paper and 
wood are approximate. Examine the table carefully and carry out the exercise that follows. 
SUBSTANCE 
	 SPECIFIC HEAT 
(CALORIES/GRAM °C) 
Calcium 	 0.155 
Copper 	 0.092 
Gold 	 0.031 
Iron 	 0.107 
Nickel 	 0.106 
Paper 	 0.600 
Silver 	 0.056 
Sodium 	 0.293 
Tin 	 0.054 
Water 	 1.000 
Wood 	 0.420 
a. If the following substances all have the same mass, which will become the hottest when put in the sun for 
the same amount of time: water, a piece of wood, a piece of tin, or a paperback book? 
b. Which of the following substances has the greatest specific heat: iron, copper, gold, or silver? 
c. Order these substances according to their specific heats, from largest to smallest: paper, calcium, water, 
gold, tin, nickel. 
d. How many calories are required to raise the temperature of the following by 1°C? 
47 grams of water: 	 calories 
10 grams of sodium: 	 calories 
30 grams of silver: 	 calories 
100 grams of wood: 	 calories 
20 grams of copper: 	 calories 
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4. Answer the following questions: 
a. Suppose we put 40 grams of water at 20°C in a calorimeter, and add to it 10 grams of water at 50°C. The 
final temperature of the mixture is 26°C. How many calories are gained by the 40 grams of water? How 
many are lost by the 10 grams of water? 
b. We now put 20 grams of water in a calorimeter, and add to it 50 grams of water at 24°C. The final 
temperature of the mixture is 20°C. What was the initial temperature of the 20 grams of water? 
c. Suppose we have 44 grams of water at 18°C in a calorimeter, and we add a certain amount of water at 
26°C. The final temperature of the mixture is 24°C. How many grams of water at 26°C were added to the 
calorimeter? 
Reflections on the Concepts of Temperature and Heat 
Imagine that you fill two containers with cold water. One is a plastic cup holding 50 grams of water and the other is 
a large plastic bucket containing 10,000 grams of water. You let the cup and the bucket sit for a while until they 
reach room temperature, and then you measure the temperature of water in each and find that they are both exactly 
25°C. You then heat up the water in the cup and the bucket enough for each to reach a temperature of 50°C. From 
what you have learned in this lesson, you know that while the temperatures of the two bodies of water, both initially 
and finally, were the same, the amount of heat that it took to raise their temperatures differed greatly. It is clear that, 
although related, temperature and heat represent two entirely different concepts. Temperature is a measure of how 
hot or cold things are, while heat is something that seems to flow in or out of an object to raise or lower its 
temperature. Yet, in everyday conversation, the words heat and temperature are often interchanged. In each pair of 
sentences below, mark the one in which words related to temperature and heat are used correctly in a scientific sense. 
My mother asked me to raise the heat in the oven by 50 degrees. 
My mother asked me to raise the temperature in the oven by 50 degrees. 
The heat from the radiator warms the room. 
The temperature coming from the radiator warms the room. 
The heat in the room is overbearing. 
The temperature in the room is overbearing. 
Terms associated with temperature and heat are often used figuratively. For example, in the sentence "He is 
hot-tempered", the word hot does not refer to temperature, but to the person's state of being. Examine the sentences 
below and mark those that use words related to temperature and heat in a figurative way. 
It was a chilly day. 
The atmosphere of the meeting turned chilly when he began to criticize everything. 
The policeman told the angry driver to cool down. 
The nurse prepared a tepid bath for the newborn. 
She was lukewarm about the idea. 
He gave me the cold shoulder. 
The discussions of the town council started to heat up when the subject of the new factory was raised. 
It really burns me up when I see such injustice. 
They live in a temperate climate. 
I like hot, spicy food. 
The room was painted a warm red. 
The room is too warm; please open the window and let some fresh air in. 
She has a warm smile. 
His fever broke during the night, and his temperature was normal by the next morning. 
The newspaper was hot off the press. 
He poured her a hot cup of tea. 
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APPENDIX 3 
In her thesis, Dr. M Roosta reflects on the interviews she held with the students, tutors and a 
coordinator of FUNDAEC's Systema de Aprendizage Tutelar (SAT) in the context of empowerment. 
These students' narratives address several empowering seeds in their learning process. Through teaching 
methodology, students are encouraged to take responsibility and to actively participate in their learning. 
Delivering the core message of education, curriculum encourages students to reflect on the internal and external 
forces that shape their community life. And it requires them to get involved in the life of the community. The 
discussion of the nature of human being and its inherent qualities constantly invites students to critically examine 
the prevalent theories regarding the peasants as an obvious obstacle to development. The eminent pedagogical 
character of empowering is illustrated in students' statements. 
However, these empowering seeds in the learning process need to be nurtured. To have the idea of 
empowerment embedded both in curriculum and in methodology is crucial. Nevertheless, true learning and 
transformation require a strong action-reflection process. Students need to learn in real-life experience what it is 
like to participate in community development and what it is like to foster a change process in the community. 
The SAT program provides a social space with different real-life experience learning potentialities. 
Working as SAT tutors, students at this university center have the opportunity to learn through long-term 
interaction with the community residents. At the same time, participation with villagers in different projects 
paves the path toward knowledge generation and application in the community. These explain why students refer 
to SAT as an inherent part of the university program. 
Below are a few lines from some of Roosta's interviews: 
A student who had finished high school before becoming associated with FUNDAEC's program made the following 
statement: 
...Moreover when I finished the secondary school, I had no real vision and didn't have a very good 
relationship with my community in spite of the fact that I had always worked with them. But there wasn't 
a connection with the community. So I had the idea to leave the village and go to the city because there 
was employment and money.... 
...Later I started to work at SAT. Really, it was there that I started to discover a great connection to the 
community. I very much liked the area that is called "service to the community" in the SAT system, in 
which I started to wake up... A moment arrived in which I said, "I am useful to people," because I hadn't 
done it before. It was then that I started to have a great love for the program.... 
The attitude with which the students are to approach community service is discernible from the following comments 
made by one of them: 
In the texts of FUNDAEC, something very important is the agricultural project. Agricultural projects are 
formidable, because the community has more experience [with them]. So one has to give them parameters 
and be prepared. They already know that one has to learn from them. At first, they are teaching and I am 
learning. For example, I knows that one has to make holes in the earth to the depth of 40 centimeters to 
plant carrots. I am teaching them this, but I know that in reality they are teaching me. To me this is very 
important.... 
That service to the community is intimately connected with their own spiritual development was not lost to the students 
as the following passages from various interviews clearly demonstrate: 
...I think that is fundamental. The most wonderful thing is that I am grateful for my life and grateful to 
God who gave me this opportunity to grow as a human being and of being conscious that what I was doing 
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was useful for society. I was developing indispensable human values that I needed. This restlessness 
never would have awakened inside of me in the university where I had been. I would have never asked 
myself who I was and how useful could I be to society. Here they do that daily. 
"Human development" is the expression another student used to describe the spiritual foundation of the curriculum: 
Well, when one starts at SAT, he begins to like the methodology, starts to like the ease with which one can 
study. Later after a year, it is not only the methodology and economy, but the fact that one begins to 
realize that this is personal development, human development. [Later during university program it 
becomes clearer] that the methodology is secondary, the economy is secondary. Human development is 
primary. Then this is what one likes the most. And one starts this way because it would be impossible 
and a lie to say at first that what one likes best is human development. When one enters into one of the 
programs, one is unfocused, disconnected. What one ends up liking the most and identifying with most is 
the human development. This is what defines the program. 
Another student stated: 
You see, in elementary school that is the elementary education that I received, the first education that I 
received was very quantitative. It was concerned mainly with performance. That is the way that had been 
developed to measure knowledge, right? But this education is more concerned with values, with 
capabilities that one has. And it never tries to underestimate students or compare them, not at all. There is 
a beautiful equality. Clearly what they say here is true. There is unity in diversity. Of course, everyone 
wants to be equal, always respecting our ideals. 
And another: 
Human formation would be first of all equality of values. This is extremely important. Then [comes] 
spiritual formation, understanding that I am a person with a physical part and a spiritual part. And that in 
the moment that I balance the physical and spiritual, I am an integrated human. This is fundamental. Then 
when I speak of what is human formation, I speak of values, of spiritual formation. From this, one finds 
the will, love, appreciation, and sincerity. 
That religious dogma is not preached at the university has allowed a program that is clearly inspired by Band'i belief to 
prosper in a Catholic environment: 
The spiritual formation I feel is more like an appreciation toward what one sees, like when I find a small 
tree over there. Therefore, there are no dogmas... In this university, they never have said that I have to 
believe in this, or that you have to be like this in order to have spiritual formation. No! To me, I have 
simply been taught to love, from the very small to the most profound the essence of that small tree, of this 
animal, of this person. This is what I refer to as spirituality.... 
This is the way the coordinator of the program in Apia expressed his understanding of human formation: 
I believe that they [the spiritual values] are not so abstract. This is a very important thing, and we see them 
operating, and we see--we start to find it in the first text of FUNDAEC in a very integrated way. And we 
talk, for example, of veracity, of justice, of honesty, of love. There is a series of potentialities that are 
operative that are expressed through concrete action. It is interesting, to mention one example, and this 
came as a surprise to me, when at the Practitioner level, we enter into a supposedly technical part of 
designing a project, to plan the work for the project, where all technical issues are expected. [But first] we 
all reflect on some problems that can prevent a project from being advanced. If there is not, especially 
among the group, coherence, if there is no respect, affection, and closeness among people, and if there is 
no honesty on the part of all participants, the spirit of sacrifice and all of that, .the project does not get 
anywhere, no matter how well we had identified the problem and how well we had designed the project. 
This is needed before the technical part, before identifying the problem, how to prioritize, how to look for 
solutions, how to start with resources and to plan the activities.... 
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One of the students interviewed summed up the challenge of human development in this way: 
"Regard man as a mine rich in gems of inestimable value. Education can, alone, cause it to reveal its 
treasures and enable mankind to benefit therefrom." This is the message that to me is the most interesting 
in FUNDAEC. For nine years I have liked this, have liked to listen to this. It has fascinated me. Because it 
is real. It is real. It is what one is! 
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